THE NATION-STATE’S BLURRED BORDERS: 
ERDOĞAN AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
KURDISTAN IN TURKEY

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Turkey’s history with its large Kurdish community has been an unhappy one. Established as a nominally secular and ethnically Turkish nation-state, the Turkish Republic has been exclusionary and discriminatory against non-Turks from its very inception in 1923. Regarding the Kurds, it followed a complex strategy of denial and forced assimilation on one side and military containment and police violence against Kurdish identity based movements on the other. Since the 1990s, when extreme oppression triggered a major Kurdish nationalist revolt in the country’s Southeast, close to 50,000 combatants and mostly Kurdish civilians died (cf. Öktem 2012a, Gunter 2008, Meiselas 2008, Romano 2006). Pro-Kurdish parties, which began to run for office in the mid-1990s created a political space for opposition, yet suffered massive political repression, not least under the ruling government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Cf. Watts 2010).

When Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan initiated a “peace process” in 2012 many observers sensed a historic turn in Turkey’s attitude towards the Kurds. They felt confirmed in March 2013, when an open letter by the incarcerated leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) Abdullah Öcalan that called for an end to armed struggle was read out in Turkish and Kurdish in Diyarbakir. Coinciding with the Newroz celebrations, an ancient festival that has become a major symbol for Kurdish nationalist mobilisation, the public delivery of Öcalan’s letter marked the high point of power of Turkey’s Kurdish nationalist movement. In November 2013, it was Erdogan, who chose Diyarbakir, the symbolic capital of Turkey’s Kurdish geography, to reinvigorate the peace process and to utter the term “Kurdistan”, if in a qualified fashion.²

The Turkish Prime Minister was not the only man on stage in Diyarbakir, though. In addition to two well-known Kurdish singers,³ it was The Leader of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, Masoud Barzani, who stood out. Tens of thousands in the centre of Diyarbakir cheered the two leaders with Turkish and Kurdish flags. Slogans were saturated with the words ‘peace’, ‘brotherhood’ and ‘new beginning’ in both languages.

Erdogan’s Diyarbakir address was not the first example of a Turkish politician trying to engage with Turkey’s “Kurdish reality”, as another Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, had chosen to name it as early as in 1991. ⁴ And yet, there was something novel in this picture of Turkish-Kurdish friendship, which deserves a closer look: The fact that Turkey’s Prime Minister has chosen to locate the resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish challenge outside the borders of the Turkish nation state and within the framework of an unbounded territory which includes another country, i.e. Iraqi Kurdistan, and potentially Syria. This regionalisation of the country’s Kurdish question by Turkey’s decision makers, not as a

Executive Summary

2012-2013 has marked a significant departure from Turkey’s traditional Kurdish policy. This departure pertains above all to the actors involved and the larger political space in which it is negotiated. In terms of actors, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has introduced into the Turkish political system the Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani as an alternative to the incarcerated chair of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan. In terms of political space, leading figures of the AKP have increasingly resorted to a political language that transgresses the logic of the nation-state and instead suggests flexible, variable and softer borders between countries and people. While this proposition may resemble a shift towards liberal alternatives to the nation-state, I will suggest in this paper that both phenomena - the inclusion of external actors and the extension of Turkey’s political space - are representative of a form of governance that weakens the demos, i.e. the political space of the citizens’ of the Turkish Republic and limit its prospects not only for a resolution of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict but also for Turkey’s democratic consolidation.
side effect of regionalisation processes in the Middle East, but as a conscious political choice is a significant departure from the logic of the nation-state. This departure may appear as a liberal attempt to move beyond the narrow confines of the Turkish nation-state and towards a more inclusive polity. This policy, however, raises a set of new tensions, both for Turkey’s Kurds and for the future of Turkey as a nation-state.

In this brief, I argue that it is may be too early to throw out the baby of the nation-state, admittedly, a big and troubled one, with the bathwater of trans- or post-nationalism. Turkey’s Kurdish problem certainly has an inherent regional dimension, predicated upon the existence of major Kurdish populations divided by the territorial arrangements of the Sykes-Picot agreement and consolidated by the power balances after World War I. However, it is crucial to remember that Turkey’s Kurdish sphere was created by the Turkish nation-state. It was the nation-state that sought to oppress and assimilate the Kurds and that triggered revolts and opposition to these policies and, finally, also led to the emergence of a specifically Turkey-based Kurdish political movement. This movement, represented by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and the armed forces of the PKK, differ significantly from Kurdish movements in Iran and Iraq in both ideological references and forms of mobilization. Hence, I argue, Kurdish grievances can also only be solved convincingly within the framework of the Turkish nation-state, by the collective of the citizens of Turkey and its government on the basis of the legitimacy bestowed upon it by the demos of the republic.

**Demos, demois and democracy: The nation-state and its critics**

The role of the state in the study of politics has been a constant but volatile phenomenon, with frequently shifting emphases. In the mid-1980s, Theda Skocpol’s plea for “Bringing the state back in” (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985) testified to a shift away from society-centred theories of political inquiry to a renewed engagement with the state, its capabilities and its power mechanisms. Constructivist International Relations theory, and the literature on transnationalism and globalisation throughout the 1990s and 2000s suggested a gradual weakening and in some case, a dissolution of the nation-state in favour of the emergence of global governance and transnational actors. Despite these shifting perspectives, however, the realist mainstream in International Relations never left any doubt that the foremost actors of the international system are states. This view of the primacy of the nation-state also came to be recognized by constructivists like Varadarajan (2010), who theorized the re-emergence of the state even in those areas, where they were least expected: In the field of diasporas, which far from being independent actors, are increasingly structured and led by nation-states.

The persistence of the nation-state both in the politics and IR literatures, and in empirical reality, has had different reverberations in the Turkish case, and particularly in the critique of the Kemalist nation-state. This revisionist project, particularly in the social sciences and increasingly in history, deconstructed the Kemalist project of modernisation and its outcome, the Turkish nation-state, as a deeply illiberal and undemocratic form of governance that was built on the exclusion of large sections of society and on the oppression of any opposition directed against it, whether from ethnic or socialist groups (cf. Öktem 2012, Kadioğlu and Keyman 2011, Suny et. al 2011, Üngör 2011, Kieser 2006, Zürcher 1986).

This deconstruction of the Kemalist project from a post-nationalist angle is an important intellectual and political project in its own right. Yet, it has often been less interested in a crucial connection: The connection between the nation-state and democracy. No matter how much one might disapprove of the Turkish experience of nationhood, democracy, in principle, requires a bounded territory to thrive and a demos, or a people with voting rights, that is grounded in this territory. Without these premises, democratic
decision-making processes, the distribution of state budgets and the negotiation of consent and legitimacy face multiple challenges.

This model of the democratic nation-state, in which the demos of the voting people and territory coincide, is, to an extent, an ideal type that has ample exceptions. In the margins of democratic nations on political maps might suggest, boundaries are often much more permeable than the clearly demarcated lines of nation-states, as they are depicted on political maps, lines of nation-states on political maps might suggest. In the United Kingdom, for instance, citizens of Commonwealth countries are entitled to vote in national elections after fulfilling a minimum residence requirement. A key debate in the European Union is concerned with the “European demos” and whether Europe, one day, can become a single demos or a “democracy” (Nicolaidis, 2004), a “Union of peoples, understood both as states and as citizens, who govern together but not as one” (Nicolaidis, 2013: 351). So far, however, the European Union has not been able to move towards a common demos. The nation-states appear as the ultimate fall back options in times of crises.

It is only in smaller immigrant nations, or like Israel, in “settler colonialist states” (cf. Pappé 2011, 2008) where the demos is significantly larger than the population of its territory. In Israel, the demos encompasses potentially all Jews in the world and not only the citizens of Israel. Such disconnect between territory and demos poses significant tensions for a democratic polity, a circumstance that is reflected in the vast literature on “ethnocracy”. It suggests that the massive extension of the demos beyond the territories of the nation-state often comes at the expense of others, who live within the confines of the nation-state but lack equal citizenship rights, such as Palestinians in Israel proper, as well as in the occupied territories (cf. Yiftachel 2006, 1999; Smooha 2002).

It appears therefore that a democratic polity is predicated upon a relatively bounded territory. How this territory is governed, i.e. whether as centralized state, as a federal system or a confederation, is another question and not as important for our inquiry. What is essential, however, are the outer borders of the territory and the demos and the question who can make a legitimate claim to its political system. In a liberal state, the demos consists primarily of the citizens residing in that territory, independent of their racial, ethnic, linguistic, gender or religious affiliations. So, how can we make sense, then, of the shifting nation-state narrative, which the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader, Prime Minister Erdoğan, has employed over the last few years?

Blurring the boundaries and de-emphasizing the demos

The AKP’s rhetoric on Turkey’s new role in the world and in its overlapping neighbourhoods has been marked by a series of transgressions regarding the logic of the nation-state and its bounded territory. The foundations of this transgressive perspective can be found in Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s doctrines of “Strategic Depth” and the now defunct “Zero Problems Policy with Neighbours”, as well as in the larger ideological background of Islamist political ideology, where the nation-state is seen as a Western-imposed anomaly (Cf. Davutoğlu 2001 and 1993 for both perspectives). Yet, whether rooted in political ideology, or the outcome of short-term political thinking, the narrative of Turkey as a state that has responsibilities and accepts claims beyond its borders has real effects on the conduct of politics.

The notion of Turkey as an actor beyond its borders has become most notable and most widely discussed with reference to the Balkans (Öktem 2012, 2011; Türbedar 2011, Petrović and Reljic 2011). In addition to a massive presence of Turkish development agencies, religious institutions and civil society organizations, Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu have been highly visible and audible in the Balkans. Both repeatedly made widely noted speeches, often steeped in religious and cultural symbolism, on Turkey’s
role and responsibility in the Balkans, and the importance of the Ottoman imperial legacy as a common heritage.

A brief methodological note may be appropriate here: Public speeches of leading political figures can easily be dismissed as ephemeral moments, in which political symbolism may run high. Hence, some would say, they do not provide for deeper insights into the workings of political processes. I would reply to this critique that such speeches are not only carefully written by an army of scriptwriters and vetted by advisers, they are also planned well in advance to achieve a certain political and symbolic effect in a particular place and a particular moment in time. They are therefore particularly meaningful sources that are replete with hints about deep-seated convictions, worldviews and ideologies, probably even more so than party programmes and official communications. On the basis of this assessment, I suggest a critical reading of some key utterances of Turkey’s most influential two leaders, Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.

During a recent visit to Prizren, Kosovo, Erdoğan began his address to a large crowd by emphasizing that “Kosovo is like our second home” and continued:

Do not forget that Turkey is Kosovo and Kosovo is Turkey. We are so close to each other that even the poet of Turkey’s National Hymn is from Kosovo, from Ipek.”

Prizren might be seen as an exception, as the city is still home to a sizeable Turkish community, and Turkish is widely understood among the now mostly Albanian residents of the city. Examples of this thinking beyond borders can, however, be multiplied with reference to many other Muslim majority countries in Turkey’s neighbourhood. The most interesting case is Syria, with whose leaders Turkey developed close neighbourly and strategic relations over the second half of the 2000s, only to end up on two opposing sides of the Syrian war after 2011.

Prime Minister Erdoğan, during a visit to Damascus in 2008, argued:

The Syrian and Turkish people are two brotherly people who, like flesh and nail, cannot be separated, cannot be imagined separately. ... To be frank, neither the word friendship, nor the word kinship is sufficient to define us.”

There is an inherent tension in this statement between the notion of one people that is united by ties stronger than kinship and the reality of two existing states. It would not be too much of a speculation to assume that those ties, which are stronger than friendship and kinship, are the religious ties between the Sunni Muslim communities on both sides of the border. Yet, the motive of (Sunni) Muslim solidarity, i.e. a form of ummah-based understanding of the world, is cautiously buried in the language of ties and kinship.

Such tensions between notions of unity and the reality of difference also surface in Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s speech on the occasion of the lifting of visas between Turkey and Syria in September 2009.

Today, I would like to make myself heard to the brotherly Syrian nation. Turkey is your second country and the Turkish people are ready to receive you with open arms.

Terms like “second country”, “second home”, “ties stronger than kinship”, “Kosovo is Turkey” suggest a logic of soft and negotiable rather than hard borders between countries and their peoples. This blurring of lines and the implicit transgression of the logic of the nation-state could be construed as a major departure from exclusivist notions of the Kemalist state experience and even as a post-nationalist turn. Many observers have indeed done so. Yet, the key question, which arises from this turn would ask “who belongs to the demos of Turkey” and “who has the right to speak as part of its body politic”, when the categories of citizenship become permeable? In other words, what happens if a
Kosovar, or a Syrian, can also be a Turk and hence also formulates claims to the political system or joins in its democratic politics?

Considering that as of December 2013, more than 550,000 Syrian refugees have entered Turkey, this is not a theoretical question. Members of Parliament of the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) have repeatedly voiced concerns over the allegation that Syrian refugees have been awarded fast track access to Turkish citizenship, insinuating that these newly naturalized citizens would vote for the AKP. The latest such enquiry was made in Parliament by CHP MP Birgül Ayman Güler in September 2013, in which she also proposed that Syrian refugees with newly acquired Turkish citizenship are being resettled in Izmir to shift the voting power in favour of the AKP. The enquiry was answered by the Interior Ministry, who categorically rejected any submission that Syrian nationals had been naturalized. The matter of citizenship granted to foreigners with close ties to the government re-emerged during the anti-corruption operation in December.

Establishing whether these enquiries are motivated by the ethno-nationalist mindset of some leading CHP members and their aversion to Arabs in general and Syrian refugees in particular, or whether they reflect a new reality on the ground is beyond the scope of this policy brief. What we can say, however, is that both circumstantial evidence circulating in the electronic media and public debate, as well as the ambiguity of the AKP discourse, which I have tried to outline above, have triggered a sense of unease among some sections of society about Turkey's demos and its limits.

Where is Kurdistan?

The transgression of the body politic's bounded space took on a more profound quality with the visit to Diyarbakır of the leader of Iraqi Kurdistan Masoud Barzani on 16 November 2013. This event shared discursive elements with the aforementioned Syrian and Balkan examples, but also possesses a novel dimension. Regarding the shared elements, excerpts from Prime Minister Erdoğan's speech are instructive:

*Diyarbakır, you city of Brotherhood, Diyarbakır. I salute you from my heart... I salute the entirety of our 81 provinces. I salute Diyarbakır's brother, Arbil. ...

Today, we welcome my friend Massoud Barzani, son of Mollah Moustafa Barzani here in Diyarbakır. In your presence, we salute our brothers in the Kurdistan Region of Northern Iraq. ....

In Arbil, we have felt like being in our own city. Now feel Diyarbakır as your own city. ...

If Diyarbakır is at peace, Arbil will be more peaceful, if Diyarbakır feels more peaceful, Qamishli will be more peaceful, if Diyarbakır lives in wealth and peace, Turkey will be wealthy and peaceful.*

The themes of kinship (brotherhood), interconnectedness, sameness and belonging reverberate with the Syrian and Kosovar examples. Most notably, the Prime Minister uses the term "Kurdistan" as first Turkish high-level politician since the 1930s, a theme which the Turkish media has commented on profusely. It has been suggested that Erdoğan was only referring to Iraqi Kurdistan. By now, however, it should have become apparent that in the political universe of the AKP those borders are neither primordial nor insurmountable, but negotiable and soft, at least in principle.

The novel element in the transgression of the nation-state logic can be found in the very fact that the political leader of a Kurdish entity outside Turkey was invited to address the Kurds of Diyarbakır. The current political context matters: Turkey is readying itself for the March 2014 local elections, and Erdoğan's Diyarbakır appearance marked the launch of the AKP's election campaign. After almost a year of lukewarm negotiations with the incarcerated Kurdish nationalist leader Abdullah Öcalan and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy
Party (BDP), the Kurdish “peace process” had slowed down significantly and the party’s prospects in Turkey’s Kurdish provinces were diminishing fast. By inviting the most respected and powerful Kurdish politician outside Turkey, Erdoğan addressed two challenges: In one stroke, he demonstrated to the Kurdish electorate his continued commitment to the peace process and he took a major step to weaken Kurdish nationalist actors in Turkey (including Öcalan and the BDP), by introducing an alternative actor (Barzani), who is more sympathetic to the current Turkish government and also shares its Sunni Muslim tradition and the AKP’s social conservatism.

All these steps are largely coherent with the government’s earlier policies of a qualified engagement with Turkey’s Kurds, marked by a gradual granting of rights while seeking to undermine the influence of the Kurdish national movement in Turkey by continued repression (cf. Casier, Jongerdeen and Walker 2011, Kirişçi 2011, Larrabee and Tol 2011, Somer and Liaras, 2010). These cautious reform steps have been accompanied by some voices in pro-government conservative papers and close to the Hizmet network of Fethullah Gülen that Turkish-Kurdish cooperation (with Iraq) could evolve into some form of federal arrangement. Yet, by introducing, on the highest level, Masoud Barzani as an alternative leader to Abdullah Öcalan, Erdoğan has not only extended the body politic in the sense of the demos as the electorate, but also in the sense of those who have a legitimate claim on playing a political role in Turkey. Thereby, and in the case of Diyarbakır, the limits of the demos are now blurred on both levels of the voting public and of its potential leaders.

Conclusion: Post-national turn or Machiavellian electioneering?

What does the blurring of borders mean for Turkey’s democratic future? First of all, we need to remember that Barzani’s political track-record is an ambiguous one, which involves quite a few examples of Machiavellian zero-sum games. In the past, the peshmerga forces under his command have repeatedly fought against Turkey’s Kurdish national movement together with the Turkish army. And neither can the political entity, which he presides over, the Kurdistan Regional Government, be described as a consolidated democracy. So, the choice of Barzani as a key ally for Turkey’s Kurdish policy is hard to make if your foremost goal is advance democratic transition.

Turkey’s public space has been inundated with commentaries and debates on the Diyarbakır visit, and the range of opinions was far too wide to be adequately summarized in the confines of this brief. Suffice to say that it ranged from unfettered enthusiasm about Prime Minister Erdoğan’s “historic step” (pro-government newspapers), via cautious optimism (some liberals) and cautious approval (less nationalist Kurds) to scepticism and fear of division (Kurds of the Nationalist movement) and, finally, to outright rejection and hostility (the nationalist opposition, i.e. the CHP and the Nationalist Action Party). Yet others suggested that this was a cynical power play of the government to attract the Kurdish vote for the upcoming electoral cycle. Very few, however, asked what this all means for Turkey’s future as a democratic state. I believe that this is indeed the crucial and most formidable challenge.

As I have sought to demonstrate, the Turkish government’s rhetoric, most lucidly represented in Erdoğan’s public speeches, blurs the boundaries of Turkey’s demos by discursively recasting borders between countries and by inviting actors from outside Turkey’s political system. Whether it does so due to the tradition of anti-Kemalist and anti-Western nation-state thinking in Turkey’s mainstream Islamist tradition, due to Machiavellian power politics or short-term electioneering, or even due to a sincere attempt to find a solution to Kurdish grievances, is a question that deserves to be debated in detail.

Yet, no matter what the motivation is, the blurring of borders will have some inescapable effects.
By introducing external actors such as the leader of the Kurdistan Regional Government Masoud Barzani, the AKP government seeks to marginalise the representatives of the Kurdish national movement in Turkey, even though it is unlikely that this policy will bear fruits. More importantly, the demos of Turkey, made up of Turks and Kurds and members of all national, religious, social and other groups, and hence, the potential of Turkey as a democratic polity of equal citizens will be significantly weakened.

The decoupling of demos and territory has its risks. It allows for personalised rule and robust authoritarian power arrangements. While the nation state and its ambivalence in the context of globalisation and transnationalisation is being debated in the literature as well as in politics, some actors in Turkey may wish to remember that a volatile power set-up with blurred territorial borders and limited democratic rights is unlikely to lead to a liberal arrangement. In fact, it is much more likely to pave the way for a substantial turn towards authoritarianism and the weakening of the demos. It also creates a space of possibilities for continued adventures in the sphere of foreign policy.

As I suggested at the outset of this paper, and as the literature of International Relations theory reminds us, the international system remains to be based on states, and democracy continues to rest on a clearly distinguishable voting public, which has a credible claim for political representation and a common, if differentiated history of achievement, inclusion and exclusion. A more inclusive nation-state that is based on more flexible regional power arrangements but pays credit to the demos and its rights is infinitely more desirable than a semi-imperial openness towards the ill-defined and unrealistic notion of Muslim solidarity advocated by an authoritarian leader.
END NOTES

1 | I would like to thank Prof. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, whose critical question during a conference at Sabancı University sparked my interest in discussing the nation-state as part of a solution of the Kurdish conflict rather than its obstacle.

2 | It is very likely that Erdoğan’s Diyarbakır appearance in November was a tit for tat and an opportunity to take back the symbolic presence, which the PKK leader had established with his peace letter.

3 | The singers in question were Ibrahim Tatlıses and Şivan Perwer, representing two opposite ends of Kurdish trajectories in Turkey. Tatlıses has made his entire career in the popular music environment of Turkey, often at the cost of deemphasizing his Kurdish background. Perwer became a Kurdish protest musician, who was forced to leave his country in 1975 and had since not set foot in Turkey until his Diyarbakır performance.


10 | In Hatay province, such narratives circulate very widely. Considering that many other such local narratives (Turkish state support for Jihadi fighters in Syria, collusion with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, treatment of Jihadi fighters in Turkish hospitals across the borders) are now known to be true, the suggestion that at least some Syrian refugees might have been granted citizenship cannot be dismissed outright.

11 | Especially members of Turkey’s Arabic speaking Alawi community, which maintains familial ties with Syria’s Alawites, and Turkey’s syncretistic Alevi feel unease about the openness, with which Sunni Syrians refugees have been welcomed in Turkey.


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