FROM AUTONOMY TO FULL-FLEDGED CIVILIAN CONTROL:
THE CHANGING NATURE OF TURKISH CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AFTER JULY 15

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August 2016

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Introduction

The night of July 15 will forever be imprinted in the collective memory of Turkish citizens as a night of chaos, horror, and fear. As the so-called “Peace in the Country Council” declared power via state television channel TRT, the fury of helicopters and the abrasive murmur of F-16s over Istanbul and Ankara mixed with a roar of uncertainty across Turkey. Memories of previous coups danced through the minds of those who had lived through the treachery of martial law, torture, and worse—the suspension of everyday life.

Shocked, frantic, and disillusioned, the night of the attempted coup citizens fled to the streets to gather the essentials—collecting tens of thousands of Turkish liras in cash from ATMs, taking the last scraps of bread from the bakeries, and crowding the few local markets open after midnight—seemingly readying for an apocalypse of the state. Some, however, grabbed their flags and took to the streets to resist, unwilling to endure what would be a fifth coup in the Republic of Turkey. For the vast majority of the crowd, live broadcast of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s FaceTime call on CNN Türk mobilizing civilians to go out on the streets to protest the coup had prepared the battleground. This was the ultimate call to arms to protect the decades-long civilianization of Turkey. The people were called for the first time to elevate their role as the new guardians of democracy after decades of military praetorianism. And it was these new guardians who won, who proved that civilian control of the military would not be reversed.

As after every battle won or lost, a strategic turning point is now before Turkey. On the heels of the military coup, will Turkey continue on a path toward general democratic civilianization of the armed forces, or will it subdue the military to the point of inactivity? The question of “how to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to do with the military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do” reflects a long-standing debate in political science. Peter Feaver calls this paradox the “civil-military problematique.” That is, because we fear others, we create an institution of violence to protect us but then we fear the very institution we have created for protection. This implies the need to have protection both “by” and “from” the military.

On the night of July 15, Turkey bitterly experienced the latter need, the need to have protection from the military. On this night, Turkey passed a major democracy test that included a coup attempt, the worst terror ever against its citizens, disproportionate use of military power against government institutions, and extrajudicial execution attempts on the elected civilian elites. Thousands of Turkish citizens who took to the streets that night gave the clearest message: Those who came with elections will leave with elections. This package of violence on the night of July 15 saw the use of tanks, heavy armor, and assault helicopters and warplanes, mostly in Ankara and Istanbul; 240 civilians were killed, 1,440 were wounded, and another 104 coup forces were killed. Just after the failed coup attempt, a wave of detention began, and as of July 31, around 8,000 soldiers of various ranks, mostly conscript privates, were detained. According to a state of emergency decree law published in the Official Gazette late on July 31, all military schools in Turkey have been shut down, and 3,073 soldiers have been dismissed from the army over suspected links to the July 15 failed coup attempt. A revolutionary civilianization process has been spearheaded by the government with the aim of further decreasing the scope of the military in politics and society. In this regard, society itself has certainly passed a democracy test, but another pertinent question remains: have the manner and scope of the reforms on the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) democratized Turkish civil-military relations?

The speed and scale of the reforms have been both swift and strong. Opposition parties and military staff alike have objected to this broad stroke of reforms. There is a gap between civilianization and democratization that needs to be bridged.

Turkish civil-military relations (hereafter, CMR) are now at a critical juncture. A major paradigm shift has occurred. Turkish CMR is now experiencing a transition from a more Huntingtonian structure of CMR—that is, the professionalization of an autonomous army that is thought to remain apolitical by its very nature of autonomy—to a more Janowitzian structure—denying the existence of an auton-
omous military and instead bridging the gap between civilians and military. This paper will briefly rehash the events of July 15 as well as explain the subsequent military reforms in the weeks following the attempted coup. The paper will then illustrate both the old and the new paradigm, which will then lead to a discussion of the possible implications of such a hasty and large-scale reform process.

What happened the night of July 15?

For civilians, the first sign of the turmoil came around 10:00 pm on July 15 as tanks occupied the two Bosporus bridges and low flying F-16s were deployed over central Istanbul and Ankara, later bombing a number of buildings around the capital including the Grand National Assembly. For officials, the first signs of the coup came as early as Friday afternoon. Around 4:00 pm, the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MİT) had intercepted messages from the futureputschists, explaining the abnormal activity detected around military bases the day before.5 Within one hour, MİT's chief intelligence officer Hakan Fidan had warned Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar of a coup attempt to take place later that night. It was not long after this, around 7:00 pm, that Akar himself was taken hostage by the coup plotters, capturing him in his office and insisting, while holding him at gunpoint, that he read aloud the coup declaration before national television. After Akar refused to participate in the operation, the plotters took matters into their own hands only to be foiled by commander of the Istanbul First Army General Ümit Dündar, who reported to President Erdoğan that a coup was unfolding outside the TSK chain of command. By 11:00 pm, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım had echoed the general's words on national television. A coup against the government and the top brass of the TSK had officially been launched. Although it seems as if President Erdoğan was the last to know about the coup, having been on holiday in the Mediterranean resort town of Marmaris, by 12:30 am he was able to connect to CNN Türk via mobile video-calling app FaceTime, not only decrying the legitimacy of the coup but also galvanizing the population to take to the streets. Within hours two major bombs had exploded in Turkey: one at Erdoğan's vacated resort within 30 minutes of Erdoğan's plight, a major oversight of the coup plotters, and another across Turkey as civilians rose from their armchairs, went out from their homes, and flooded the streets in protest.

Meanwhile, the battle continued throughout the night. The masses reached the squares, the Istanbul bridges, and the government buildings in Ankara. The putschists stood firm against the people, and confrontations between police and civilians against the soldiers flooded the stage with blood. The noise of gunshots ricocheted across the neighborhoods of central Istanbul and Ankara, as well as military areas. Pixilated television coverage showed a dark cloud of bodies amassed across the Bosporus bridge, both firing and strewn across the pavement. The coup was losing ground against the people and the police as civilians, both men and women, lie before the tanks. A defiant population became martyrs of the cause. Around 3:00 am, President Erdoğan arrived at Istanbul Atatürk Airport where he spoke at length against the coup and continued to call for more people to go to the streets, further demoralizing the coup plotters. By 6:00 am, the surviving contingent of soldiers surrendered at the Bosporus bridge. The coup had been defeated overnight.

Since 4:00 pm on July 15, an excess of intelligence and evidence has been surfacing linking the coup to the followers of Fethullah Gülen, known as Gülenists, and what is identified by the state as his “terrorist organization,” FETÖ (Fethullahist Terrorist Organization). Officials such as Energy Minister Berat Albayrak have claimed that upwards of 95% of Turkish citizens believe that FETÖ was behind the coup,6 while pollsters estimate that at least two-thirds of the population believe this to be true.7 In the week following the coup, scores of names on the government’s list of suspected FETÖ members matched with the lists of commanders and soldiers having taken part in the July 15 coup circulated via Whatsapp. Of course, other soldiers were obliged to join in the coup attempt—whether by orders or through calculated assumptions of officers seeking self-promotion—but the large majority of the suspected plotters have been branded as FETÖ members. Several key testimonies following the attempted coup have further implicated the Gülenists, as well as Gülen himself, and unraveled a small portion of the mystery surrounding Gülen’s
extended network within Turkey. The Gülenist organization was already declared a terrorist organization operating against the Turkish state prior to the coup. However, it was not until July 15 that the true intentions of the organization were exploited.

The Revolutionary Civilianization Process after July 15

The reforms that have taken place within the TSK following July 15, with particular emphasis on the meeting of the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) on July 28 and the purges of July 27 and July 31, have been the government’s largest recourse for action against the attempted military coup. The reforms can be summarized and categorized as follows:

Reforms in the military-government relationship: Such reforms were first seen with the announcement that the annual meeting of YAŞ, previously scheduled for the first three days of August, would be moved up to July 28 and condensed within one day. The annual meeting of the council is designed to discuss the promotion and retirement of military personnel, a particularly fateful subject on the heels of an attempted coup. A symbolic change in the meeting’s location took place: instead of convening at the headquarters of the general staff, which had been compromised during the coup, the meeting was held at Çankaya Palace, the residence of the prime minister and a symbol of civilianization. Prior to the meeting, purges in the TSK began on July 27 under a state of emergency decree law. With the dismissal of 1,684 ranking officers, nearly 44% of Land Force generals, 42% of Air Force generals, and 58% of Navy admirals were formally discharged. By July 31, the total number of soldiers dismissed reached 3,073, and the number of soldiers of various ranks, mostly conscripted privates, detained stood at around 8,000. Further, the Gendarmerie Command and Coast Guard Command came under the control of the Ministry of Defense, and the Land Force, Navy, and Air Force were brought under the control of the Defense Ministry. The structure of YAŞ will now include a greater number of civilian representatives, including deputy prime ministers and the foreign, justice, and interior ministers, while dismissing a number of military officers.

Reforms in military education: All military schools in Turkey have been shut down, and an inclusive new National Defense University will be founded in their place.

Reforms in the military judicial system: Discipline of military judges and personnel transactions will go through the Ministry of Defense. Disciplinary action will go through the Ministry’s authority. This arrangement may in a second phase result in the complete removal of the military justice system.

Reforms ending the military’s privileged domains: All military hospitals will be placed under the Ministry of Health. Shipyards, factories, and industrial establishments in the hands of the TSK will be connected to the Ministry of Defense.

These institutional changes will be the focus of the TSK in the future. With greater civilianization of the armed forces comes greater cooperation with the civilian contingent of the state, both societal and governmental. For the study of Turkish CMR, what do all these reforms mean? The old paradigm has ended, and a new one has emerged. A grasp on Samuel Huntington’s and Morris Janowitz’s understandings of CMR is imperative to comprehend this shift.

From Huntington to Janowitz: The Changing Nature of Turkish CMR

The literature on CMR revolves around the nature of the relationship between what is civilian (governments, civil society, academia, media, think tanks) and what is military. To, again, reference Feaver, CMR “is a very broad subject, encompassing the entire range of relationships between the military and civilian society at every level.” It is mainly because of the problem of explaining the complex relationship between what is civilian and what is military that historians, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, and military strategists have all made important contributions to expand the scholarly grasp of the field. Work done by both Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz dating back 60 years is still relevant for contemporary debates regarding CMR. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State and Janowitz’s The Professional
Soldier not only methodically combined empirical research on CMR with systematic theorizing for the first time but also led to the emergence of different paths within research on CMR. That is, political science studies of CMR, on the one hand, have mostly followed Huntington’s tradition and are mostly concerned with the question of how civilian political leaders can maintain civilian control or the subordination of the military under the legitimate elected civilian leadership. Janowitz, on the other hand, concentrates more on the cultural norms, values, and societal factors affecting militaries and the relationship between the soldiers and civilians.

During the Cold War, Huntington proposed a solution to reconcile two apparently incompatible social imperatives: the need to construct an institution powerful enough to defend American society against the Soviet threat while at the same time ensuring civilian control so that this armed institution could not become a threat to society itself. Simply put, Huntington’s solution to this civil-military problematique was the maximization of the separation between what is military and what is civilian. According to Huntington, the way to achieve this is to foster “military professionalism,” which is the development of a genuine conservative military mindset focused on corporateness, social responsibility, and expertise in the management of violence.

The field of military sociology following Janowitz’s work, on the other hand, has been concerned with the reciprocal influence of military and society. In The Professional Soldier, Janowitz’s main message is that, just like other social subsystems, the military is subject to technological, socioeconomic, and political changes. Therefore, the role and missions, norms and values, and more importantly, self-perceptions of the military’s officer corps, as well as the function of the modern military institution itself, should not be considered as a “given fact” or constant but changed in line with the prevailing value system and dominant norms of the greater society. In this tradition, military sociologists focused on issues such as the bureaucratic organization of the military, the sociology of military personnel and their families, and racial and gender integration in the military. Particularly, Janowitz’s understanding of military professionalism may be useful in the Turkish case as it sees the institution of military both as a product of tradition and hierarchy and, maybe more importantly, as an agent shaped by its environment. This understanding provides for a more dynamic grasp of the military as a profession, as a security organization, and as a social institution because it gives officer corps agency and supposes that they are fully aware of their “influence” on politics and society in addition to being an actual product of them.

For over six decades both the Huntingtonian and Janowitzian approaches have remained primary points of references for much of scholarly research in the field of CMR. While military sociology that followed the Janowitzian tradition has become a well-established subdiscipline of mainstream sociology, the Huntingtonian strand has remained as the subdiscipline of the larger discipline of political science.

While Janowitz agrees with Huntington on separate characteristics of the military and civilian world, he differs from his predecessor on how the military would be denied from posing a threat to democracy and society from which, in fact, it was created. For Janowitz, the military world is conservative and always prone to resist societal changes; therefore, it is highly unlikely that the military will adapt to changes as fast as its society could. Janowitz challenges Huntington’s objective control and proposes outside intervention, or “subjective control” in Huntington’s words, as the most viable instrument that may facilitate the change of the military in a timely and effective manner. Janowitz, who then opposes Huntington’s primary assumption that sees the inherent gap between the military and the civilian as it is, seeks to shrink the gap either by civilianization of the military or the militarization of society. For Janowitz, the civilianization of the military, which means equipping the military with the norms and expectations of the society, is the wiser strategy in diminishing the gap. That is why he encourages the use of conscription and reserve officer training programs and the collaboration of military in universities in the realms of education and technological research so that the broadest level of society’s influence on the military may be settled. Simply put, for him, the more societal norms and attitudes are digested by the military, the smaller
the attitudinal and behavioral differences between these two worlds and consequently the greater the likelihood of establishing and maintaining civilian control over the military. Thus, the key difference between the two is that Huntington separates the civilian and military domains, but Janowitz defends the integration or entanglement of those domains. In sum, together Huntington and Janowitz define the civil-military playing field. Huntington implored civilians not to attack the conservative military culture, while Janowitz lamented the consequences of a conservative military drifting too far from civilian society.

**Old Paradigm: More Huntington, Less Janowitz**

The Turkish military has been an important actor since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923.\(^9\) Gareth Jenkins writes:

> The role of the military in Turkey is rooted in Turkish society, history and culture. The military has always lain at the heart of how Turks define themselves; and most still regard the institution of the military as the embodiment of the highest virtues of the nation.\(^{20}\)

In addition to its empowered status and pre-eminent role in Turkish socio-cultural life, the Turkish military was entrusted with laws recognizing its “special status.”\(^{21}\) The Turkish military, as Zeki Sangil puts it, “has had a special position of de facto veto player in the Turkish political system.”\(^{22}\)

During all interventions, the Turkish military adopted a profile for itself of being above politics, that is of being distant from fractional demands but certainly in defense of the state’s interests and for the sake of the whole nation. This may be defined as an illustration of a hegemony construction in Gramscian terms, in which the military disperses its values to the society and state’s bureaucratic machine by making the soldiers hegemonic and dominant in the political system but in a tacit way.

Ersel Aydınlı suggests that the nature of Turkish CMR reflected the centuries-long historical experience of the Ottoman Empire (and its gradual decline), a distressing War of Independence (1919-1923), a Cold War that was essentially quite hot in Turkey, and an enormous modernization project that was eventually adapted to the Turkish military itself.\(^{23}\) He then concludes that, after the initiation of the multi-party system in 1946, the Turkish military was never the army of a single party, and it was never the tool of radical politicians. Yet being a guardian, it was also never truly a predatory military that wanted permanent power possession with a long-term vision, always having returned power promptly to the civilians after the various military interventions. Along the same lines of Aydınlı, Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu highlights that after grasping the control of administrations, the military immediately assigned the power to the civil governments and passed into the multiple-party regime.\(^{24}\) However, for Karaosmanoğlu, after each coup the Turkish military expanded its “autonomous” or “above-politics” sphere of influence by making changes to the constitution as well as other laws and legal regulations. The military, for instance, achieved important privileges through constitutional and legal regulations to intervene in the political Service Law, the State Security Courts (DGMs), the right of the military to select one of the members of the Higher Education Council (YÖK), and the right of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council (MGK) to nominate one member of the Supreme Board for Radio and Television (RTÜK). The military also directly intervened in politics through informal mechanisms, such as public statements, press releases, and declarations given by top-ranking officers. The reason for this, according to Aydınlı, was that the military was never convinced that the level of democracy in Turkey and the quality of civilian politics were good enough to become fully subordinate to them.\(^{25}\)

One could then assert that the military during much of the Republican Period shared political power with civilian governments, with Steven Cook’s words, “to rule” by leaving the daily routines of governance to the civilian governments.\(^{26}\) Through its role as the protector of the whole nation and the guardian of the state both against internal and external threats, the military had a powerful position in the affairs of the state, which eventually led to the ability to decide the fate of governments and politicians as well as a privileged position in the eyes of the people. On four occasions (1960, 1971,
1980, and 1997), the military directly intervened to change the course of the political system and to replace the government. All were effective for the military in the sense that the military was able to change the course of events in their own favor. Directly placed under the office of the Prime Minister instead of the Ministry of Defense, the Chief of General Staff remained in fourth place on the state protocol list after the President, the head of parliament, and the prime minister. The military enjoyed sufficient autonomy to influence decisions made by the political leadership. These decisions were not only on security-related issues but also in other domains such as judicial and legislative processes as well as matters in budgetary, education, and broadcasting. The officer corps had been a privileged group in Turkish society, respected and trusted by the population and enjoying special privileges in the form of high quality education, secure employment, housing, and various other welfare benefits. Generally, the military and society had a good and strong relationship. Known for its adherence to law and order and incorrupt ways, the military had been the most trusted institution in the country, recording much better in opinion polls than any other civil-political organization. For instance, a Gallup poll in May 2007 found that Turks are more likely to express confidence in the country’s military than any other national institution, with 81% of respondents saying they have confidence in the military. Similarly, the Eurobarometer opinion poll of 2008 indicated that the vast majority of Turkey respects the military as an institution, and a total of 84% of Turks named the military as the most trusted institution in the country. One should also note that military interventions in politics were also, by and large, accepted by the society as a necessity during times of political unrest.

The military began to civilianize in the early 2000s under pressure from both the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the European Union (EU). The AKP brought stability to the political system, which in turn brought power and prominence to civilians over the military. At the same, Turkey diminished or ended military representation in civilian government bodies, introduced greater transparency in defense spending and policymaking, and improved parliamentary oversight of the military while on its reform pathway toward EU membership. The desire for civilianization of the armed forces by civil society, politicians, and the international community, as well as the changing ideology of the command staff in the TSK, drew the military largely away from politics and towards professionalism, at least temporarily. However, rather than draw the military closer to society, this phase is often seen as a time in which the military “retreated to its barracks,” and the military still had its reserved rooms such as the Supreme Military Council, military education system, the promotion of the generals, the existence of the autonomous military judiciary, etc. within its own realm. For nearly a decade, the military and civilians had lived apart. Civilians simply looked on as two major military trials, Balyoz and Ergenekon, sent thousands of military staff to jail. Over time the influence of the military began to fade away. Rather than bridging the gap between the realms, this civilianization widened it, and the reality of Turkish CMR continued in Huntington’s world.

New Paradigm: Less Huntington, More Janowitz

The attempted coup on July 15 has not only shocked and terrorized civilians but also shocked and terrorized the military establishment and Turkish CMR as a whole. The extent of this shock has led to this revolutionary reform process and an equally revolutionary change in Turkish CMR. The comprehensive reforms of the TSK concerning its structure within the government, the judiciary, education, health, business, etc. have challenged the old paradigm and demanded a conceptual change: less Huntington, more Janowitz. The July 15 putschists have broken the ivory tower in which the military once sat. Janowitz’s depiction of “the professional soldier” has become a desirable solution in the eyes of Turkish politicians and society. The need to seek a professional military that is also in touch with the reality of civilians has been one goal of the government’s major reforms and restructuring of the military post-July 15. The government has exercised “subjective control” of the military in order to orchestrate what it sees as a timely and effective
change over an institution in which it has otherwise lost confidence. The reforms carried out through the state of emergency decree laws have slashed the privilege of the military, bound it to the politicians in more ways than one, and ushered in a new era of civilian control. Moving forward from July 15, the revolutionary civilianization process has picked up the Turkish military from Huntington's world and placed it right back down in Janowitz's. Civilians have seen the coup as a clear sign that the military had been living in another world, maybe even another universe, or maybe just somewhere that did not have enough wireless coverage to connect to FaceTime. Now the military must live and work within earshot of the people and the government.

The new paradigm after July 15 does not recognize the autonomous domain of the military; therefore, it seeks to exterminate it rather than manage it. As seen from the above description, the new paradigm cuts off nearly 100 years of Turkish history. The social and cultural norms that have been embedded within the military since 1923 will be eradicated in this new era; the military will need to adopt civilian norms. Through the subordination of several posts to civilian offices such as the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, the military will be held accountable according to these civilian establishments.

Reforms in the military's judicial processes are a definitive narrowing between the military and the civilian elements. Efforts to include more military cases into civilian courts had been a main component of the TSK’s civilianization process through Europeanization in the early 2000s. Abolishing military courts and trials holds the TSK more accountable to civilian standards of justice and law. Talk of abolishing all military courts could lead to a complete overhaul of the military justice system in the future.

Reforms in military education have called for the Janowitzian collaboration of military in universities in the realms of education and technological research. Although the military's privilege of selecting one of the members of the Higher Education Council (YÖK) had been previously removed, the military's autonomous network of high schools and colleges has now been reformed so as to facilitate collaboration on national defense between military and civilians, synchronizing civilian and military defense systems in the future.

The July 15 coup attempt has proven that, just like other social subsystems, the military is subject to technological, socioeconomic, and political changes. Therefore, the role and missions, norms and values and, more importantly, self-perceptions of the military’s officer corps, as well as the function of the modern military institution itself, should not be considered as a “given fact” or constant but changed in line with the prevailing value system and dominant norms of the greater society. The coup showed us that the old system, in which it was assumed that the military was a static institution, was deeply wrong. The dynamism of the military must be explored in this new paradigm as reforms and restructuring continue to unfold.

Civilization, but how?

These reforms surely mean civilianization of the Turkish military. But civilianization (transfer of power from military elites to the elected civilians) does not automatically mean democratization (distribution of power from military elites to the government, opposition parties, and civil society to the extent that checks and balances can be created and full accountability and transparency are established) or ensure effective and efficient military operations on the ground. A healthy CMR is one that is well balanced and transparent. Civil and democratic control, effectiveness and efficiency, social legitimacy, legal legitimacy, and credibility of the TSK in the international security environment are at risk of falling apart if the present atmosphere of CMR continues. Changes must be seen in these categories to achieve democratic civilianization of the TSK.

Civil and Democratic Control

This transformation process has thus far been very hasty. The absence of viable discussions both under the roof of parliament and civil society has hindered “consensus-based” outcomes and democratization. Civilian control of the military by itself is no guarantee that policy makers will make
good decisions or implement policy in such a way as to result in effective and efficient outcomes on security issues. When major military reforms are pushed through by three separate state of emergency decree laws, such as is the present case in the post-July 15 setting, objections to the means of reform by all three opposition parties on the grounds of democracy should not be ignored. Civilian control is, surely, a necessary condition for a healthy CMR, but it is not sufficient in and of itself to achieve a democratic outcome. Civilian control would be irrelevant if the military, as the primary instrument for attaining security, could not effectively fulfill its missions assigned by the civilian authority. After all, despite the civilian-based Europeanization process of the military in the early 2000s, the TSK still ended up in its current predicament, and the Turkish state itself is still far away from achieving EU membership. Therefore, how civilian control will continue to be implemented ought to be monitored in the post-July 15 setting. What is needed is more gradual and incremental institutional change with the objective of maximum consensus.

Effectiveness/Efficiency

Civilian control is basic and fundamental, but it is irrelevant unless the instruments for achieving security can effectively and efficiently fulfill their roles and missions. How to effectively protect the state from future coup plots as well as maintain effective and efficient operations on the ground is one of the most prescient challenges faced by the TSK and Turkish CMR in a post-coup setting. Edward N. Luttwak claims, “A coup operates by taking advantage of this [predictive and automatic] machine-like behavior [of the state].” Although FETÖ was not able to complete its objective on July 15, the organization had made significant strides toward employing this strategy. By systematically invading the complete ranks of the military—the land forces, air force, navy, and gendarmerie—for decades and across the country, the Gülenist movement sought to manipulate the system, the machine-like behavior of the state, to its advantage. Hiding their views from a culture that is prone to persecute free speech and punish those who do not conform to the standardized mold, the Gülenists “blended in” just like everyone else, some even masquerading as staunch secularists. There is a collective memory of the TSK’s strategic culture and mathematic work. As it was seen, FETÖ solved this and very well abused it. Therefore, how to prevent a coup should be as simple as figuring out how to change the machinery of the state. The purge of the coup plotters is an obvious first step. But replacing these positions with recently acquitted military personnel jailed after the Ergenekon and Balyoz plots comes with potential risks and rewards. On the one hand, a thoroughly trained command staff is able to work from previous knowledge of operational tactics in the field, creating fluency within the military. On the other, such experienced staff could, again, fall into the trap of operating within the confines of the “machine-like” behavior of the state, and the military could fall prone to future cons who could take advantage of this. Although the military was compromised by internal developments of FETÖ and it is reasonable that civilians question the military’s abilities, the civilian domain will need to open communication with the military side in order to understand how it is functioning and developing under this new structure to help implement the most efficient and effective reforms. There is a critical need for civilian leaders to understand the real challenges when assigning possible roles and missions to the military out of the wide spectrum of roles and missions available in this new era for the TSK. The difficult question ahead for CMR is how much the military can change while still maintaining effective operations and professionalism.

Social Legitimacy

The attempted coup has not only created a fault line between military and society but also increased the visible split between the pro-AKP masses and the secularist circles in Turkey. Between the military and civilians, two competing narratives over the question of “who prevented the coup” have emerged. Because of this the Turkish military and Turkish CMR have become a new domain for political conflict on the nature and extent of secularism, Kemalism, and religion, which is not good. The first narrative focuses on the idea that “the people prevented the coup” while the army was sitting in the shadows.” This has been taken up predominantly by the mobilized pro-AKP and Islamist masses still protesting on the streets. Their objective is to
bring the military under full-fledged civilian control. The second narrative is that “The military itself resisted the coup plotters, and those Kemalists and secularists within the military prevented the coup.” This camp, which is mainly led by the ex-officers arrested and tried in the Ergenekon-Balyoz cases as well as some secularist and nationalist (ulusalci) circles, argues that the military should turn back to its “factory settings,” which are Kemalism, secularism, and other founding principles of the Republic. Their objective is to reestablish military autonomy with a new ideological outlook. Because of this social conflict, Turkey is now facing an existential debate over whether to “patch up the old paradigm” or to abolish it and move on. This leaves the TSK in an uneasy position at a time when it needs public support. More tension around the social legitimacy of the armed forces can be expected in the coming days. Trust-building exercises need to take place between the military and the civilians before the two sides can move forward from the post-coup era. The military needs positive reinforcement from civilians to support its acting in civilians’ interests under a Janowitzian paradigm.

Legal Legitimacy

With over 10,000 soldiers either dismissed or detained, the legal legitimacy of the TSK has been chaotic. The mass purges and reforms have shown that the government sees itself as the overlord of the military, but so far only the executive has taken up any legal changes. Although both the ruling party and opposition parties (at least the MHP and CHP) have started discussing constitutional changes to the structure of the military, there have so far been no democratic consensus-based reforms. The unanimous establishment of an investigative commission in the Turkish Grand National Assembly to probe coup suspects is a solid initiative by the civilian apparatus, but fair trials must be ensured in order to start building a more efficient and effective military that is free to focus on security rather than politics. To begin with, although the military violated the rule of law by enacting a violent military coup against the state, the civilians and remaining military structure must hold onto the preexisting rule of law, not bend it to make room for a circumstantial death penalty. With the much-touted phrase of the politicians, “The people prevented the coup, keep watch and ward,” claiming social but not legal legitimacy, the era of post-guardianship of the military, in which the military is the agent of civilian principles, should be amended. Working within this new paradigm shift into the Janowitzian, it is imperative that the military realize its own agency and be fully aware of its influence on politics. The civilians are now their own keepers, requiring the army’s agency foremost as a security apparatus. Likewise though, civilians have the responsibility not to impose undue political pressure on the TSK and to treat its symptoms under due respect for the law. Transparency must be a priority on both sides to create a constructive climate that facilitates the building of an effective military that can meet domestic and increasingly global expectations and standards.

The Credibility of the Turkish Military in the Global Security Environment

The implications of a Turkish military coup are much bigger than just Turkish domestic politics. The reality in the post-9/11 era is that the armed forces are central actors in many developed democracies and are involved in many different roles: they engage in peacekeeping missions, reinforce the police in fighting crime, support civilian authorities in dealing with natural disasters, conduct search and rescue missions, provide humanitarian assistance, contribute to nation and state building efforts in host states, and fight against terrorists. Modern militaries are diverse, just like the democracies they serve. Although their micro and macro structure may vary around the world, they are called to maintain their multi-faceted character, no matter their internal crises. Faced with a number of threats and challenges, from battling the Islamic State (ISIS) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to securing its borders and managing the security of over three million refugees, the Turkish military’s engagements have ballooned from local to global conflicts. As a member of NATO and other international bodies, it is critical that the Turkish military continue to fulfill its international engagements while implementing democratic norms at home. It cannot withdraw and shirk its international duties, for any reason, in the midst of global crises.
Conclusion

Turkey has been riding the waves of an unprecedented paradigm shift in its CMR. From Huntington to Janowitz, from objective control to subjective control of the military, Turkey’s revolutionary civilianization process has implemented reforms one after the other at a breakneck pace. The paradigm shift has been geared toward 100% civilianization, but the relationship between civilianization and democratization of the military has not been so focused.

Changes and challenges to the TSK and Turkish CMR must be approached prudently and precisely. The same shock, chaos, and disillusionment seen on the night of July 15 cannot be exhibited in the reform process. Turkey must now be incredibly careful in reforming and restructuring the image and institutions of its military in light of July 15. Not only are citizens looking on from “democracy watches” but so also are Turkey’s international partners. Military restructuring must be a careful process that ensures the protection of the effectiveness and efficiency of armed forces’ operations and democratic reform above all else. The speed and the lack of consensus with which reforms have proceeded during the state of emergency have been alarming. This “revolutionary” process must be dampened to lessen aftershocks felt throughout the TSK. More time should be made to consult with not only the whole of parliament but also the military itself. Reforms in military and government relations, military education, the military judicial system, and military privilege have been an effective means of reform, but to what end are they designed to meet?

There is a fault line within Turkey centering on the TSK. In the process following the July 15 coup, there has been an increasing gap between people claiming, “the army prevented the coup;” and the people claiming, “the people prevented the coup.” If the whole of society fails to digest this paradigm shift of rapid demilitarization, then society, along with the TSK itself, could be divided. That, in the long term, would be a success for the July 15 coup plotters. It is the job of the politicians now to fix this and encourage active engagement between the military, society, and policy makers. According to T. Young, “the fundamental different cultural norms and conditions that exist between political leaders and military officers will always be an inherent source of tension in a democracy.”

Maybe the conflict between politicians and the military can never truly be reconciled; nevertheless, the last weeks of civilianization of the military cannot be undone, nor can the military ignore the politicians and its own historic and present political impetus after a military coup. The die has been cast, and if the Janowitzian paradigm shift is unsuccessful, then civilians and the military will forever live apart.
ENDNOTES


5 | Gurcan, “What Went Wrong with Turkey’s Whatsapp Coup.”


13 | “Turkey discharges 1,389 soldiers, shuts down military schools.”

14 | There is an ongoing debate on the status of these building and their incorporation into their environments as civilian establishments: “Future of army school by Bosphorus debated,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, August 3, 2016, 02; Sena Alkan, “Residents do not want to see military school in Kuleli, headman says,” *Daily Sabah*, August 3, 2016, 08.


18 | Ibid., 420.


21 | The three main laws relating to the status and legal responsibilities of the TAF are:


Particularly, Chapter 3 of the Constitution privileging military judicial system as an independent judicial branch in the state, Article 145 regulating the military judicial system, Articles 156 and 157 regulating the Higher Military Courts, Article 117 regulating the national defense, and the Article 118 recognizing the National Security Council as an constitutional institution and assigning tasks to it.


30 | Yaprk Gursoy, “The Impact of EU-Driven Reforms on the Political Autonomy of the Turkish Military,” *South European Society and Politics* 16, no. 2 (2011): 293-308.


39 | Feaver, “The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision.”


41 | This study defines efficiency as the achievement of maximum output with minimum inputs (resources) such as personnel, cost, and equipment. The distinction between effectiveness (the capacity to implement the civilian-formulated policies with the desired results) and efficiency (choosing the alternative which produces the largest result for the given application with the use of minimal resources) is important. In some sectors of the public realm, education or transportation for example, efficiency can be measured to some degree by how many kilometers of roads were laid or what percentage of students graduated relative to the amount of money spent. When it comes to security, these rudimentary measures of efficiency do not apply. How, for example, can we measure the deterrent value of the armed forces, of a nuclear capability, a submarine vs. aircraft carrier? Or, when fighting against terrorism, how should we rate the efficiency of intelligence when success means nothing happens? This paper asserts that the conceptualization and measurement of efficiency in the area of security is extremely problematic. However, since the concept of efficiency is mainly about the use of resources, institutions must deal with the allocation and oversight of these resources.


43 | Gurcan, “Nasil bir sivil-asker ilişkisi?”


