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INTRODUCTION BY THE ORGANIZERS

This report contains the proceedings of the expert session of the EUNIC-FEUTURE Stakeholder Conference titled “Between Rapprochement and Rejection: Identity and Culture Drivers in the Europe-Turkey Relations” held at the Austrian Cultural Forum in Yeniköy, Istanbul, on September 14, 2018.

The idea for the conference first originated during the research conducted for the Horizon 2020 project FEUTURE (The Future of EU-Turkey Relations: Mapping Dynamics and Testing Scenarios).1 The conference brought together fifteen international partners to map the dynamics of EU-Turkey relations across six thematic dimensions (politics, security, economics, energy, migration, and identity), examine underlying narratives and thematic drivers, substantiate the most likely future scenario(s) and assess its implications, and draw policy recommendations. Two partners of the project, Koç University and Sabancı University, were mainly responsible for the thematic field of culture and identity, where they sought to analyze and understand the mutual representations of identity in the relations between Turkey/the Ottoman Empire and European countries since the 19th century through to the present day. Thanks to the efforts of Johanna Chovanec from the University of Vienna, who took part in the project as a researcher while based at Sabancı University, the interest in cultural interaction and identity issues in the relationship between the two sides led to a cooperation between these universities and the Austrian Cultural Forum in Istanbul, resulting in the aforementioned conference. The Austrian Cultural Forum is part of the cultural network EUNIC (European Union National Institutes for Culture).2

In 2018, the director of the Austrian Cultural Forum, Romana Königsbrun, served as president of the EUNIC Istanbul Cluster. She managed to secure financial support through EUNIC Global for this conference and ensured the active participation of EUNIC partners and the EU Delegation in Turkey at the conference.

By connecting the Horizon 2020 project to the more concrete and practical cultural work that EUNIC partners facilitate on the ground in Turkey, an academic exercise was linked to the work of cultural practitioners. Enhancing the dialogue between academia and cultural institutions was another long-term objective of the stakeholder conference, which was also meant to feed into the process of updating the EUNIC 3-Year-Country Strategy for Turkey.

The research within the work package “Culture and Identity” of the Horizon 2020 project FEUTURE was characterized by a comparative approach that included an analysis of historical and present identity and cultural drivers through sources from the European as well as the Turkish context. The research findings3 have shown that identity representations of the respective Other were closely linked to the political status quo that underlines Europe-Turkey relations. The interdisciplinary and comparative outlook of the project also provided the focal point of the conference: the invited scholars focused on the linkages between politics and culture while at the same time comparing various forms of cultural production in Turkey and European countries.

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1 Grant Agreement Number: 692976, http://feuture.eu/.
2 https://www.eunicglobal.eu/.
In what follows are the contributions of the participants who took part in the expert session of the conference. The session titled “Representing and Construing the Other: Images of Europe and Turkey in Literature and Arts” focused on how the two sides have been represented in the literature and arts in both settings at different points in history. The contributions by Chovanec & Müller-Funk, Nocera, and Dominik discuss mutual identity representations in the literature and arts at the national level (Austria and Turkey by Chovanec & Müller-Funk; Italy and Turkey by Nocera; Poland and Turkey by Dominik); Levin’s contribution takes a broader look and underlines the history of the role of identity in Turkey-Europe relations with a focus on its contemporary ramifications for the European Union’s relations with Turkey; and Costantini moves beyond identity representations to propose guidelines for a novel cultural policy in and for the Eastern Mediterranean.

Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Sabancı University
Romana Königsbrun, Austrian Cultural Forum
Bahar Rumelili, Koç University
Johanna Chovanec, University of Vienna
The correlations between empires and their legacies, as expressed in literature and the arts, have been the main focus of study in the framework of the interdisciplinary research project “Kakanien Revisited” (situated at the University of Vienna) and the follow-up project, “Post-imperial Narratives in the Central European Literatures of Modernity” (situated at the University of Zagreb). Theoretical approaches from postcolonial studies were taken as a starting point for the transnational analysis of the imperial complex of the Habsburg monarchy and in a comparative view of other great powers such as the Russian and the Ottoman Empires, all of which disintegrated in the course or immediate aftermath of World War I. The research questions of the aforementioned projects address the relationship between the imperial center and peripheries as well as how economic dependencies have been perpetuated after the downfall of the empires. Further research issues include analyses of the various constructions of “the Other” as promoted by the imperial elites in each society, for example, Orientalized Bosnia after its annexation by Austria-Hungary in 1878.7 How the concept of modernity has affected politics and framed discussions around the binary opposition between progress and backwardness is another important topic. In the Ottoman context the notion of Europeanization was widely discussed in intellectual circles against the background of the Tanzimat reforms (1839–1878). Similarly, in the Habsburg monarchy catching up with modernity and transforming Vienna into a modern European capital was a common discourse in the second half of the 19th century.

Picking up these debates, literature is an excellent medium to trace back the transition from empire to nation state, the historical development of images of the imperial or national Self and its various Others, and the cultural and economic relationships between the imperial center and peripheries. Moreover, and for the framework of this paper most importantly, novels capture how the empires reverberated after their dissolution in the course of the First World War. As Magerski points out, the narratological foundation of the so-called postimperial

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4 Johanna Chovanec is a doctoral fellow at the Austrian Academy of Sciences (ÖAW) at the Department of Comparative Literature at University of Vienna as well as a doctoral fellow of the German Academic Scholarship Foundation (Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes). Wolfgang Müller-Funk is a former professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham and at the University of Vienna; he is currently a 2019 senior fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM), Vienna.

5 “Kakanien” is a nickname for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy coined by the Austrian author Stefan Zweig in his novel The Man Without Qualities (1930–1943). The term “Kakanien” is derived from the German abbreviation K und K for kaiserlich und königlich ("imperial and royal"), used to indicate the status of Austria-Hungary as a dual monarchy. Kakanien Revisited, last modified October 31, 2009, http://www.kakanien-revisited.at/.

6 The most recent volume published by researchers of the project is: Marijan Bobinac, Johanna Chovanec, Wolfgang Müller-Funk, and Jelena Spreicer (eds.), (Post)imperiale Narrative in den zentral- und osteuropäischen Literaturen der Moderne (Tübingen: Francke, 2018), http://postimpnarrative.ffzg.unizg.hr/.

novel is based on the experience of contingency: the narrative is closely linked to the loss of the imperial order as well as the following reorganization of social, political, and cultural life.\(^8\)

In that sense, the proposition “post” in postimperial entails a broad range of connotations. It does not mean primarily an “after” in the sense of an absolute end of the imperial lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*). On the contrary, the term refers to the continuing after effects of imperialism as well as to the far-reaching social, economic, and cultural ruptures connected to the downfall of political entities. In this paper we aim to shed light on how postimperial narratives are expressed in Turkish and Austrian literature. By means of literary texts from each context, we especially want to focus on the notion of melancholy as a main *topos* of the postimperial novel in Austria and Turkey. Nostalgic retrospection of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires is a central theme in both countries’ literature and refers to different aspects such as the loss of order, stability, political weight, or cultural identity. The texts under analysis are written by Joseph Roth, Stefan Zweig, Claudio Magris, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Orhan Pamuk, and Elif Şafak.

In the field of cultural studies, there has been a vivid debate about certain “turns” over the last decade.\(^9\) Both the narrative and the imperial turn are among the most recent trends in the humanities. What can be described as the “narrative turn”\(^10\) is the fact that all narrative phenomena can be seen through a cross-disciplinary approach that focuses not primarily on the literary structures of texts but on the cultural function of narrations for collective entities from small groups to imagined communities such as nations. Narratives are characterized by the specific quality that they not only remember, invent, or reframe events of the past, but they also interpret them in a reproducing and memorizing act. They work on the past in the context and discursive framework of the respective present. Consequently, they establish a never-ending symbolic process of representation, connecting the past with today and creating a sense of values for groups as well as individuals. Thus, they construct identity as a sample of common interpreted events and qualities of the narrative community. The “imperial turn”\(^11\) in cultural studies refers to the recent scholarly interest in the history, aftermath, and importance of empires for the political, economic, and cultural realities of today. The innovative aspect of the research projects “Kakanien revisited” and “Post-imperial Narratives” is that they aim at combining the narrative turn with the imperial one by describing empires as power complexes with various symbolic spaces. The ideological foundation of empires is based on a heterogeneous, fluid, and at the same time often asymmetric, hegemonic narrative structure in which stories of different ethnic groups, various traditions, and religions find their place.

Postimperial narratives can be understood as a process of storytelling in which the rupture, the breakdown of the empires, is dealt with collectively. There are different types of possible narratives; one is melancholic in the sense of Sigmund Freud’s essay *Trauer und Melancholie*, which addresses melancholy as the individual’s reaction to the unresolved loss of a beloved subject or an abstract idea

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such as one’s homeland. In literature, a melancholic narrative is characterized by the fact that the narration compensates for the loss of the object in the act of storytelling. A postimperial narrative evokes the past of the empire, its greatness and generosity, its diversity, and its often religiously influenced norms. This is the case in the myth of Moscow as the third Rome and successor state of the Byzantine Empire in the era of Putin\textsuperscript{12} as well as in what Claudio Magris has called the Habsburg Myth in Austrian literature. This is also the case in what Johanna Chovanec, by analogy, has described as the Ottoman Myth in Turkish literature.\textsuperscript{13} There is a hidden narrative behind the melancholic gesture, the longing for a new political size and/or cultural attractiveness.

The Habsburg Myth is such a politically ambivalent melancholic narrative.\textsuperscript{14} It was an Italian PhD student in the 1960s, Claudio Magris, who gave nostalgic retrospection to the world of the Casa di Austria in literature an explicit narrative format. According to Magris, the Habsburg Myth is a collective melancholic narration that generated its symbolic, identity-creating power in the Interwar period and became a central aspect in the Austrian nation-building process. In his famous book on the Habsburg Myth,\textsuperscript{15} Magris understands the myth as a narrative with a meta-historical kernel in which the historical reality is transformed into an illusionary world of yesterday. It is the image of a picturesque, secure, and orderly fairytale world. However, the myth as a founding narrative is at the same time a utopia projected into the future, focusing on Austria’s historically grown role in a unified Europe. Famous Austrian authors such as Stefan Zweig, Joseph Roth, Robert Musil, Hermann Broch, and many others are representatives of this literary trend. The glorious account of the imperial past reacts not only to the breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian Empire but also to the problems of the new socialist regime in Russia and the decline of liberal national democracy that was undermined by National Socialism, Fascism, and Communism. Central to the myth is the literary yearning for the lost aspects of the monarchy, such as stability, a slow but functioning bureaucracy, or a harmonious coexistence of different groups and ethnicities.

Although the most important period for the Habsburg Myth in Austrian literature is the time between 1918 and 1945, its political origins can be traced back to the 19th century. One literary example of the official promotion and glorification of the Habsburg monarchy with the purpose of increasing the solidarity of the population with the empire is the so-called Das Kronprinzenwerk (“Crown Prince’s Work”).\textsuperscript{16} The 24-volume encyclopedia was initiated by Crown Prince Rudolf of Austria-Hungary in 1883 with the idea to present Austria-Hungary as an empire in which every province makes a contribution to a peaceful, multicultural, and liberal space.


\textsuperscript{15} Claudio Magris, Der habsburgische Mythos in der modernen österreichischen Literatur (Vienna: Zsolnay, 2000).

where cultural variety is accepted and welcome. It was a unifying project in favor of the United States of Austria—against the nationalism and anti-Semitism of the époque but also in contrast to the abstract cosmopolitanism in socialist narratives. In some of his plays (König Ottokars Glück und Ende, 1825; Ein Bruderzwist im Hause Habsburg, 1848) Franz Grillparzer (1791–1872), the first modern Austrian writer, refers to the long history of the Habsburg dynasty, the kernel of the Habsburg Myth. The Austrian novelettes (Novellen aus Österreich, 1877–1906) by Ferdinand von Saar (1833–1906) also belong to this narrative matrix—as a melancholic perspective from the increasingly marginalized nobleman who is portrayed as one of the victims of the “progress” that goes hand in hand with the decline of the Austrian empire.

The Habsburg Myth celebrated its triumph after World War I in the 1930s. In a short novella (The Bust of the Emperor, 1934), the famous Austrian writer Joseph Roth (1894–1939) presents his main protagonist as the ideal subject of the disappeared empire. Franz Xaver Morstin is the prototype of a multicultural Austrian human being: transnational, neither Polish, Italian, nor German as his first name might suggest, a brave soldier, and multilingual, speaking nearly all European languages. He is everywhere at home, especially within the monarchy. For this aristocrat, belonging to a nation is meaningless in comparison to the lost colorful life in the monarchy. Hence, he is not willing to accept that the village of his family has now become part of the new Polish nation-state and denies removing the bust of his emperor Joseph, which he had erected in front of his mansion. Coming in conflict with the new authorities, he decides together with a Catholic priest and a Jewish rabbi to bury the bust in the cemetery of the village. Afterwards he leaves his homeland by concluding with the metaphor that only his old home, the monarchy, was a large house with many doors and rooms for different peoples. For the Jewish writer Stefan Zweig (1881–1942), the monarchy is also the object of melancholic yearning. In his famous memoir and essay, The World of Yesterday (1942), he praises the empire as an open world of peace and cultural richness.

From today’s point of view, Magris’ book about the Habsburg Myth contributed to the myth that it had once analyzed: with its melancholic undercurrent, the text can now be rather read as a nostalgic document in the tradition of Zweig and Roth, perpetuating their literary discourse. To some extent the myth is still relevant for the Austrian symbolic space of today. In this perspective, Austria is seen as a postimperial diplomatic player and, because of its heritage, as a cultural power in Central Europe. The imperial past has also been relevant for many public intellectuals and poets in (former) Communist countries (e.g., Milan Kundera, György Konrad, Vaclav Havel) in their discourse on Mitteleuropa. As Zweig has pointed out in The World of Yesterday, Central Europe, the former space of the Habsburg Empire, was the central overlapping transnational European space for creating civil societies. From this point of view, the Old Austrian melancholy carries a utopian meaning: the Monarchy as a multinational complex is the harbinger of a new, peaceful postwar Europe and of the European Union. In his influential book, the founder of the idea of a Pan-European Union, Richard Coudenhove-Calergi, interpreted the idea of an integrated Europe as a project in the tradition of the Habsburg Empire.

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17 Joseph Roth, Der Leviatan. Erzählungen (Munich: dtv, 1976), 139.
As a postimperial narrative expressed in literary texts, the Ottoman Myth20 in Turkish literature can be viewed analogously with the Habsburg Myth in Austrian literature. Central to the Ottoman Myth is a nostalgic retrospection of the lost Ottoman past. Melancholic themes in novels deal with various aspects of the disintegrated Ottoman Empire such as its multicultural and multi-ethnic population, the political importance and wealth of Istanbul as the empire’s capital, and the cultural richness and authenticity of the Ottoman lifeworld. Melancholy in Turkish literature has a long discourse history, its origins dating back to the second half of the 19th century and leading up to the inflationary presence of the Ottoman Empire in postmodern literature. When looking at the Ottoman context, melancholy is connected to a discussion about cultural authenticity and an anticipated loss of identity. This debate had already started in the course of the Tanzimat reforms and was picked up by many famous intellectuals of that era. Published in the 1870s, the first Ottoman novels were especially concerned with addressing questions such as how increased Westernization affected Ottoman culture and whether or not European cultural values should be fully appropriated or if only aspects of technical progress should be adopted. For example, Ahmet Mithat’s (1844–1912) novel Felatun Bey Ile Rakim Efendi (1876),21 which tells the story of two young men, created a new literary figure that would become a repeating topos in late Ottoman literature: the züppe. The züppe is a dandy or snob who imitates Western languages, dress codes, and behaviors on a superficial level. He forgets the moral, Islamic values he grew up with, loses his identity, and becomes a caricature. Felatun represents a misinterpreted, false, artificial (yankış ve yüzeySEL Batılılaşma) Westernization and makes a fool of himself.22 By contrast, Rakim Efendi fulfills the ideal of “half Westernization.” He knows many languages and becomes a successful translator. He educates himself in certain fields of European cultures yet does not get detached from his own background and values. The novel expresses a fear of loss of cultural identity connected to the reform activities in the Ottoman Empire and the political as well as economic dependency on the European powers. This notion can be regarded as the origin of the melancholic discourse in Turkish literature.

Whereas melancholy was a main theme in Austrian literature in the Interwar period, nostalgic references to the Ottoman Empire were rare in Turkish literature in times of nationalism and Kemalism. Against this background, the novels of Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar (1901–1962) can be regarded as exceptional. In his oeuvre, the Turkish writer and literary scholar explores perceptions of Europe and the search for a Turkish identity beyond Kemalist paradigms. Described as a melancholic (hüzünlü) author in Orhan Pamuk’s novel Istanbul, Tanpinar’s literary texts such as his essayistic compilation Beş Şehir (“Five Cities”)23 (1946) deal with elements of the lost Ottoman heritage such as the transformation of the urban space in Istanbul, the empire’s former capital city, or the absence of the former multicultural population that gave way to a largely homogenous, Muslim Turkish majority society. Furthermore, Tanpinar’s literary melancholy points toward increasing Westernization, which distances Istanbul and its inhabitants from an idea of cultural authenticity that can only be found in continuity

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with the past. Cultural authenticity in times of Europeanization and Kemalist reform activities is also a central concept in Tanpınar’s novel Huzur (1948, translated as A Mind at Peace). The main protagonist Mümtaz, a melancholic intellectual, feels disoriented in postimperial Turkey and is in search of an identity that combines elements of the European as well as Turkish culture.

However, it is only in the 1980s that we can observe an increased publication of historical novels set in Ottoman times or postmodern novels combining fictional with historical elements. Melancholy has become a main topos in Turkish literature and is often explicitly expressed. In his novel Istanbul (2003) the noble prize-winning author Orhan Pamuk (1952–) refers to the collectively felt hüzün, an emotion he describes as almost tangible and omnipresent in Istanbul. Pamuk mourns the lost glory, power, and wealth that were once characteristic of the former (imperial) Ottoman capital. His inclusion of black and white photographs by the famous photographer Ara Güler (1928–2018) accentuates the melancholic discourse, while, for instance, the crumbling and already destroyed konaklar, Ottoman mansions, represent a melancholic motif.

There are numerous literary examples that demonstrate how postimperial melancholy expressed through literature often pursues different political targets. For example, Ahmet Ümit’s (1960–) crime novel Istanbul Hatırası (“Memory of Istanbul”) (2010) puts forward a critique of capitalism and its unsustainable practices as its main topic focusing on how Ottoman and Byzantine buildings in the Fatih neighborhood of Istanbul have given way to new shopping malls and hotels. Elif Şafak’s (1971–) essays such as “Life in the Islands” (2006) describe a multicultural, multilingual Ottoman Empire as a positive and harmonic societal model, or a political counter model. However, what most novels have in common is that they, on the one hand, use the Ottoman Empire as an aesthetical frame of reference (music, literature, etc.), and on the other, they highlight Turkey’s history as a distinguishing feature in relation to European identities.

It is evident that the Habsburg Myth as expressed by authors such as Zweig and Roth envisions a clear European and transnational structure. The Ottoman Myth in texts by writers such as Pamuk and Tanpınar can be read as a postimperial narrative that tries to integrate Western and Turkish symbolic elements by bridging the gap between the East and the West. Both melancholic traditions can be understood as counter-models to the homogenizing nation-building narratives and, at the same time, as political utopias for the postimperial space. They each entail a traditional moment that tries to integrate the imperial past into the future of Europe and its Eastern neighborhood. Another similarity is that the origins of the myths can be traced back to the 19th century. In the Austrian case nationalism is seen as a dramatic threat to the political and cultural integrity of the monarchy. Similarly, in the Ottoman Empire it is a fear of losing one’s own culture and identity in the process of Westernization and reform activities. In both cases, literature is the preferred medium to convey an alternative image of the empire, not as a prison of peoples (Völkerkerker) but as an open house for different groups.

26 Ahmet Ümit, İstanbul Hatırası (Istanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2010).
The protracted and controversial relationship between Turkey and Europe has long been the topic of several studies and research. Toward understanding these relations, a historical-political approach or an analysis in the framework of international relations is generally favored. In my paper, I would like to underline how, by examining some aspects of the socio-cultural history that links Turkey and Europe, it is possible to promote an innovative approach to the study of their relationship. In particular, I focus on the relations of cultural exchange between Turkey and Italy in the period after World War II.

In this period, relations between Turkey and Europe were intense and continuous. During the Cold War years, Turkey, as the far eastern border of Western Europe behind the Iron Curtain, adopted a strategic position on geopolitical issues. Together with Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, Turkey was considered part of the South European countries in official sources. For instance, official documents about migration movements in post-WWII Europe, especially those concerning the recruitment of the Turkish labor force for German industries until 1984, neither stress Turkey’s lack of belonging to the EU nor its peculiarity as a Muslim country.

Later, because of the following developments in the European Community and the writing of a European historiography strongly affected by the building of the EU, the definition of Turkey as a country belonging to the South European group of countries has been dismissed if not forgotten. This is not only a geographical definition but a political one, testifying to the position of Turkey vis-à-vis Europe and vice-versa.

Since 1945, Turkey has belonged to the Western European and U.S. military security zone. As Zürcher explains, “The post-war era was a period of intensified incorporation of Turkey into the world capitalist system, not only in the economic field, but also in the realms of foreign policy and defense.”

Having abandoned the Kemalist foreign policy doctrine of cautious neutralism, Turkey became a solid part of the political and military structures that the United States and its allies built up to safeguard the continued existence of democracy and free enterprise. Within the context of the Cold War, Turkey’s entry into various international organizations (OEEC, Council of Europe, NATO, as well as the European Broadcasting Union) seemed to confirm the notion that the country had finally gained full status among Western nations. The intensification of relations between Turkey and Western countries was yet not only a matter of

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29 This happens because, for what concerns the 20th century, at the core of the analysis are the relations between Turkey and the European Union: for instance, Birol Yeşilada, EU-Turkey Relations in the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2012); Senem Aydin-Düzgit and Nathalie Tocci, Turkey and the European Union (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

30 I have extensively discussed this issue in Lea Nocera, Manikürlü Eller Almanya’da elektrik bobini saracak (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2018).

military and international affairs but reflected also in socio-cultural relations, in the many opportunities for contact and exchange between the societies and in daily life. In seemingly frivolous events such as beauty pageants, Turkey was indeed a European country, which helped shape its social imagery. For instance, in 1952, Günseli Başar, a twenty-year-old girl from Istanbul, great-niece of the Grand Vizier Halil Rifat Pasha, represented her country at the Miss Europe beauty contest held in Naples, Italy, and became Turkey’s first ever Miss Europe winner on August 20, 1952. Her nomination confirmed both in Turkey and Europe that the Turkish republic deserved to be considered as a European country, and this had a political meaning. This mirrored a similar event in 1932, when Miss Turkey Keriman Halis was selected as Miss Universe.32

Europe has always been an inspiration for Turkey, even before its foundation, since the Ottoman times, and European culture as well has been a landmark in the education of Turkish elites since the 18th century. During the 1950s, in the beginning years of mass culture, while remaining a reference point for the upper bourgeoisie, which still sent its children to study in France, Germany, Austria, or going on a cruise around the European ports, Europe became also a reference to dreams of modernity within the emerging Turkish urban middle class. In spite of the so-called Americanization of Turkish society, which was probably much more an idea than a fact, Europe shaped cultural models inside Turkey, at this time not only for the elite but also for a larger part of the society, through cultural commodities belonging to the realm of popular culture.33

Italy as a Myth

Popular music and cinema, therefore, were the main vehicles for a modern, up-to-date lifestyle inspiring the new urban middle class. Being aware of the fact that European education and culture had always been a sign of social and class distinction, the emerging urban bourgeoisie longed to access European cultural life, and Italian popular culture satisfied it. By the late 1940s and through the 1950s and 1960s, Italian cultural commodities were strongly promoted and diffused in Turkey. If the upper class could have the Piccola Orchestra at a gala dinner in the Hilton Hotel in Istanbul, the middle class could at the same time listen to Mina’s or Milva’s records. The presence and the relevance of culture coming from Italy is in fact still vivid in the popular memories of the period and has contributed undoubtedly to shape a shared imaginary about modernity, and also European modernity, in Turkey. Italian movies, popular songs, comics, and photo stories were quickly imported, translated, and distributed all over Turkey and seduced a large public ready to follow the Italian stars (actors, actresses, and singers) on their Turkish tours. Italian singers


33 Cultural production in Turkey and the outset of the Turkish cultural industry have very often focused on the question of imitation and/or emulation of Western cultural models, whether European or American. Particularly, the “Americanization” of Turkish society from the 1950s seems to be an undisputed fact. Even if it is evident that in political discourse the United States became the so-called “New West” (Yeni Gar), and that U.S. pioneered mass consumption became a central symbol, it is not clear to what extent it effectively affected Turkish society, practices, and aspirations. As Kaelble argues, for Europe, the Americanization of European consumption is debated and is a “still misleading simplification.” H. Kaelble, A Social History of Europe 1945–2000 – Recovery and Transformation After Two World Wars (New York/Oxford: Berghahn Book, 2013). For Turkey, it seems necessary to investigate how European patterns of consumption, with their own styles, variety, and traditional links to the Turkish social elite, persisted to be seductive and incisive for an emerging urban bourgeoisie. The success and the mass consumption of Italian cultural commodities seem to push in this direction.
often gave concerts in Istanbul, and the new weekly cultural magazines (e.g., Ses, Yıldız, Diskotek) followed them closely, describing the details of their concerts and providing information for fans.

Italy was an attractive destination, where change and the future appeared possible and closer. It mirrored a Southern European society, a Mediterranean country, which in some ways was perceived as a model of progress and development due to its “economic miracle” and its successful cultural products (like movies). As the Turkish cultural magazines of the period show, Turkish girls dreamt of having the chance to go to Italy and become actresses or pop singers, not different from their peers in Southern Italy dreaming to go in Rome and change their lives. In the eyes of the younger generation in Turkey, in the 1950s, Italy was a true myth.

**The Italian Representation of Turkey**

On the other side of the Mediterranean, however, despite all the political and social changes in Italy, representations of Turkey were not changing quickly or radically. Italy after WWII was also deeply changing and actively engaged in international relations. During the Italian economic miracle, Italy set up solid relations with many countries, even behind Europe and the United States. Enrico Mattei, public administrator and founder of Italian energy company Eni in 1953, who negotiated important oil concessions in the Middle East and broke the power of international oligopolies, was one of those brilliant figures who fostered stronger connections outside European borders. In the same direction, Italy established the first Italian cultural institute in Turkey, in Istanbul, in 1951 and two years later another in Ankara.

Italian society was changing rapidly—as neorealist cinema attentively showed—and was curious about other cultures and countries. Nevertheless, in those years the image of Turkey or of Turkish people did not differ that much from a still vivid Orientalist stereotype. It was not only because of the legacy of the older Italian culture—though, for instance, *The Turk in Italy*, the opera (buffa) by Gioacchino Rossini first performed in 1814, gained a renewed fortune during the 1950s.
A couple of examples reveal to what extent the representation of Turks was not substantially affected by the changes in society or in foreign relations. The first one is a comedy film, *Un turco napoletano* (Neapolitan Turk), directed by Mario Mattoli, produced in 1953, and starring Totò, the most popular Italian comedian of all time. “Neapolitan Turk” is set in Naples and Sorrento in the second half of the 1800s. It is based on a series of funny situations and misunderstanding that arise from the figure of a Turk, a eunuch who, as the spectators know, proves to be a great womanizer and gains the sympathy of all the girls in the town. The fake eunuch is played by Totò, who gives the film portentous comic vein. The film is a classic example of cinematic Italian comedy in the 1950s, based on the indissoluble presence of two elements: comedy and sex. But still more, here, along the entire story, it gathers all the typical clichés about the Turkish and Middle Eastern world: the harem, belly dancers, fez, and the Arabian melody from Franz Hünßen’s “Fantaisie arabe, op. 136” (1845), a classical, stereotypical theme of Middle Eastern music and culture. Classical elements of the Oriental world, where Turks are often confused with Arabs, continue to appear. This not only reflects a representation of Turkey completely disconnected to all the changes that occurred at those times in both countries, Turkey and Italy, but also in relations between the two.

Another example of this Italian perception concerns a real Turk in Italy, in this case a woman: Ayşe Nana, a Turkish actress, dancer, and stripper of Armenian origin whose story inspired the late Italian director Federico Fellini to make his classic film *La Dolce Vita*. Ayşe Nana, who began her career in 1954 at the age of fourteen before moving to France then Italy to become a belly dancer, shot to fame when she performed a striptease at a restaurant in Rome in 1958. Police raided the Rugantino restaurant while the party was still in progress and closed it for offending public morality, but a photographer who shot the entire sequence managed to get out with a roll of pictures of Nana stripping to her underwear (figure).
The photos created a scandal when they were published several days later, but Fellini seized on the episode as an inspiration for a film he had been wanting to make about the idle, wealthy cafe society in Rome. Nana then married an Italian film director and went on to play small parts in several Italian films. She was one of the last major protagonists of Rome’s Dolce Vita years. Her image, sharply contrasting the elegant and discrete Miss Europe, perfectly corresponded to the Oriental lust associated with women and the Middle East.
Conclusions

While in Turkey Italy represented a symbol of European culture and provided narrations of modernity and progress through its cultural products—which were much closer to Turkish society and to the emerging urban bourgeoisie, as well as their imagery, than North American or North European models—Italian representations of Turkey were still strongly influenced by rooted stereotypes and affected the definition of the most common image of Turkey and Turkish people. These images were reproduced despite the continuous and stable cultural and commercial relations between the two countries.

It is important and useful to investigate these relations and the diffusion of Italian cultural production in the decades following WWII. Focusing on the distribution and the influence of Italian (and European) culture in Turkey shows intense cultural relations between those countries, which were up to now mostly disregarded. As aforementioned, these relations (namely South-South relations in the 20th century) have not been sufficiently explored because of a European historiography strongly influenced by the EU process. A study of transnational connections in the cultural field can reveal undiscovered socio-historical aspects of the Turkey-Italy relationship and open up new perspectives in the historiography of Europe, as well as in the formulation of European identity and Europeanization, and can also contribute to coping with ongoing clichés and stereotypes.

Ayse Nana, https://retrorambling.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/6645_nana_01.jpg
When one speaks of Turkey’s relations with Europe, its contacts with Poland may not come to mind as the most obvious example, despite the fact that in the early modern period the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth—the predecessor state of modern-day Poland known in Ottoman Turkish as “Lehistan”—was the European country that shared the longest border with the Ottoman Empire. In this context, it is worth recalling that in 2014 Poland and Turkey celebrated the 600th anniversary of diplomatic relations, which was accompanied by a rich cultural program that aimed at mutual rediscovery and deepening of cooperation in various fields. It was a unique anniversary on the European, and even world, scale, as not many states can boast of such an enduring history of mutual contacts. The memory of several centuries of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire as neighbors is still alive in Polish tradition and culture. What is striking is that the present Polish perception of Turkey is loaded with national mythology that comes from the turn of the 20th century. Its foundations lie in the works of the Polish Nobel Prize winner Henryk Sienkiewicz (1856–1916) from over a hundred years ago. In his novels—written to “upraise hearts” of Poles living under foreign rule—Sienkiewicz often used the image of a “villain Turk” as an actual substitute for a “Russian” in order to avoid Tzarist censors who were closely following the content of publications in Poland. The faraway “Turk” or “Muslim” stood in for the close-by “enemy” under whose yoke Poles lived at the time. By the time Sienkiewicz had published his novels, thousands of Polish political émigrés had found refuge within the Ottoman borders, and the most renowned Polish Romantic poet Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855) had drawn his last breath in Istanbul in 1855 while involved in the political mission of formation of the Polish military units in the Ottoman army during the Crimean War (1853–1855).

The following paper is by no means an attempt to present or even sketch these relations over the past six centuries. Rather, it consists of a few vignettes that will provide some insights into the rich history of Polish-Turkish contacts.

There is no doubt that the “Turkish threat” played a substantial role in Polish internal political propaganda from the battle of Varna in 1444 onwards. Together with the battles of Hotin (1621, 1673) and the siege of Vienna (1683), they served to construct a Polish self-image as a Christian and European state. “Antemurale Christianitatis”—the bulwark of Christianity—is a vital component of many national cultures in Central Europe, and Poland and Poles are not an exception. In that period numerous anti-Turkish pamphlets, called turcyki or turcica, were published in Poland in the sixteenth and seventeenth century and were reminiscent of

34 Paulina Dominik is a doctoral fellow at the graduate school Global Intellectual History at the Freie Universität Berlin.

35 A number of events plus two big exhibitions highlighted the Turkish-Polish relationship.


37 Dariusz Koboldziejczyk, “A historical outline of Polish-Ottoman political and diplomatic relations,” in War and Peace: Ottoman-Polish relations in the 15th–19th centuries (Istanbul: Ministry of Culture, General Directorate of Monuments and Museums, 1999), 12.
Remarkably, the image of a “Turk,” or an “Ottoman,” was highly ambivalent and combined fear and fascination. On the one hand, Poles criticized the Ottoman dynasty’s adherence to Islam (referred to as “paganism”) and despotism in their style of ruling the state. On the other, they admired Ottoman wealth, power, and order. It was not a coincidence that Oriental dress and armor were adopted by Polish nobles, who happened to be confused with Ottomans during their visits at Western European courts. The nobility’s Oriental stylization of their appearance and lifestyles was an expression of Sarmatianism (Sarmatyzm)—an ethno-cultural phenomenon spanning from the sixteenth well into the end of the eighteenth century. Indicative of the phenomenon’s complexity is the fact that the climax of the folly for Oriental fashions among the nobles coincided with the period of the seventeenth-century Polish-Ottoman wars. In addition, Tatar, Crimean Karaim, and Armenian minorities played a considerable role in bringing to the Commonwealth elements of Oriental culture that were reflected in armor, furniture, clothes, and the lifestyle of the nobility, as well as a number of the Ottoman Turkish words that found their way into the Polish language and are still in use today.

However, the importance of Polish-Ottoman relations in the Polish tradition hardly corresponds with the place of Poland in the Ottoman and Turkish collective memory. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, an aspiring Orientalist Józef Sękowski translated fragments of Ottoman chronicles pertaining to Ottoman-Polish relations. To his great disillusionment, the space given to Poland by Ottoman historiographies was much scarcer than he had expected. References to Poles and Poland were to a large extent limited to wars against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Poles’ participation in the Holy League.

The Treaty of Karlowitz signed by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire in 1699 put an end to all conflicts and wars between the two countries and begun “a peaceful era” that continues until today. Any possible animosities were replaced by a joint objective: cooperation against the common danger, Russia, and its expansionist ambitions. The most telling vignette from this new period in Polish-Ottoman contacts is the 1790 diplomatic mission of Piotr Potocki, the last Polish ambassador to the Sublime Porte. Its outcome was a project of military alliance. The two allies declared that it was their obligation to reverse the great damage inflicted to the European balance by the disproportionate rise of Russia. The project was never put into place, and Poland disappeared from the map five years later. Nevertheless, the fact that Polish and Ottoman diplomats at the time invoked the European balance in their treaty suggests that

44 Kołodziejczyk, “A historical outline of Polish-Ottoman,” 13; For more on this subject, see: Hacer Topaktas, “Stosunki osmańsko-polskie z perspektywy tureckiej w zapisach i pamięci/ Ottoman-Polish relations from the Turkish perspective. Written, unwritten and remembered,” in Herito (Turcja – Türkiye – Turkey) 14 (2014): 50–61.
already in the eighteenth century they regarded themselves as members of Europe, responsible for that continent’s future and well-being.46

The disappearance of Poland from the map in 1795 and the subsequent strengthening of its neighbors, especially Russia, did not go unnoticed in the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman statesmen perceived the catastrophic fate of its northern neighbor as a warning and a definite sign of the urgent need for reform of the Ottoman state.47 After the failure of the November Uprising of 1830, the armed rebellion against Russia in the heartland of the partitioned Poland-Lithuania—the semi-autonomous Congress Kingdom—the mass migration of Polish political and intellectual elites, known in the Polish historiography as the Great Emigration, followed. Next to France, the Ottoman Empire became the chief destination for Polish political émigrés. Poles fled to Istanbul in the hope of securing Ottoman support in their efforts to regain national independence. Given the difficulties to win the definite support of either France or Britain for the Polish cause, on the one hand, and the enthusiasm of the Ottoman statesmen towards welcoming Polish emigration within their borders, on the other, from the early 1840s onwards, the Ottoman Empire turned into a key center of Polish emigration. The importance that it held for the Polish national activities of the 19th century was stressed by a number of emblematic events such as the foundation of the Polish Eastern Mission in Istanbul in 1841, which became the center of Polish political activism against Russia; the establishment in 1842 of the Polish village called Adampol/Polonezköy, which in the lands of partitioned Poland and beyond gained status as a legend and for years has preserved its Polish character; and the organization of the Sultanic Cossacks’ Division, commanded by Polish officers and manned by Polish soldiers during the Crimean War (1853–56). The Polish presence in the Ottoman Empire, however, was not limited to activities aimed at the restoration of an independent Poland. Hundreds of Polish émigrés pursued occupations in the Ottoman army, administration, diplomacy, road, and telegraph construction as well as health services. They worked as advisors at the Ottoman court, wrote for the Ottoman newspapers, and brought new ideas to the Ottoman lands. Polish émigrés were for decades actively involved in the reforms of the Tanzimat Era (1839–1876), which attempted to modernize the Ottoman state. Ottoman dignitaries supported their national independence mission and appreciated their contributions to the changes aiming at transforming the empire into a modern state.48

The heroism and patriotism of Polish soldiers—who after being exiled from the partitioned Poland-Lithuania fought in various independence movements all over the world in accordance with the nineteenth-century motto “For our freedom and yours”—was recalled by the chief literati of the late Ottoman and early Republican periods.

For Mehmet Emin Yurdakul (1869–1944) in his poem “Ey, Türk Uyan” (“Hey Turk, Wake Up,” 1913), written in the midst of the Balkan Wars, Polish freedom fighters became a symbol of rebellion against foreign occupation. In his 1916 poem “Vernihora’ya” (“To Wernyhora”), inspired by the Ottoman soldiers fighting in the Galician front, he speaks of the common lot of Poles and Ottomans.49

46 Balcer, Kołodziejczyk, and Królikowska, Orzeł i Półksiężyc, 17.
48 For more on the Polish emigration in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, see: Adam Lewak, Dzieje emigracji polskiej w Turcji 1831–1878 (Warsaw: Gebethner & Wolff, 1935); Kazimierz Dopierała, Emigracja Polska w Turcji w XIX i XX wieku (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Polonia, 1988); Paulina Dominik, “From the Polish Times of Pera: Late Ottoman Istanbul through the Lens of Polish Emigration,” in History Takes Place: Istanbul. Dynamics of Urban Change, eds. Anna Hofmann and Aysė Öncü, 92–103 (Berlin: Jovis Verlag, GmbH, 2015).
Yahya Kemal Beyatlı (1884–1958), who in the following years was to be appointed as the ambassador of Turkey to Warsaw, in his 1922 “Istiklalimiz Hissi” (“Our Feeling of Independence”) celebrated “the fire of independence and freedom” burning in the Polish hearts and regarded it as a common characteristic between Turks and Poles.50

The heroism of Polish volunteers involved in struggles for liberation around the globe were also extolled by Nazım Hikmet (1902–1963). After leaving Turkey in 1951, Hikmet spent some time in Poland, received Polish citizenship, and adopted the surname of his great-grandfather Borzęcki. In his poem “Lehistan Mektubu” (“Polish Letters,” 1954) Hikmet speaks of his Polish ancestry and takes pride in it. In the verses of the poem he asks rhetorically: “Was there a place or time when among those fighting for freedom there were no Poles on the frontline of this struggle?”51 When he finally speaks of his experience of exile and homesickness, he speculates that his Polish great-grandfather, similar to himself, must have also deplored the painful possibility of never again being reunited with his homeland.52

My final vignette is a story that is frequently recalled both in Poland and in Turkey. According to it, the 19th century Ottoman court had never recognized the partitions of Poland and had waited for the arrival of “the ambassador from Lehistan [the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth],” Whenever the diplomatic corps was received by the Ottoman sultan, on the sight of the empty chair of the Polish deputy, the Ottoman chef de protocol would ostentatiously ask: “Where is the deputy from Lehistan?” At each occasion, he would receive the same reply from his aide—“Your Excellency, the deputy of Lehistan could not make it because of vital impediments”—to the annoyance of the diplomats from the partitioning states. Although this moving legend lacks historical evidence, it has nonetheless gained popularity both in Turkey and in Poland since the times of WWII when it was first “publicized” by the former ambassador of Poland to Ankara, Michał Sokolnicki.53 Even if not confirmed by historical facts, it is certainly telling of the attitude of Ottoman statesmen and the spirit of 19th century Ottoman diplomacy. At the same time, it has played, and continues to play, a significant role in the Polish collective memory as a tool of statecraft. In 1989, when Poland regained its full sovereignty after the fall of Communism, Tadeusz Mazowiecki attended the session of the Council of Europe as the first non-Communist Prime Minister of Poland since 1945. He began his speech with the story and concluded it saying that “the long-awaited deputy from Lehistan had finally arrived”—highlighting that Poland was at last a free country.54

52 Ibid.
53 Dominik, “From the Polish Times,” 94–95.
There is a vast number of factors that affect Turkey’s EU accession process: the reform progress in Turkey (or lack thereof), economics, national security, domestic and international politics, voting mathematics in EU organs, the legal framework, institutions, path dependency, and so on. I want to focus on one of these factors, one that I think lies underneath all the others, either undercutting Turkey’s prospects or enabling them. That is the question of identity, about what Europe is and who can make legitimate claims to be or become part of Europe and who cannot.

My argument builds on a book chapter that in turn built on a book I wrote that came out in 2011. I will not deal very much with the latest twists and turns in the politics of Turkey-EU relations. Instead, I want to start with a retrospective assessment and then slowly work my way back to today.

My 2011 book dealt with identity within a narrative and dramaturgical theoretical framework. I examined the roles that Muslims and Turks played in the stories that Christians and later secular Europeans told about themselves. I identified two broad types of stories, or rather tendencies:

- The first I described as a comic tendency or metanarrative: one that was outward-looking, confident, and associated with representations of the Other as alien but not fundamentally so. It was also often associated with outward movements like the crusades. Here, Muslims were like heathens or pagans that could be converted or like heretics, almost Christians who had merely gone astray.

- The other was a tragic metanarrative: inward-looking, defensive, one in which Christianity or later Europe was under siege from some frightening Muslim or Turkish Other. This Other was often described using imagery that was exclusionary in the sense that the Other was fundamentally or irreparably different. Here, he was rather the beast of the apocalypse, harbinger of doom, and a punishment for Christian sins, so only by repenting could he be fended off.

In my research, I identified these two broad tendencies. They were two different ways of making sense of and ordering a much messier real world in which there were Muslim-Christian interactions, or as my mentor Hayward Alker used to say, “inner-actions” within Islamic-Christian civilization rather than “inter-actions” between Christian and Muslim civilizations. This imagery and these metanarratives were ways in which the guardians of group identity sought to tame the messy and fluid reality.

They were social constructs but ones that mattered. They were repeated over time and transferred between geographies and eras with remarkable consistency. Reformation thinkers like Martin Luther who rejected much of the medieval Catholic

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heritage picked up the medieval imagery pretty much unchanged. And they were subsequently secularized and picked up by Enlightenment thinkers like René Voltaire.

To make a long story short, I believe that traces of the same two metanarratives or two inclinations—the self-confident and expansive comic story and the tragic story of a continent that is under siege—can be identified even in the present-day debate over Turkey’s membership in the European Union. And in recent years, the tragic metanarrative appears to be experiencing an upswing.

Extreme right parties have made electoral gains in most EU member states by telling a story of a Europe again under siege by threatening foreigners, most prominently Muslims. It is a “tragic” story, even apocalyptic in some versions, and it evokes the same kind of exclusionary and inward-looking identity as that which the early Eastern Christian predecessors employed, quite often invoking symbolically charged historical battles like the 1683 Siege of Vienna. Many mainstream European politicians have followed suit and adjusted their rhetoric. The question is what this means for Turkey-EU relations. I believe that it has had consequences for attitudes in both the EU and Turkey towards EU accession for Turkey, and that it has contributed to the initially cautious but later dramatic democratic backsliding that we have seen in Turkey over the past decade.

If we first consider some quantitative data on attitudes in the EU towards this quest and towards Turks in general, we find clear indications that the long historical legacy of anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish imagery in Europe is visible today. The Eurobarometer surveys conducted by the Commission of the European Union have long been collecting data on support for EU enlargement, including the level of support enjoyed by specific applicant countries and future or potential applicants. As a result, we have data that allows us to compare whether, as we would expect in light of the historical legacy explored above, opposition to Turkey is stronger than to other countries or whether it otherwise stands out.

At the time of writing, opposition in the EU to letting Turkey enter the EU as a full member is strong across the political spectrum and for good reasons. The increasingly authoritarian turn of the Justice and Development (AKP) government, with truly massive purges after the failed coup of July 15, 2016, the harsh crackdown on dissenters during the 2013 Gezi protests and beyond, and the suppression of freedom of speech, have all combined to turn even the most supportive friends of Turkey in the EU into critics. Few today, even among supporters of Turkey’s EU accession, believe that it is in the cards anytime in the foreseeable future.

However, the Eurobarometer data that we are considering here goes back to the period before Turkey took this authoritarian turn. In fact, it shows that opposition in the EU to Turkey’s EU accession increased during the years 2001–2005, which arguably was the period of the most ambitious EU-harmonizing reforms Turkey has ever experienced. Ziya Öniş calls this the “golden years” of AKP rule.58 During this period, the death penalty was abolished, great strides were taken to abolish the practice of torture in prisons and detention centers, nine democratization packages were adopted, and new civil and criminal codes contained significant legislation on women’s rights based on lobbying by women’s civil society organizations.

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57 This graph was first published in Paul T. Levin, *Turkey and the European Union: Christian and Secular Images of Islam* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) and is reprinted with the permission of the publisher.

Despite these strides, public opposition in the EU to Turkey’s EU accession increased during this time, most likely influenced by factors wholly exogenous to the accession process but which stirred up the old canon of anti-Islamic imagery. Beginning with the eruption of Islamic extremism on 9/11 and a series of spectacular terrorist attacks in Europe, peaking in 2004 with the gruesome killing of Theo Van Gogh and the Madrid bombings, these exogenous developments made it easy for the far right to pray on discomfort with the idea of a large Muslim-majority candidate for membership in the European “club.”

Analyses of debates in the European Parliament have shown a significant rise in the use of exclusionary imagery and rhetoric after 2002. The ascent to power in Turkey of a party with roots in political Islam—the AKP—arguably worked against

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**Opposition in the EU toward enlargement to... (1993-2006)**

* CYPRUS: Nov-Dec 1994 data missing, Jan 1996 data used as proxy.


**** Ukranie: Data missing for 1997, EB44.2 Jan-March 1996 used as proxy.

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60 Levin, *Turkey and the European Union.*
Turkey as far as popular perception in the EU was concerned. This rise of the AKP made it easier for Turkey’s detractors on the far right to evoke Islamophobic responses when talking about Turkey, despite the fact that the AKP during this period was busy conducting significant reforms in order to harmonize with EU law.

The historical legacy described above and the continued practices of Othering Turkey by leading politicians in the EU have arguably had serious consequences for Turkey–EU relations and have also had a negative impact on political developments in Turkey. Let us look at two troubling trends with respect to the said relationship. First of all, support for EU membership in Turkey—once extremely strong across almost all demographics—has now declined significantly. This is in part a reaction to the EU’s “ambivalent and discriminatory approach in the application of its conditionality.”

Another part of the problem is that the two metanarratives can be hard to distinguish from each other, even though there are two distinct kinds of opposition to Turkey’s membership bid within the EU. On the one hand, there is a contingent opposition on the basis that Turkey at the current time does not fulfill the Copenhagen criteria but that accession should be welcome when it does fulfill the criteria. The inclusive imagery described above fits in this category, and it is typically associated with comic meta-narratives. The tragic mode of employment and exclusionary imagery, on the other hand, are associated with a view that Turkey should not be allowed to join the EU because it is predominantly Muslim or (supposedly) culturally alien. However, proponents of this latter school of thought have tended to hide behind arguments about the state of Turkish democracy (i.e., the Copenhagen criteria), which explains why it has been so difficult for many Turks to distinguish between the two lines of reasoning.

Turks have increasingly been saying, “why should we listen to you lecturing us on human rights when you’re really just using it to keep us out because we’re Muslims?” It is quite clear that members and supporters of the sitting AKP government nowadays use this line of reasoning strategically and, quite cynically, to rebut criticism from the EU. However, the reason it works is that it taps into widespread sentiments among the Turkish population. Unfortunately, this has had a negative impact on the EU’s so-called normative power to propel reform in Turkey, which today is much diminished.

Second, the early pace of reforms aimed at harmonizing Turkish legislation and policy with the EU *acquis communautaire* had slowed substantially by the year 2010, but a shift could be traced as far back as 2005. Ziya Önis’s “golden age” (2002–2007) constituted a golden opportunity for the European Union to exercise the considerable conditional leverage it then held over Turkey and propel it towards serious and lasting reforms. Unfortunately, just as Turkey was beginning this arduous reform process, opposition to the whole project rose in Europe, and EU leaders like German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy either added caveats to or outright rejected the notion of full membership for Turkey. Partly for this reason, partly for internal political reasons that have not been my focus here, the AKP government soon turned away from the serious reform process and eventually focused solely on consolidating its power by any and all means, leading us to where we are today.

We are now at a point where “national conservative” parties on the far right have gained significant ground in many EU member states in recent years. The rise of these populist parties has shifted the

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discourse on topics such as immigration, the place of Islam in Europe, and ultimately Turkey’s bid for EU accession far to the right. Even though the increasing authoritarianism of the governing party in Turkey in many respects mirrors developments in some EU member states like Hungary and Poland, it has provided xenophobic and Islamophobic actors in the EU with an easy target. Accordingly, the “threat” of Turkish EU accession figured prominently in the Brexit referendum debate, where the Vote Leave campaign played on old prejudices and fears.

In many ways, these developments have played right into the hands of conservative and anti-Western forces in Turkish politics and society, not least within the ruling party. Increasingly, Turkish officials shrug off EU institutions’ criticism of Turkish human rights abuses, asserting that the critique is mere prejudice or that the EU is in no position to lecture those it is asking to care for the refugees that EU member states failed to welcome. Following the attempted coup on July 15, 2016, cabinet members and pro-government pundits lambasted the EU, and the West more broadly, for allegedly failing to come to the defense of the Turkish people or denounce the coup fast enough. A not-so-subtle line or argument has also emerged holding the United States responsible for the attempted coup. In Turkey, too, a “tragic” and more or less paranoid metanarrative of a country under attack by external forces that want to divide and weaken it—along with a set of increasingly nationalistic and exclusionary identity constructs—has become nearly hegemonic after the coup.

What we see in Turkey–EU relations today are the centrifugal effects of a vicious circle of anti-Turkish sentiments in EU member states and anti-Western sentiments in Turkey feeding off each other. The historically anchored and increasingly exclusionary representations of the Other are mutually reinforcing. Turkish Muslim nationalists invoke the conquest of Constantinople when European nationalists invoke the Siege of Vienna. In this chapter, I have not attempted to show that this turn for the worse in Turkey–EU relations is exclusively a function of the legacy of writing an exclusionary European history. Rather, I hope to have shown that this legacy did play a significant role in this downward spiral.

In this sense, Turkey was never Europe’s to “lose.” But, the saga of Turkey–EU relations in the first decade and a half of the new millennium could well be told as a tragic story of lost opportunities.
Almost seventy years have passed since Fernand Braudel published his famous La Méditerranée, highlighting an assumption that would become a standing point for historiography: the history of the 16th-century Mediterranean conjuncture could be more appropriately understood if contextualized in a larger historical and geographical framework that considered the Mediterranean basin and its lands as a unique, connected system. Sandy shores and cliffs, hilly or flat islands, impenetrable woods and terraced high grounds, calm seas or stormy winds constituted a diversified shared landscape that Early Modern Mediterranean states and empires had to contend with. While geographical features were susceptible to generalization, the strategies of management and survival adopted by different states and societies became comparable. This comparative approach had a profound influence on national historiographies, since it showed a way to overcome the ideological boundaries that had restricted each country's historical and, more broadly speaking, cultural developments happening in the aftermath of respective national emergencies. In the name of historical generalization and comparison, a new cultural integration of the Mediterranean seemed possible.

Understandably, in that framework the perspective offered by Ottoman documents was considered of major importance, and Turkish historians were therefore quickly involved in the debate. A successful period of intellectual cooperation started. In a conference held in June 1974 at the “Giorgio Cini” Foundation in Venice, Ömer Lütfi Barkan explained to an audience of European scholars, including Fernand Braudel, that the late 16th-century Ottoman elite also nourished an interest in keeping trade with the West alive. Strange as it might have seemed to the mainstream researchers of European archives, the Ottomans were neither always nor necessarily eager to make war with Christian states.

Since June 1974 historiography has certainly advanced, and relevant work has been done on topics requiring an interwoven analysis of French, Italian, Ottoman, and Spanish sources. Thanks to the efforts of three generations of historians, Ottoman studies are no longer considered an exotic curiosity. In some cases, far from boasting a revolution in historiography, scholars of Ottoman history have humbly but efficaciously preferred to verify data and interpretations transmitted by European national historiographies via Ottoman sources. Nevertheless, in my opinion the integration of this historiographical progress in the broader framework of each nation’s cultural policy, not to talk about foreign policy tout court, is still far from being effective. Most European states seem somehow imprisoned in Orientalism’s most misleading trap: that of considering the Eastern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean as a world inhabited by people whose memories, needs, and ambitions are irreducibly diverging from “ours.” Little emphasis is given to the Mediterranean seen as a common ground for analysis and action, while risks and dangers involved in eventual partnerships are over-stressed. I believe that the systematic integration of an Ottomanist standpoint in histo-
riography as well as of a “Turcological” perspective in all social sciences would help overcome this trap and prepare the ground for the advent of a cultural climate capable of letting us take full advantage of a renewed network of trans-Mediterranean partnerships. With this paper, I will try to illustrate a few guidelines that may facilitate the task.

Firstly, I think that Turkish studies, such as Turkish language and literature, Ottoman history, and Republican history, should not only be a branch of Oriental studies. Unfortunately, in Italy, as in most European countries, they are, and as such, they have nothing to gain and everything to lose. Academically weak, Italian Turcologists and Ottoman historians suffer from a structural lack of space of dialectical confrontation with other Early Modern historians, squeezed as we are between Iranists and Arabists, both groups traditionally interested in topics related to literature, philology, or translation. The concept of including specialists of the Ottoman Empire and of Turkey in Departments of History, Philosophy, History of Art, and Sociology, rather than among Orientalists, seems to be especially true in a country like Italy, where the traces of a common past with the other side of the Mediterranean are so numerous and substantial. For instance, the amount of Ottoman documents conserved in the Italian archives is impressive. This would not mean to deny any specific “identity,” but rather to create a new ground for discussion, leading perhaps to job opportunities, the lack of which affects many Mediterranean countries, including Italy and Turkey. Turkish studies, in other words, is certainly a group of specific disciplines requiring a specific education, but it should also become a perspective, a methodology of systematic comparison, to the advantage of cultural and political initiatives taking place in the universities of European and especially Mediterranean countries.

I would suggest at least five areas of intervention: logistical cooperation, greenfield investment planning, qualified tourism networking, the safeguarding of historical heritage, and in-depth media coverage. In connection with the respective national institutions, private enterprises, and operators, European and Turkish universities should create partnerships and joint projects in order to promote concrete opportunities of growth and exchange.

As far as logistics are concerned, the maritime connections between Mediterranean countries, and especially between the Eastern and the Northern harbors of the Mediterranean Sea, should be reorganized according to a new rationality based on regional and transregional cooperation rather than competition. Why should the maritime exchange between Italy and Turkey, for instance, be exclusively reduced to the Istanbul/Trieste axis? In Italy, port authorities are state owned and have a radically different administrative structure to Turkish ports. What can we learn by comparing these two alternative ways of managing maritime logistics? Could a new logistical network be reconsidered starting from the analysis of the economic needs of the two countries’ respective industrial structures?

The logistical issue, in fact, is closely linked to industrial partnership. The exchange of goods between Germany and Turkey transits via Trieste. Nevertheless, a quick glance at the road map will show that Trieste serves the Central-Eastern European hinterland more effectively, whereas German markets should be preferably reached via Venice and Verona. They should be, but currently they are not. Comparative research on this topic, conducted by some Italian and Turkish universities, preferably located in areas that may nourish direct interests in opening up new maritime routes, may motivate political actors to change the rules and rediscuss the Mediterranean roadmap. For several years I have worked on this topic with the Venice Port Authority, and thanks to a cooperation with LimakPort Iskenderun we are now trying to promote a direct link between Venice and Iskenderun in the service
of European enterprises wishing to contribute to Northern Syria’s reconstruction, hoping that it will soon be on the agenda.

Several European Union countries, such as Germany and Italy, are already among Turkey’s most important economic partners, although greenfield investments are not necessarily the rule. What, I believe, might be further developed is the will to create triangular partnerships, involving Turkey as mediating partner between EU members and Central Asian or Northern and Central African countries. Why should Italian entrepreneurs look either at Egypt or at Turkey, for example? Wouldn’t a partnership be stronger if it were all-inclusive? We often hear politicians speak about the need to make reforms in order to let our economies become stronger and more competitive. Competitive for whom? Other European nations? Turkey? Far-Eastern countries? I do not want to sound more “Smithian” than I am, but, contrary to what is happening now in EU economic planning, isn’t the Mediterranean space an area that seems to suggest the opportunity for a sensible regional specialization, especially in the field of the food industry? Moreover, if it were European and Turkish universities involved in creating such opportunities, wouldn’t it be easier to promote the issue of healthy and environmentally sustainable food production and redistribution, possibly asking for Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) sponsorship?

Tourism is currently one of the most successful economic sectors in the Mediterranean. Whole islands and shores live on tourism. Even former industrial establishments have become tourist resorts, such as 19th-century Ottoman soap factories in Crete, now converted into fashionable inns. Coming myself from a city that due to mass tourism has almost completely lost its basic functional facilities, let me warn about the risks of an only-tourist economic inclination. Tourism makes you dependent on foreign economies and standards at the costly risk of losing any productive vocation and tradition. Even the centuries-old Murano glass factories are almost entirely annihilated by Chinese competition. The late Ottoman elite understood how essential it was to import technological knowhow and machines for political independence; how have Italians become a country characterized by the chronic lack of an industrial policy and only by the triumphant success of the third sector?

An antidote to the pervasive exclusivity of the tourist sector might be the establishment of a permanent connection with a homogeneously standardized policy of the safeguarding, restoration, and development of our historical heritage. For once, Italian architects, archaeologists, and art historians may legitimately claim leadership capacities in this issue. Common architectural and artistic traces of a shared past might be highlighted in specific tourist proposals involving university-based start-ups and internships for students of the disciplines involved.

My final point concerns the media and, more generally, information transfer. The availability of first-hand sources of information and the evaluation of their reliability is at the center of the controversy concerning fake news. Therefore, it is not a topic just concerning the Eastern Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the Near East is one of the areas in the world where it is harder to have access to reliable first-hand information. Articles are generally written from a one-sided perspective that does not leave much space for doubts and further consideration. I find it hard to believe that, after more than a century of modern historiographical debate, journalists do not consider a critical analysis of sources as an unavoidable methodology, the essential tool for the reconstruction of reality. The internet revolution truly has provided everyone with constant access to countless information but at the same time it would be hard not to recognize that historiography has lost its most important battle, that of showing the importance of a scientific method of analysis in the
definition of the topic, in the selection of first-hand and second-hand sources and in processing the final interpretation. There was a time, in the 1970s, when the most advanced historians felt the need to conduct research at the service of society as a whole.

Historical research and history tout court were considered the key disciplines to introduce any student and any future citizen to an awareness of the present. Departments of history were not only founded in order to educate future historians but also future journalists, diplomats, and politicians. I believe that much of their failure was due to the incapacity of mainstream historians to fully integrate the Middle Eastern (Eastern Mediterranean, Ottoman, “Turcological,” etc.) approach in their research. Fernand Braudel’s legacy has not been developed to its full potential, and the perspective “of the other side” has not been systematically investigated in reconstructing the history of Europe. Antonio Gramsci wrote that the history of Italy could not be written without the consciousness of the North and South’s divergent models of development, the so-called questione meridionale. Analogously, the history of Europe cannot be written without being aware of the question d’Orient. To be more precise, now that Ottoman archives are available, the history of Europe cannot be written without Ottoman sources, which offer the main opportunity to check and verify assumptions, theories, and interpretations. Far from being a matter of taking sides, the point is rather to recognize the intellectual and scientific need to offer European citizenship to Ottoman sources on a permanent basis. The Ottomans were not the silent witnesses of Europe’s historical actions. The time has come to let their voices be heard.

Needless to say, it is already late. This cultural standpoint should have been adopted in the 1980s, maybe on one of the many occasions when the Turkish democrats needed support and recognition from la civile Europe. Neither support nor recognition came. They were left alone, and now we realize that by refusing to integrate a Turkish perspective, in reality, it is we Europeans who have been left alone, on the periphery of the world’s decision-making processes.
BETWEEN RAPPROCHEMENT AND REJECTION: IDENTITY AND CULTURAL DRIVERS IN EUROPE-TURKEY RELATIONS

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