


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NEVER AGAIN! BUT HOW? STATE AND THE MILITARY IN TURKEY AFTER JULY 15

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About Istanbul Policy Center

Istanbul Policy Center (IPC) is a global policy research institution that specializes in key social and political issues ranging from democratization to climate change, transatlantic relations to conflict resolution and mediation. IPC organizes and conducts its research under three main clusters: The Istanbul Policy Center-Sabancı University-Stiftung Mercator Initiative, Democratization and Institutional Reform, and Conflict Resolution and Mediation. For over a decade, IPC has provided decision makers, opinion leaders, and other major stakeholders with objective analyses and innovative policy recommendations. As an essential part of Sabancı University, IPC strives to foster academic research. The Center extends intellectual and substantive support to young academics and policy researchers through its various programs.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper, a part of the Post-Coup Opportunities on Conflict Resolution and Democracy Project conducted by the Istanbul Policy Center, presents a model for 'damage control' of the state and security after the July 15 military uprising through analyzing three domains: the state bureaucracy, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), and civil-military relations (CMR). This paper hopes to provide both scholarly and practical advice to policymakers to limit the damaging effects of the July 15 coup attempt and its aftershocks.

The July 15 uprising has revealed significant differences between the *reality of the state* (a state in which the bureaucratic cadres are vulnerable enough to be infiltrated) and its *rhetoric* (strong state discourse continuously narrated by state elites). The July 15 failed coup showcased the prolonged, calculated attempts of a religiously motivated/pseudo-utopist covert cult supervised/inspired by the U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gülen to infiltrate the entirety of the state bureaucracy, primarily through the security and intelligence bureaucracy and judiciary. Thus, faced with the challenge of rebuilding the post-July 15 state and its institutions, how can Turkey prevent the occurrence of another July 15 hijacking the state apparatus? To answer this question, this paper sets forth recommendations for principles that would constitute as risk-diminishing factors in the recalibration of the state apparatus.

In the domain of CMR, this paper emphasizes Turkey's overarching dilemma in the post-July 15 setting: whether to *monopolize* or *democratize* CMR for more effective civilian control. That is, on the one hand, the monopolization of CMR, implying transfer of power from the military elites to the elected executive presidency, enables strict civilian control of the military by the elected civilian president; on the other hand, democratization of CMR enables diffusion of power among the elected president, elected government, and parliamentary and civil society actors such as academia, think thanks, and media so as to create a more effective oversight and monitoring system over the military. Indeed, the post-July 15 setting, shaped by concurrent military reforms and mass purges, led to two paradigm shifts. The first shift took place in the nature of Turkish CMR, implying a transition from the Huntingtonian paradigm focusing on the management of the gap between the military and civilian worlds to the Janowitzian paradigm aiming to diminish the gap between the military and society so as to anchor the military to society as a whole. The second shift is in the Turkish military's institutional identity, emphasizing a transition from a *monolithic* identity to a *polylithic* one composed of many but separated micro-identities. To elucidate the impact of these paradigm shifts, this paper analyzes the possible implications of such a hasty and large-scale civilianization process on the nature of Turkish CMR. It then explores the extent to which the military's institutional identity has evolved from a monolithic whole into a polylithic formation involving many but separated micro-identities in terms of the military elites' stance towards change and their worldviews. This transition from monolithic to polylithic is driven by the weakening of the agency of the Chief of General Staff and seems to be the prime risk factor within the military and, thus, is in need of delicate management.

In total, this paper identifies the following risk factors faced in the post-July 15 setting within state institutions, the military, and Turkish CMR:

- The absence of constructive scholarly debate about the pros and cons of narrowing CMR to the level of 'president-military relations' due to the ultra-securitized political context in Turkey;
- Low levels of civilian intellectual capital on security issues and military transformation;
- The military's becoming the primary domain of the popular and political debates between conservatives and seculars in a polarized socio-political context;
- The friction between the civilian elites and the military elites over the causes, scale, and tempo of military reforms after July 15 shaping the nature of CMR;
- The friction between the pro-status quo camp and the reformists within the military;
- The friction among those military elites with differentiating worldviews regarding the military's new institutional identity, the role of Islam within the state and society, pro/anti-U.S. sentiment, pro/anti-NATO stance, and being a part of the Western security architecture or going for a 'non-aligned' position in the construction of this new identity.

These six risk factors should be meticulously managed in the post-July 15 setting.

INTRODUCTION

Peter Feaver notes "because we fear others, we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we have created"[1] and he calls this paradox the 'civil-military *problematique*',[2] implying the need to receive protection both *by* and *from* the military. On the night of 15 July,[3] Turkey bitterly experienced the need for the latter, the need to be granted protection *from* the military.[4]

Since 20 July 2016, just five days after the shocking coup attempt that claimed over 240 lives, Turkey has been under a perpetual state of emergency—by means of which the government can issue executive decrees in a rapid fashion both for the de-Gülenification of the state bureaucracy and to fight more effectively against two violent non-state actors currently active in Turkey, the Islamic State (ISIS)-linked extreme Salafi networks and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). While initially this state was declared for a single 90-day period, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has faced few complications in extending this period past its intended expiration. In 2016 alone, around 500 civilians (including 40 foreigners) and 400 security forces (soldiers, policemen, and village guards) were killed in 25 major terror attacks in Turkey.[5] It is likely that the forthcoming constitutional referendum on 16 April 2017, involving a set of 18 proposed constitutional amendments ending the parliamentary system in Turkey and establishing an executive presidency, will be put to vote under the state of emergency, which will last, in President Tayyip Erdoğan's words, 'until everything is settled down'.[6]

Turkey has indeed been going through challenging times since 15 July 2016, and multiple factors have put the country's future at peril, including that of the state, the military, and Turkish civil-military relations (CMR). For some, the most effective remedy for Turkey to diminish these risks is to first formalize and then institutionalize the executive presidency, a 'practical reality' that has seemed to turn into an 'urgent need' after July 15.[7] Proponents of the system change suggest that the lack of strong government was closely related to the fragmentation of political parties and resulting parliamentarism and growing friction between various identity groups, which led to periods of instability in Turkey.[8] Following this line of thought, first quickly civilianizing and then slowly monopolizing CMR under the strict civilian control of the elected executive presidency is not only the solution to preventing the occurrence of another July 15 but also the means to developing more effective security forces.[9]

Turkey's current dilemma of whether to *monopolize* or *democratize* CMR to prevent military interventions marks another *problematique* in addition to Feaver's paradox. On the one hand, the monopolization of CMR enables strict civilian control of the military through the elected civilian president, implying transfer of power from the military elites to the elected executive presidency. On the other, the democratization of CMR enables diffusion of power among the elected president, elected government, parliamentary, and civil society actors such as academia, think thanks, and media.

Another risk factor to be delicately managed is the institutional transformation of the state apparatus after July 15. As Bülent Aras notes in his policy report concentrating on the effects of July 15 on Turkish foreign policy, the 15 July 2016 coup attempt marks a tipping point for the entire state apparatus in Turkey.[10] It is indeed possible to define the military uprising of July 15 as the act of putschists attempting to hijack state power both to redesign the state apparatus and, in the case of strict Gülenists, to rule people until society

1 Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 2 (1996), p.149.

2 Ibid, p.149.

3 Metin Gürcan, "Why Turkey's coup didn't stand a chance," *Al-Monitor*, July 17, 2016, accessed August 2, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-kamikaze-coup-attempt-fails.html.

4 Please see these pieces for an earlier version of this article: Metin Gürcan and Megan Gisclon, "From Autonomy to Full-fledged Civilian Control: Changing Nature of Turkish Civil-Military Relations After July 15," *IPC-Mercator Policy Brief* (Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center, August 2016); Metin Gürcan and Megan Gisclon, "What is the Turkish Military's Strategic Identity after July 15?" *IPC-Mercator Policy Brief* (Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center, September 2016).

5 Metin Gürcan, "Does New Year's nightclub attack signal tough year ahead for Turkey?" *Al-Monitor*, January 8, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/01/turkey-nightclub-attack-signals-even-tougher-year.html.

6 Please see: "Erdoğan, KHK ve OHAL'e devam dedi: Referandum için üzerime düşeni yapacağım," *Diken,* March 2, 2017, accessed March 3, 2017, http://www.diken.com.tr/erdogan-khk-ve-ohale-devam-dedi-referandum-icin-uzerime-duseni-yapacagim/.

7 Burhanettin Duran, "The Executive Presidency and Turkey's Future," *Daily Sabah*, January 31, 2017.

8 Burhanettin Duran and Nebi Mis, "The Transformation of the Turkey's Political System and Executive presidency," *Insight Turkey* 18, no. 4, (2016): 11-27.

9 "Turkey in need of effective executive presidency, Deputy PM Kurtulmuş says," *Daily Sabah*, January 7, 2017.

10 Bülent Aras, "Turkish Foreign Policy After July 15," *IPC Policy Paper* (Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center, February 2017).

adapts to 'Fethullah Gülen's totalitarian political vision militarized by the Gülenist putschits'.[11] These two factors distance the events of July 15 from past coups in the history of the Republic of Turkey, which had sought to topple the elected government and hand over political power to the elected civilians at the end of the day. July 15 then indicates a grim reality: in terms of bureaucratic capacity to challenge the existential threats, 'state rhetoric' (a state in which the bureaucratic cadres are vulnerable enough to be infiltrated) and 'state reality' (strong state discourse continuously narrated by the state elites) differ in Turkey. The 'strong state tradition',[12] which was developed out of Turkey's historic background, has been painfully revealed to be strong in rhetoric yet vulnerable in responding to the existential bureaucratic challenges on the night of July 15. The July 15 failed coup showcased the prolonged, calculated attempts of a religiously motivated/pseudo-utopist covert cult supervised/inspired by the U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gülen to infiltrate the entirety of the state bureaucracy, primarily through the security and intelligence bureaucracy and judiciary.

It is thus of the utmost importance to ask the following questions: how can the state prevent the occurrence of another July 15, which attempted to hijack the state apparatus? Will monopolizing/accumulating power under an executive presidency enable stricter control of the state apparatus, or does democratizing power represent the better opinion in that it will create checks and balances, institutional oversight, and monitoring mechanisms within the state apparatus?

In a nutshell, the military uprising of 15 July imposes upon us the call to carry on the argument for the transformation of CMR and the military, as well as the institutional structure of the state, into the most existential (ontological) ground. The aim of this paper is to provide a perspective in order to not only repeat the cries of 'Never again!' but also to seek answers to the accompanying question, 'But, how?' The author will analyze three areas of discussion: the state apparatus, the Turkish Armed Forces as an institution, and civil-military relations after July 15. These three arenas constitute the grounds in which significant and long-term actions must be taken to limit the damaging effects of the July 15 coup attempt and its aftershocks.

To achieve this, the first section will elaborate on the shock to the institutional structure of the state caused by July 15. The second section delves into how the continuing mass purges have impacted the strategic identity of the TSK. The third section provides an analysis of the paradigm change in Turkish civil-military relations as a result of the military reforms triggered by July 15. The discussion section first elucidates and then assesses the risks and challenges faced in the post-July 15 setting in the domains of state institutions, the military's strategic identity, and Turkish CMR. This section also presents six risk domains that should be managed delicately in this setting.

11 The author prefers this definition in light of observations/experiences he obtained during his service in the Turkish General Staff (2010-2015), in which he could interacted with many currently arrested putschist officers allegedly linked to FETÖ.

12 Metin Heper, *Türkiye'de Devlet Geleneği* (Istanbul: Doğubatı, 2008).

STATE AFTER JULY 15

In times of crisis, the state's capacity and success in responding to existential challenges, such as the one Turkey experienced on the night of July 15, bears the utmost significance. The literature on failed states[13] has been highly developed since the 1990s and 2000s. It is now a point of consensus that all states face existential threats. Yet while some manage to survive via their own capacity generated by effective, efficient, and democratic functioning of their institutions, some turn into collapsed institutional structures that threaten local populations, and other states and become what we call 'failed states' that cannot effectively and efficiently function for the delivery of what they promise.[14] At this point, it is necessary to lay out the six qualities of a well-functioning state that can stand and sustainably cope with existential threats:

- The state should first promise and then deliver what it promises to its constituents by maintaining its institutional continuity and governance activities through its institutions.
- To make life more prosperous, peaceful, and democratic, the state should first promise and then deliver less unpredictable, arbitrary, and uncertain outcomes.
- To maintain internal social cohesion, the state should promise to peacefully and democratically resolve political, social, and economic confrontations through inclusive and pluralist institutions.
- The state should find optimum balance between freedom and security, maintaining homogeneity and preserving heterogeneity, promoting plurality and protecting particularity, and transforming effectively and maintaining the required amount of stability during a transformation.
- The division of 'what is political' and 'what is bureaucratic' should be designed in a transparent and accountable fashion for determining borders, duties, and responsibilities within the bureaucracy.
- The state's approach to religion should be carefully crafted: the state's very own agency and citizens' freedom of religion should not dare to hijack one another.

The July 15 uprising revealed a bitter truth for Turkey: the existence of a religiously motivated 'secret network'[15] with a distinctive utopian religious/political vision that *militarized* itself through infiltration into critical senior posts of the TSK. The aim of this 'militarized secret network' was to hijack state power by operationalizing its cadres within the state's bureaucracy, particularly within the security sector involving the TSK, National Intelligence Agency (MIT), National Police Force (EGM), Gendarmerie Command, and Coast Guard. The secret elements of this network, then active within the judiciary and higher administrative bureaucracy, also became operational on the night of July 15 to play an 'enabler' role for the military elements attempting to hijack state power. One should note that this secret network's ability to infiltrate into the state bureaucracy, particularly into the security sector, is not only a disease in itself but also the symptom of a grim reality of the state in Turkey: its ability to be easily infiltrated.

A significant factor that sets the July 15 coup attempt apart from its predecessors is the state's response in its aftermath, in which massive purges caused a social outburst against the state's handling of the de-Gülenification process as well as the victims of the purges. Attempts to recover from the societal trauma caused by July 15 are likely not based on a consensual, all-inclusive framework in ideological, ethical, and sectarian terms. For instance, it is expressed quite often that the exclusion of the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and the Kurds from the Yenikapı process was a mistake.[16] Another point to be raised is the government's falling into the Nirvana fallacy of implementing an 'Iron Fist Approach' not for de-Gülenification efforts but against the pro-Kurdish HDP and Democratic Society Party (DTP) organizations, municipalities run by these two parties, and all HDP/DTP-affiliated political networks and economic and socio-cultural organizations by

13 Jonathan Di John, "Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature," *School of Oriental and African Studies*, Working Paper No: 25, January (2008).

14 Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, "Fixing Failed States: A Cure Worse than the Disease?" *Harvard International Review* (2008).

15 Metin Gürcan, "Why it is so difficult to decipher the Gülenist network?" *Al-Monitor*, August 2, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/turkey-coup-attempt-who-difficult-to-decipher-gulenists.html.

16 Mahmut Bozarslan, "Turkey's Kurds excluded from the post-coup unity," *Al-Monitor*, August 3, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/turkey-kurds-further-alienated-after-coup-attempt.html.

means of the legal privileges provided by the state of emergency. During his 4 September 2016 visit to Diyarbakir, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım declared that there is 'no solution or anything' to the conflict and that the government will pursue kinetic methods until the very end to annihilate the PKK[17] or de-PKK-ify the Kurds in Turkey, implying a change in the rhetoric of 'the Kurdish problem' into the 'Kurds' PKK problem'. Thanks to extended legal and law enforcement authority provided by the state of emergency, this new strategy can be described as total eradication—not deterrence—of the PKK and all its auxiliaries in the political, economic and socio-cultural domains.[18]

Thus, in the aftermath of July 15, there have been many state-related risk domains predicated by current affairs. These can be listed as follows:

- the embrace of a broader approach of prolonged total war against FETÖ so as to physically eradicate both open and covert networks instead of a quick shock therapy solely concentrating on those covert networks attempting the July 15 uprising;
- linking the fight against the PKK to the counter-FETÖ mobilization and using privileges provided by the state of emergency not only to fight against the PKK's armed wing but also PKK-affiliated political, economic, and socio-cultural actors, which may not be directly linked to PKK-initiated violence and terror attacks;
- putting FETÖ, PKK, and ISIS, three violent non-state actors with different power bases, ideologies, strategies, and tactics/techniques, into the same basket, popularly defined as the 'cocktail terror',[19] or a kind of a messy centre of convergence on which these three jointly operate.
- construction of a loose and hard to define concept of a 'superior mind', which promotes the conspiracy theory implying FETÖ, PKK, and ISIS are mere agent-less instruments of foreign powers whose utmost aim is to destabilize/divide Turkey;
- extreme politicization of the debates about system change and the executive presidency with the forthcoming referendum;
- the inclination to 'securitize' all problems in Turkey with binary templates such as patriots vs. traitors, citizens vs. terror supporters, loyalists vs. collaborators with foreign powers.

It is therefore possible to assert that the July 15 uprising and its aftershocks, mainly shaped by military reforms and mass purges, have most predominantly affected Turkish CMR and the military itself. In the following section, what, why, and how this impact has altered the military's strategic identity and changed the very nature of civil-military relations will be elucidated.

17 Binali Yıldırım, "Çözüm mözüm yok kardeşim," *CNNTürk*, September 4, 2016, http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/binali-yildirim-cozum-mozum-yok-kardesim.

18 Metin Gürcan, "Ankara's hardening anti-PKK strategy," *Al-Monitor,* September 12, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/09/turkey-new-anti-pkk-strategy.html.

19 Metin Gürcan, "Would like your terror straight up or as cocktail?" *Al-Monitor*, October 22, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/turkey-syria-isis-ankara-bombings-terror-cocktail-kurds-pyd.html.

MILITARY AFTER JULY 15

Speculation has been rife on how these purges have affected the TSK's combat effectiveness and on whether there will be problems filling critical posts.[20] Since the mass purges beginning on 27 July 2016,[21] nearly 44 percent of the land force generals, 42 percent of air force generals, 58 percent of naval admirals, and around 30 percent of the staff officers in charge of concept development and planning in strategic headquarters such as the Turkish General Staff and force commands have been formally discharged.[22] On 2 February 2017, the official website of the Chief of the General Staff provided a breakdown on the TSK's personnel changes. According to the figures given, as of February 2017, about 359,273 personnel are serving in the Turkish army, navy, and air force: 203 generals, 26,768 officers, 67,999 non-commissioned officers (NCOs), 47,570 specialist soldiers, 16,149 contracted soldiers, and 204,074 conscripts.[23] Accordingly, 43 percent of the TSK are professional soldiers, while 57 percent are conscripts. When we compare these numbers with the March 2016 figures, we see a 38 percent reduction in the number of generals, which then numbered 325 across the three branches, and an 8 percent reduction from the total 32,451 serving officers. There were no major changes in other ranks. In February 2017, the total number of soldiers dismissed reached 3,939, and the number of soldiers of various ranks detained, mostly conscripted privates, stood at around 8,000.

In short, the depletion of personnel has adversely affected the combat strength of the TSK, but it is generally felt that the high motivation of the remaining personnel can make up for the numerical decline. It is also important to note that among the TSK personnel now detained, there are scores who were not involved in the coup attempt. Concluding their investigations could further increase the number of available officers. Although the TSK appears to be coping with the effects of the dismissals, no one can deny that the Special Forces units, navy's underwater assault teams, and Turkish Air Forces Search and Rescue teams will need at least a year—for the TSK, a minimum of two—to restore their personnel numbers to pre-July 15 levels.

One should also note that the failed coup attempt on July 15 and the following purges aiming for the de-Gülenification[24] of the officer corps, particularly senior cadres of the military, have caused an endogenous shock within the military and have increasingly transformed its monolithic identity embodied and represented by the Chief of General Staff into a polylithic one (composed of many but separated micro-identities) in terms of the military elites' stance towards change and their worldviews. In light of the author's PhD research and in-depth interviews conducted with retired/serving soldiers after July 15, this paper suggests that the differentiation among military elites in terms of their stance towards change and the differentiation in terms of their worldviews would be two primary categories indicative of change within the military.

In terms of their stance on change, the military elites can be classified into three categories.

Symbionts: [25] Military elites who have a parasitic and mutualistic relationship with the TSK

Pragmatists:[26] Military elites who only think of their careers and have opportunist relationships with the military

20 Metin Gürcan, "How the post-coup purges depleted the Turkish military," Al-Monitor, September 16, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/09/turkey-military-needs-two-year-fill-ranks-emptied-by-purge.html.

21 Metin Gürcan, "After massive purge, what's next for Turkish Armed Forces?" Al-Monitor, August 1, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/turkey-coup-attempt-major-purge-of-armed-force.html.

22 "Infographics: Turkey's coup attempt in numbers," *Hurriyet Daily News*, July 29, 2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/infographics-turkeys-coup-attempt-in-numbers.aspx?pageID=238&nID=102228&NewsCatID=341.

23 "TSK'nın Şubat 2017 Personel Mevcutları," *MSI*, February 1, 2017, accessed March 2, 2017 http://www.milscint.com/tr/tsknin-subat-2017-personel-mevcutlari/.

24 Kadri Gürsel, "Has Turkey's Gülenist witch hunt spiraled out of control?" *Al-Monitor*, August 29, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/turkey-gulenist-purge-shows-hysteria-symptoms.html.

25 Symbionts exploit an institution for private gain even though they depend on the existence and the broad efficacy of the institution to achieve this gain. Symbionts think that they have already paid their dues for their past service and that they are entitled to kick back while it is the system's turn to look after them. In this way, there is a one-sided relationship with the institution. Please see: James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 24. Please also see, Metin Gürcan and Megan Gisclon, "What is the Turkish Military's Strategic Identity after July 15?"

26 Pragmatists have ambiguous preferences about institutional change. They neither actively seek to preserve the status quo nor visibly try to change the rules. Pragmatists instead exploit whatever possibilities exist within the prevailing system to maintain their interests. Pragmatists consistently follow the status quo or the trends that are happening inside the institution and fall on the side of what would be the best for their career. Please see: Mahoney and Thelen, *Explaining Institutional Change,* 25.

Reformists:[27] Military elites who are not pleased with the current situation and who want to see the TSK turn into 'something' else. There are two variants of this category: the **originalist reformists** and **progressive reformists**.[28]

An example may better illustrate these typologies. For instance, think about the discussion of whether or not the graduates of *imam-hatip* schools (high schools with religious curriculum) should become officers or NCOs in the military. The originalists would not accept this under any circumstance as it would deviate from the 'ideal type'. The symbionts would remain uninterested in this debate, while the pragmatists could either be for or against it depending on the tide of politics and the stance taken by their higher-ups, such as the chief commanders. As for the case of the progressives, they would conduct a cost-benefit analysis. If the analysis revealed that the need for societal change prevailed over the need to stick with the current system, then they would be in support of allowing graduates from *imam-hatip* religious high schools becoming officers and NCOs.

In addition to the typologies among military elites, it is possible to classify the viewpoints and political tendencies of the military elites as follows:

	Nationalist	Globalist
Rightest	Conservatives (*mukaddesatci*)	Atlanticists
Leftist	Neo-nationalist (*ulusalci*)	Eurasianists

Table 1. List of prominent ideologies within the Turkish military

27 Reformists are enemy to the status quo as they are constantly criticizing the TSK's culture, organizational structure, and the nature of job positions. They also believe that the TSK falls behind (in either technology or tactics/techniques) when compared with global armies.

28 Originalist reformists: According to these more traditionally-minded reformists, the current values held by the TSK have diverged from the ideals espoused during the early years of the Turkish Republic (proactive and exclusive secularism, *etatism*, nationalism, elitism and enlightenment, among others). In order to reach their goals without diverging from the intended path, the current system needs to be completely abolished and then return to the original principles (almost like a factory reset).
Progressive reformists: This type of military elite, who are not as stuck in the past as the originalist reformists, thinks that the TSK must move forward with the present situation as it stands now. Generally speaking, the progressives, who do not have as much of a values-oriented approach as the last type, are of the opinion that changes need to be made to the society, Turkish CMR, and the global security environment.

Conservatives within the military do not have knowledge of a foreign language, or experience in training or education in foreign countries. They, with isolationist and protectionist stances, tend not to be concerned with developments in the international system and the global security environment. The conservatives are pro-status quo, reactive, and normally pragmatic. They generally approach the world with a neo-Ottoman or religious perspective but lack academic background when compared with the other types. Sometimes their symbiont sensibilities can come to the forefront.

Atlanticists typically have a pro-NATO and pro-U.S. sentiment, are well-educated, speak fluent English, and have undergone at least one year of service abroad. Furthermore, Atlanticists aim at reaching a level of NATO professionalism. Atlanticists think that NATO and its value system, as well as the structure and the conditions of jobs within the U.S. military, are ideal. Furthermore, the Atlanticists perceive that the TSK is an important part of the Western security environment, with the United States in the lead. This type thinks the TSK must rank among the leading armies around the world by emphasizing its traditionally set NATO-centric geostrategic orientations.

Neo-nationalists, in contrast to the conservatives, view the period before the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 as the era of darkness, yet they do not tend to have high competence in a foreign language or much international experience, similar to the conservatives. For this reason, this type will view anything that happens outside Turkey with suspicion, and most of the time will lean towards a reactive/nationalist attitude over a leftist and staunchly secular ideological position with a firm Kemalist stance. In addition to showing pragmatic tendencies, the neo-nationalists are critical of preserving the TSK's traditional institutional identity and the continuation of the status quo, similar to the originalists.

Eurasianists, like the Atlanticists, have a good grasp of foreign languages, a good academic education, and at least one post abroad lasting at least one year. However, unlike the Atlanticist, the Eurasianist is more independent and anti-American, thus most have a non-aligned stance, yet some have a pro-Russian stance due to their leftist sentiment. They hold the opinion that the TSK should be more independent in the global security environment, and they are as anti-NATO as the neo-nationalists are. They strongly believe that the centre of global geopolitics is shifting to the east as they are the devout supporters of the 'The rise of the Rest' argument. Since the Eurasianists are more well-read,

they are not as strategically colour-blind as the neo-nationalists.

In light of these categories, some critical questions remain when addressing military reform after July 15. In the effort to rebuild the military's institutional identity, will President Erdoğan and the high command involving four-star generals have converging or diverging agendas? Will President Erdoğan apply the 'divide and rule' policy among those different types of military elites so as to create a rivalry among them and keep them divided, or will he attempt to empower a particular type in order to keep others under control? Will the Eurasianists and neo-nationalists attempt to side with the conservative civilian elites dominating the AKP's high cadres when transforming the military and recalibrating CMR or lead the way with their models of transformation (secular and Kemalist in domestic affairs but more 'non-aligned' with foreign affairs)? Will the pragmatists and symbionts work to establish stricter control over civilians to return to the pre-July 15 status quo, or will they be more aligned around President Erdoğan and support his proposal for the executive presidency and stricter civilian control? The answers of these questions will be relevant indicators when addressing change within the military after July 15.

THE NEW NATURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AFTER JULY 15: MORE JANOWITZ, LESS HUNTINGTON

The reforms that have taken place within the TSK following July 15, with particular emphasis on the meeting of the Supreme Military Council (*Yüksek Askerî Şûra*, YAŞ) on 28 July and the Executive Degrees (KHKs) of 27 July, 31 July, 2 September, and 7 September 2016 and 6 January 2017 have been the government's largest recourse for action against the attempted military uprising. The reforms can be classified into six categories:

1. **Reforms in military-government relations** such as the inclusion of civilian ministers to the National Security Council, [29] the disengagement of the Gendarmerie Command and Coast Guard from the Turkish General Staff (TGS) and its subordination to the Interior Ministry, as well as the subordination of the army (land forces), navy, and air force commands directly to the Ministry of Defence and subsequent coordinator agent-like role of the TGS, which lead to the weakening of the TGS's dominance and waning agency of the post of Chief of General Staff;

2. **Reforms changing the military promotion and appointment system** such as the executive decree of KHK 681 on 6 January 2017 in which all officers starting from the rank of lieutenant are to be promoted after the approval of the Defence Minister, which had been done by the TGS before;

3. **Reforms in the military education system** such as the abolishment of the Staff College and War Academies and the foundation of the National Defence University[30] as a more civilian institution providing military education at the undergraduate and graduate level with new curriculum;

4. **The abolishment of the military judicial system**, which was previously an autonomous and privileged military institution immune to civilian interference;

5. **Reforms ending the military's privileged domains** such as the military health system being handed over to the civilian Ministry of Health[31] and closure of military-run economic enterprises such as textile facilities, maintenance units, and some factories;

6. **Reforms aiming to diminish the gap between the military and society** such as lifting the ban on female officers wearing the Muslim headscarf within the military under an executive decree issued in February 2017.

It is likely to suggest that, given the hastiness and extent of the military reforms, some of which are presented above, this civilianization process in Turkish CMR seems 'revolutionary'. Simply, the July 15 putschists broke the ivory tower in which the military was once living in a privileged fashion. The military reforms aiming for revolutionary civilianization have led to a paradigm shift: from a Huntingtonian one to a Janowitzian one. This implies a shift from the professionalization of an autonomous army, in other words the Huntingtonian paradigm that influenced the very nature of Turkish CMR for decades,[32] to a more Janowitzian one, denying the existence of an autonomous military and instead seeking to manage the gap between civilians and the military.[33] The reforms carried out in the state of emergency decree laws have severely damaged the privilege of the military, bound it to the politicians in more ways than one, and ushered

29 "Turkish government introduces new decree law to overhaul army," *Hurriyet Daily News*, July 31, 2016.

30 Sena Alkan, "Residents do not want to see military school in Kuleli, headman says," *Daily Sabah*, August 3, 2016.

31 Metin Gürcan, "Turkish military faces new front as Health Ministry usurps medical system," *Al-Monitor*, October 5, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/turkey-coup-attempt-new-discord-military-medicine.html.

32 Ersel Aydınlı, "Civil-Military Relations Transformed," *Journal of Democracy* 23, no. 1 (2012): 100-108.

33 The work done by both Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz dating 60 years back is, indeed, still relevant for contemporary debates regarding Turkish CMR after July 15. Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* and Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* not only methodically combined empirical research on CMR with systematic theorizing for the first time, but also led to the emergence of different paths within research on CMR. That is, political science studies of CMR, on the one hand, have mostly followed the Huntingtonian tradition examine how civilian political leaders can maintain civilian control. Janowitz, on the other hand, concentrates more on the cultural norms, values, and societal factors affecting militaries, and the relationship between soldiers and civil society. While Janowitz agrees with Huntington on the separate characteristics of the military and the civilian worlds, he differs from his predecessor on how the military would be denied from posing a threat to democracy and society within which, in fact, it was created. Janowitz challenges Huntington's objective control and proposes external intervention, or "subjective control" in Huntington's words, as the most viable instrument that may facilitate the change of the military in a timely and effective manner. In sum, both Huntington and Janowitz defines the civil-military playing field.

in a new era of civilian control. Moving forward from July 15, the 'revolutionary civilianization' process has picked up the Turkish military from Huntington's world and placed it right back down in Janowitz's. Civilian elites have seen the attempted coup as a clear sign that the military had been living in another world, maybe even in another universe, and thus it is high time first to diminish the gap between the civilians and the military so as to 'anchor' the military to the civilian world. The new paradigm after July 15 does not recognize the autonomous domain of the military; therefore, it seeks to exterminate it rather than manage it. As seen from the above description, the new paradigm cuts off nearly 100 years of Turkish history. The social and cultural norms that the military has been embedded with since 1923 may be eradicated in this new era—as we have seen in the case of the transfer of the military health system to the civilian Ministry of Health or the abolishment of the autonomous military judiciary.

BALANCING CMR, BUT HOW?

To ensure the balanced success of CMR, civil and democratic control, effectiveness and efficiency, social legitimacy, and the credibility of the military must be guaranteed.

Civil and Democratic Control

It seems that the rapid civilianization process implemented across the security sector after July 15 has come to a halt. TSK continues to remain bolted to the presidential palace – whether officially or unofficially – and it is unclear when, it will be granted any independence or its responsibilities will be tied to other civilian-controlled institutions. As civilianization does not necessarily mean democratization, this process can also lead to monopolization. In the literature on CMR, the link between a sound constitution and institutions with a strong security sector is validated. But, what happens when constitutional change leads to the concentration of power in the hands of a single executive office? These pros and cons eventually become a zero-sum game, and we arrive back at the present state of insecurity in which Turkey is living. The opposition (namely, the Republican People's Party, [CHP]) has predicted that the constitutional changes will increase polarization within Turkish society, a claim that the AKP denies.[34] In a full-fledged democracy, constitutional change that deals with shifts in presidential versus parliamentary systems should never be the guarantor of CMR. Successful security sectors exist in both presidential and parliamentary states alike. Support for a political system change should not indicate whether or not one supports the fight against terrorism.[35] This is, arguably, *civilianization/monopolization* (transfer of power from military elites to the civilian elites) but not *democratization* (diffusion of power among civilian actors such as an elected president, elected government, parliament, and civil society actors such as media, academia, NGOs, and think thanks so as to enable checks and balances, oversight, monitoring and accountability in civil-security sector relations in a transparent fashion) of CMR.

Effectiveness/Efficiency

Within CMR, democratization and civilian control is not only concerned but also ranks 'effectiveness', the capacity to implement the policies, or 'doing the right things', and 'efficiency', the achievement of the maximum output with the minimum inputs (resources) such as personnel, cost, and equipment, or 'doing the things right' as central to a healthy CMR model.

Social Legitimacy

CMR necessitates a long-term change in the professionalization of security forces, which is nearly impossible to achieve with a politicized, weakened security apparatus devoid of institutional transformation within its own cadres. Within a democratically oriented CMR process, the social legitimacy of security forces is an essential element in achieving cooperation between security forces, the government, and civil society.

The Credibility of the Turkish Military in the Global Security Environment

The implications of the July 15 failed coup attempt are much bigger than the repercussions within Turkish domestic politics. The reality in the post-9/11 era is that modern militaries are dominant actors in many developed democracies and are involved in many different roles: they engage in peacekeeping missions, support civilian institutions in dealing with natural disasters, conduct search and rescue (SAR) missions, provide humanitarian assistance, contribute to nation- and state-building efforts in host states, and fight against terrorists. Modern militaries are diverse, just like the democracies they serve. Although their micro and macro structure may vary around the world, they are called to maintain their multi-faceted character, no matter their internal crises.[36] Faced with a number of threats and challenges, from battling ISIS and the PKK to securing its borders and managing the security of nearly three million refugees, the Turkish military and security sector's engagements have ballooned from local to global conflicts. As a member of NATO and other international bodies, it is critical that the Turkish military is in particular continue to fulfil its international engagements while implementing democratic norms at home.

34 "Minister slams opposition for 'threatening the public' over Turkey's charter changes," *Hurriyet Daily News*, January 31, 2017.

35 "Voting 'yes' in charter referendum could support Turkey's anti-terror fight: Deputy PM Kurtulmus," *Hurriyet Daily News*, January 29, 2017.

36 Paul Shemella, "The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces," in Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (ed.), *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006).

DISCUSSION: DEMOCRATIZING SECURITY OR SECURITIZING THE STATE?

On the one hand, what happened in the night of July 15, as to some extent seen earlier in 1999 with the Marmara earthquake and during the 2001 economic crisis, reveals that there can be differences between the state rhetoric of being resolute in the face of existential challenges and the reality in practice. On the other hand, July 15 exposes the state as an institution of bureaucratic ranks, of which can be seized on the basis of organization.

There are tense debates on system change as well as the total redesign of the state apparatus following July 15. There is a closing window of opportunity for the transition and restructuring of state institutions, which must implement the following principles:

- '***Active but passive secularism'*** aiming to establish a golden balance between the state and religion by strengthening secularism within state institutions and passively monitoring religion in private life.
- '***Equal citizenship'*** implying the provision of equal rights to all constituents regardless of their political affiliations, ethnic, sectarian, and religious backgrounds.
- ***'Pluralist and non-contentious politics'*** implying the embrace of inclusive and non-violent political methods to resolve all problems in Turkey and to go beyond armed conflicts by moving them into the political arena.

When contemplating FETÖ's secret network, which threatens the peace, freedom, and security of Turkish citizens, the state's bureaucratic structure that led to such infiltration should be taken into account. In the post-July 15 setting, therefore, the state should operationalize the below-presented points to limit the damage to the state apparatus:

- Democratic and civilian control of the security sector in general and the military in particular, implying a golden balance between the monopolization and democratization of CMR;
- Establishing effective monitoring and oversight mechanisms for maintaining control of the state bureaucracy in an accountable and transparent fashion;
- Strengthening judicial independence and fostering a bureaucratic culture with respect to the rule of law;
- Establishing a merit-based promotion and appointment system within the bureaucracy;
- Creating a golden balance with civil society between 'active secularism', i.e., protection of the state apparatus *from* the invasion of religious groups, and 'passive secularism', i.e., the protection *of* religious movements from the state's intervention as long as these movements participate as civil society actors refraining from armed violence and infiltration into the state's bureaucracy[37];
- Departicifation implying the disengagement of 'what is bureaucratic' from 'what is political' within the state through the formation of transparent, easy-to-measure, and effective institutional mechanisms and processes.

Coming to Turkish CMR, there are many questions relevant to its transformation that have yet to be answered. For example, is the Huntingtonian paradigm, providing autonomy and privileges to the military for professionalization, still relevant and applicable for Turkey today? Or, is the Janowitzian paradigm seeking to eradicate the gap between the military and the wider society the only play left in the book? How can we apply institutional control mechanisms, oversight mechanisms, and professional norms, which are three components of civilian control? This paper's overwhelming emphasis on CMR in Turkey asserts the essentiality not only of civilian control but also of democratic control, effectiveness and efficiency, social legitimacy, and the credibility of the Turkish military in the global security environment. Two levels of analysis, therefore, should be carried out in order to analyze the case of Turkey[38]:

Analysis at the ***political level***, which, for the author, has been overemphasized through the rhetoric of civilianization but lacks democratization:

The political level includes the struggle to ensure the security sector is dissuaded from using its unique coercive advantage to influence the civilian government, either at its behest or that of civilian groups. At

37 This principle entails an optimum balance between the clear-cut detachment of state bureaucracy from religion and the state's provision of freedom of religion to its constituents.

38 Metin Gürcan, Megan Gisclon, "Turkey's Security Sector After July 15: Democratizing Security or Securitizing the State?" *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Winter 2017.

the political level, this paper suggests that the most significant obstacle to CMR in Turkey is excessive politicization within the sector and increasing number of partisan elements blocking the achievement of the institutional transformation of the security sector. Unfortunately, when reviewing the current state of Turkey's CMR, one may easily notice the absence of parliamentary institutions' involvement in more effective oversight. It is likely to suggest that parliamentary oversight has lacked the expertise and capability to execute the prescribed oversight roles. As such, most parliamentarians have been content to take direction on defence and security matters either from the security sector ministries themselves or from their party hierarchies. This limits the level of oversight when those being overseen are providing the guidance. At the political level, another deficiency is the absence of an overarching-agent in charge of the prevention of duplications among all actors, coordination of efforts, and synchronization of timing and pace of the reforms. In fact, the Parliamentary Defence Commission would fill this deficiency, yet this has not been the case yet.

Analysis at the ***organizational level***, which implies the establishment of an effective and efficient military:

The organizational level is concerned primarily with how security sector organizations, particularly the military, adapt to changing organizational circumstances such as the downsizing of the security sector and transition from a conflict-affected organization to one operating in a post-conflict and ultimately stabile CMR context. Additionally, this level of analysis allows an assessment of the professionalism of the new or transformed security organizations, measured by role, expertise, professional and ethical norms, and responsibility. Particularly, the nurture of professional norms regarding the way of doing things and ethical norms regarding the way of thinking through things within the military is a must for any actor within the sector so as to form a "bureaucratic" and somewhat politically autonomous institutional culture. At the organizational level, the current move toward assigning officials whose political loyalty prevails their qualifications has led to the politicization, and to some extent 'partification' of the security sector. This trend has not only been blurring the thin line between what is 'bureaucratic' and what is 'political' within the security sector but also leads to questions about effectiveness and efficiency of the sector as this trend demolishes decentralization of the decision-making, initiative-taking, empowerment of middle-level/local decision makers, and contingency planning, transparency, and accountability within CMR.

One should also note that Turkey faces second-generation CMR problems at the moment. Limited expertise in government ministries and parliament mean limited ability to exercise control and oversight. Intelligence reform remains elusive as central control resists oversight. Civil society involvement shows limited chance for success and is largely restricted to Ankara. As with the government, civil society faces resistance from within the security sector itself. Media has no oversight capacity or qualified security experts/analysts. There has been limited growth of NGOs and think tanks studying security issues; those that do exist have extremely politicized stances and thus cannot provide unbiased technical insights.

The reforms affecting Turkey's security sector surely mean civilianization. But *civilianization* does not automatically mean *democratization* or ensure effective and efficient security sector on the ground. A healthy balance in the Turkish CMR is one that is well balanced and transparent. Civil and democratic control, effectiveness and efficiency, social legitimacy, and credibility of the Turkey's security sector in the international security environment are at risk of falling apart if the present political polarization continues. Changes must be seen in these categories to achieve democratic civilianization of the TSK. In addition to the weakening agency of the Chief of the General Staff, these two institutional mechanisms, the above-presented actors' stance within the military towards change and differentiation in terms of their world-views, correspond to the theme of 'divided elites' within the TSK that would lead to the transformation of the TSK's monolithic institutional identity traditionally represented by the chiefs into a *polylithic* one, implying the existence of many but separated micro-identities within the military.

Particularly, there are six policy recommendations for continuing the transformation of CMR and encouraging democratization of the state and military in the post-July 15 setting:

- A more robust, constructive, and politically sterile scholarly debate about the pros and cons of narrowing CMR to the level of the palace (i.e., President Erdoğan)-military relations should develop in order to combat the ultra-securitized political context in Turkey. As this narrowing process from civil-military to 'palace-military' relations has no clear institutional framework and road map to manage the transfer of power, the unintended consequences of this process would negatively affect the effectiveness and

efficiency of the military, its social legitimacy—which should encompass all segments of society in terms of political views—and the military's international credibility.

- 'Civilian-military integration' within the presidency, the Ministry of Defence, and the General Staff should strengthen the civilian intellectual capital on security issues and military transformation and nurture interoperability among the civilian and military elites. More importantly, civilian elites' reluctance (and sometimes disrespect) toward military experts' views on military reforms and new CMR should be neutralized.
- The military should be removed from the primary domain of the debate between conservatives and secularists as this trend pulls the military into the hearth of popular political debates and politicizes CMR.
- The friction between the civilian elites and the military elites over the causes, scale, and tempo of military reforms after July 15 must be resolved in order to shape the nature of CMR.
- The friction between the *pro-status quo* camp (symbionts and majority of pragmatists) and reformists pushing for military transformation or preserving the pre-July 15 *status quo* within the military should be allayed.
- The transition from the *monolithic* military to a *polylithic* one, driven by the weakening of the agency of the Chief of General Staff, should be delicately managed as this seems to be becoming the prime risk factor within the military. The friction among those military elites with differentiating worldviews regarding the military's new institutional identity, the role of Islam, pro/anti-U.S. sentiment, pro/anti-NATO stance, and being a part of the Western security architecture or going for a 'non-aligned' position in the construction of this new identity must be resolved. It can be suggested that in the post-July 15 setting it is evident that what will animate change is the power-distributional implications of power relations among these micro-identities within the military, and the question of how the civilian elites, particularly President Erdoğan, engages with them.

In conclusion, in the post-July 15 setting, what Turkey needs to do is to 'democratize security', suggesting the *diffusion* of the state's power among the executive branch, parliament, and civil society by creating effective oversight and monitoring mechanisms so as not to face with another hijack attempt like July 15. The course civilian elites have been following, however, seems just the opposite, which is the 'ultra-securitization of state', or, first, the *transfer* of power from military elites to the civilian ones and, then, the *monopolization* of power to securitize the state apparatus for the objective of strict civilian control. Thus, the question at hand is this: does it really matter if we define the basket as 'military' or 'civilian' as long as we are inclined to put all the eggs in it? Turkey will surely be a good test case for answering this question and to see whether or not civilianization of CMR automatically leads to democratization.

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