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TURKEY'S APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES

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Introduction

Turkey owes its status as an emerging actor to the steady political and economic development that it enjoyed in the first years of the 21st century and to the weakening of the Western, rule-based liberal order. This has enabled regional actors with relative economic stability and security to assume certain responsibilities that traditionally fell to the Great Powers in the Cold War era. Like most BRICS countries[1] and other regional leaders, Turkey has ridden the tailwinds of this global opening. Turkey also shares with some other emerging powers the experience of rapid economic growth, relative stability and an ongoing political transition and reform. As the world shifts to a more multipolar system, Turkey has been using its religious, ethnic, and cultural ties to try to consolidate its soft power, both regionally and further afield. During this period, Turkey has raised its profile as a regional actor and an emerging power, especially as the Arab Spring produced opportunities, crisis, and warfare on its borders.

These lessons, as well as the country's status as a European Union candidate, a committed NATO ally and a buffer state for the West, heighten Turkey's role in the facilitation of peace in the region and reinforce its image as a bridge between geographical and cultural divides. As a Western-oriented, secular state with a majority Muslim population, Turkey is increasingly regarded as a pivot in effectively addressing both humanitarian and security aspects of the entrenched conflicts in Syria and the greater Levant. Turkey hosts approximately 2.7 million Syrian refugees,[2] while at the same time it has provided support for opposition forces in Syria and allowed members of the anti-IS (Islamic State) coalition, such as the United States to use its airbases. For much of its history, however, Turkey has been plagued by rampant insecurity and economic and political instability, and has experienced four military coups and a thirty-year armed insurgency. As such, Turkey's recent activities may be supported by economic and international shifts in power, but its conceptualization and approach to peacebuilding is very much informed by the country's experiences of insecurity.[3]

The Emergence of Turkish Peacebuilding

Security and stability are two central issues that have guided Turkey's strategic considerations. In the wake of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, modernization through alignment and membership of Western institutions was seen as crucial to preserving the security and stability that had been lost in the preceding years. It is also in this context that some of the key principles of Turkey's foreign policy have emerged, such as non-interference and respect for sovereignty. Turkey's domestic and foreign policies have also been significantly influenced by the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. A number of his speeches, particularly the phrase "Peace at home, peace in the world" have been used to frame Turkey's international engagement, from its first forays into peacekeeping in the 1990s to peacebuilding activities today. Former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu had also reiterated this principle, stating that Turkey has tried to build a proactive foreign policy based on peace and stability at home.[4] This ideal, however, has come under significant strain since the Arab Spring spread to the Levant, and its transformation into a violent civil war in Syria and ethnic cleansing in Northern Iraq. These issues have directly affected Turkey's own security and stability. The suicide attacks since the June 7, 2015 general elections that have hit major towns in the southeast, the Turkish capital Ankara, and the country's largest city Istanbul, are nearly all traced to IS cells that infiltrated the porous borders in the South. This has been accompanied by renewed

clashes between Turkish security forces and the PKK (The Kurdistan Workers' Party), which are equally detrimental to Turkey's stability.

For much of Turkey's history, security and stability were conceived in military terms and in relation to territorial integrity. Turkey's first and only international intervention during the Cold War was its mediation between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s. This can be seen from a traditional security perspective, given the proximity of both countries to Turkey's eastern flank. Following the loosening of the Cold War strictures, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) was established in 1992 with the objective of expanding Turkish relations with the newly independent Turkic States of Central Asia. TIKA was conceived as a mechanism of Turkish soft power through cooperation in the economic, cultural, and humanitarian fields.[5] For much of this period, however, TIKA was left to languish as an agency due to internal instability and a focus on a harder, security-driven concept of military engagement. Turkey's first foray into peacebuilding during this time was in Somalia and the Balkans in the 1990s, contributing troops to multilateral peacebuilding and peace enforcement missions with the UN and NATO.

The shift from such hard security-based peacebuilding to the civilian participation and technical assistance that characterizes Turkey's activities today was facilitated by a change in domestic dynamics. Over the last decade, the Turkish Armed Forces has been losing its influence in foreign policy matters, which are now primarily determined by civilians in government. This was accompanied by expanded civilian and police participation in peace operations, increased engagement in multilateral organizations, and a revival of TIKA activities. Facilitated by a period of relative political and economic stability and internal reforms that eased restrictions in political, religious, and social spheres, Turkey began to expand its official development aid (see graph 1).[6] Although retaining a strong military was a necessity due to the instability of the surrounding region, under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) civic and economic power was promoted as a more sustainable method of foreign engagement.[7]

Domestic changes were accompanied by a restructuring of Turkish foreign policies priorities and goals under the AKP. This has served to both promote the prestige of a more internationally active Turkey and to reinforce the success of the country's leadership to a domestic audience.[8] Guided by then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (key adviser and then foreign minister from 2009-2014), a multilateral foreign policy emerged that sought a balance between proactive engagement and crisis management. Turkish leaders have emphasized the need for preventive diplomacy that should be intricately linked to any conflict management strategies, whether it is peacekeeping or peacebuilding activities. Identifying mediation and dialogue as essential tools in this preventative diplomacy, officials have stated that "peace mediation and facilitation efforts are the most cost-effective and efficient way of preventing and resolving conflicts."[9] Reflecting this position, Turkey has headed a number of initiatives. In 2005 the Alliance of Civilizations, which promotes interreligious and intercultural dialogue, was launched by the Prime Ministers of Spain and Turkey.[10] In 2010, Turkey and Finland created a "Group of Friends of Mediation" consisting currently of 41 countries that supports efforts by the UN and regional organizations in the area of mediation.[11] These are cross-cultural examples that Turkish officials have identified as reflecting the country's approach to peacebuilding.[12] Through these initiatives Turkey has sought to promote flexibility, trust, and cooperation as the basis of successful mediation.[13] In parallel to these efforts, Turkey launched a process on peacebuilding during its time on the Security Council from 2009-2010, which included

these initiatives and brought together the Council for thematic meetings in Istanbul from 2010 to 2013.[14]

Issues around "hard security" are still a strategic priority for Turkey's foreign policy, but they are no longer the determining consideration. As Davutoğlu has stated, "stability cannot be built on the basis of force alone."[15] Referencing the decade of reforms inside Turkey, Davutoğlu had argued that there must be a balance between freedom and security in order to achieve stability. Over the years the concept of "security" has become more multidimensional, focusing on human needs through good governance and economic stability. This is evident in Turkey's rhetorical embrace of "humanitarian diplomacy," an ambiguous concept that Turkish officials have increasingly used to frame its repositioning and activities in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Humanitarian diplomacy claims to reject state-centric realpolitik and external interference in domestic affairs. Highlighting the importance of acknowledging "local values"[16] and local ownership, it instead emphasizes the need to put human dignity and human security at the forefront of policy considerations.[17]

The Tools of Turkish Peacebuilding


There is no concept paper that explicitly describes Turkey's definition of peacebuilding. It can, however, be understood through bilateral and regional activities, norms, and discussions, such as those already mentioned, that have emerged among the country's representatives over the last decade. Most Turkish officials discuss the term peacebuilding within the context of development and reconstruction of a conflict-affected country. Therefore, Turkey's approach peacebuilding can be characterized as a twofold process, encompassing both statebuilding and peacemaking within society. Reflecting a structural approach to peacebuilding, Turkish officials emphasize the centrality of good governance, strong responsive institutions, and rule of law for building an effective state and, therefore, in their view, a stable and peaceful society. Activities related to these goals by officials include infrastructure projects, technical assistance, and capacity building programs for state institutions and personnel. This kind of structural peacebuilding must also be accompanied by an inclusive peacemaking process at all levels. Turkish officials feel that this is only possible through national ownership of goals and culturally sensitive engagement with all stakeholders, including civil society, professional associations, and women. This is particularly important with regard to political institutions and inclusive economic recovery, which Turkish officials say are essential for a peaceful society.[18] Activities associated with societal peacebuilding include mediation efforts, education programs, religious support, and inclusive economic development.

Economic interests are intricately linked to both Turkey's foreign policy and peacebuilding activities. Such interests have not only led to financial dividends for Turkey but also promoted peace in some cases. Notably, the historically tumultuous relationship between Turkey and its Kurdish neighbors in Iraq greatly improved following the expansion of economic and diplomatic relations with Iraqi Kurdistan.[19] At the time, exports to Iraq in 2013 reached $12 billion, becoming Turkey's second largest export market only after Germany.[20] There are also some links between Turkey's economic interests and its aid practices in general. Egypt, for example, was one of the top five recipients of Turkish aid for 2013[21] and the 14th largest market for Turkish exports in 2015.[22] In Afghanistan, Turkish companies' ranked 5th in terms of total number of foreign investors, with 140 registered in the country in 2013.[23] Officials have also been

frank about their interest in expanding economic relations with Somalia, the most prominent country in Turkey's development activities.[24] While not a specific policy, a pattern has emerged in which the establishment of a diplomatic presence in a new country is often soon followed by investment from Turkish companies and new flight links through Turkish Airlines.

Turkish diplomats are firm in their conviction that trade is better than aid for development.[25] Many Turkish officials regard economic development, ideally through the diverse participation of the society as an essential component of peacebuilding, with one diplomat stating "[W]e don't think that peacebuilding could achieve its goals if there is no economic recovery and participation of the whole part of the society in the program."[26] Officials believe economic investment provides alternative financial opportunities to criminality and extremist narratives, and supports national ownership of development.

Many of the initiatives that Turkish officials consider as peacebuilding activities are funneled through Turkish development aid. In 2013, Turkey's Official Development Assistance (ODA) was among the highest of the emerging powers at 3,307 billion USD.[27] This represents nearly a 30 percent increase between 2010 and 2013, in addition to a tenfold increase from 2002 to 2010 (see graph 1). Despite Turkey's participation in a number of multilateral initiatives, 3,156 billion USD of this ODA fund was provided in bilateral assistance.[28] In comparison Turkish multilateral contributions totalled 151 million USD illustrating the country's preference for bilateral engagement. Turkey has expanded its activities to some of the world's most entrenched conflicts. In both 2012 and 2013, Syria, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Somalia, and Afghanistan were the largest recipients of ODA. While Turkey does provide support to non-Muslim countries such as Ukraine, Macedonia and Kenya, the bulk of the State's activities are carried out in Muslim majority states, many of which would be on the list of least developed or fragile states. Examples of both the structural and social peacebuilding approaches of Turkey are evident in countries like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Balkan countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.



Graph 1 Turkey's Development Assistance 2002-2013[29]

Much of Turkey's structural peacebuilding activities consist of technical capacity programs, infrastructure projects, and the provision of basic services. This understanding of constructive development, which is common to both Turkish state agencies and non-state actors, has strong historical roots. Since the Ottoman Empire, privately funded philanthropic development has focused on the construction of buildings and infrastructure, as well as the funding of services such as schools, hospitals, and mosques.[30] In 2013, 225 million USD was provided in bilateral technical assistance.[31] This included funding for a number of training programs globally for example, for judges and prosecutors from Kosovo and medical training programs with the Somali Ministry of Health.[32] Infrastructure projects, such as renovating state buildings or building schools and roads, are common across all the countries in which Turkey is engaged.[33] Such infrastructure and

technical cooperation programs appear to focus on improving the provision of basic services such as medical and judicial standards. Turkish officials have said that they feel such programs directly support statebuilding by legitimizing the state's authority and making services more effective. However, they are quick to emphasize that their support must be seen as apolitical in nature, stating "We can only offer them certain technical expertise without any strict recipe. It is after all the requirements of the host country to determine how they will proceed."[34]

Technical assistance and capacity building programs are also a characteristic of Turkey's social peacebuilding. Most of these programs include training and technical assistance to support economic empowerment and appear to be focused at the local level through municipalities and communities. Technical equipment assistance has been provided, for example, to the Governorship of Sar-e Pol in Afghanistan for vocational training programs for women, and the Agricultural Development Project in East Bosnia was established to support the return of families from the 1992-1995 war.[35] These are just some of the local projects aimed at economically empowering communities. Technical assistance is also a part of other social peacebuilding activities in the education field, such as providing technical equipment for high schools and universities.

Education initiatives have been one of the more widely known areas associated with Turkey's peacebuilding activities. This is due in part to its extensive scholarship programs in Somalia. State scholarships have been provided by, among others, Diyanet (the Ministry of Religious Affairs) and the Education Ministry to students from Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe.[36] With the exception of Somalia, however, most education programs in the past have been run by third sector organizations[37] such as Hizmet or Gülen-linked schools. The Turkish state tends to run smaller education programs, such as providing school materials and equipment, funding and renovating buildings, and promoting Turkish language and cultural courses. Education initiatives such as these are not only a method of expanding Turkish soft power, but are also felt to contribute to social peacemaking through intercultural dialogue. Both officials and third state actors believe that education is a key peacebuilding tool that can counter the narrative of extremism and provide opportunities for the future.[38] As one NGO official stated, "for conflict resolution we think that education has a primary effect."[39]

Finally, Turkey's social peacebuilding activities are also characterized by an emphasis on mediation and religiously sensitive programs. Officials have stated the importance of mediation, not only at an inter-state level but also at the local level, through everyday activities and engagement with locals. This may range from consulting with communities to discussions with political authorities on bilateral projects. Turkish officials feel that mediation and consultation are mechanisms that support their own espoused principles of national ownership. These principles can perhaps also be seen to guide the concept of cultural and religiously sensitive programs. These range from sponsoring intercultural activities such as visits to Turkey or football tournaments to providing Qurans or circumcision ceremonies for boys for example, in countries such as Afghanistan and Niger.[40] The building of mosques or events during Islamic festivals such as book fairs or iftar have been staged from Sarajevo to Mogadishu and Pakistan.[41] Given the scope of these programs globally, religious sensitivity is clearly a central aspect of Turkey's activities. Such programs are not only

pragmatic but they also add legitimacy to Turkish activities in the eyes of locals. In Afghanistan, reports noted that Turkish projects were more acceptable to communities than others because of their perceived sensitivity to local Afghan culture.[42]

Impact and Conclusions

Over the last decade, Turkey's approach to peacebuilding has transformed from the strategic state-centric security engagement of the 1990s to a more multifaceted conceptualization that encompasses both statebuilding and social peacemaking. This has been facilitated by a change in civil-military power dynamics since 2000 and a broader understanding of security that considers the issue of human needs. Peacebuilding activities today range from technical assistance for state services to education and religious programs. This has been developed in parallel with new foreign policy activities that emphasize both mediation and enhanced economic ties as potential peacebuilding strategies that are of mutual benefit to both Turkey and recipient states.

In spite of Turkey's good intentions to promote peace and stability in its region and the rest of the world, Ankara's capacity to execute this vision has some shortcomings. An estimated 2.7 million Syrian refugees, the resurgence of war with the PKK, IS' penetration deep into the country's urban centers, the continuing political volatility in the aftermath of the November elections, and a receding economy constitute serious obstacles to the sustainability of Turkey's peacebuilding operations.[43] In addition, for the last several years Turkey's ambitious foreign policy goals and determination to project its soft power have alienated various supporters. Counting on African support to win another term on the UN Security Council in 2016, Turkey only received the votes of 60 countries out of 193.[44] Losing the support of African countries is due to a number of reasons, but the most visible of these is the fight between the Turkish government and the Islamist philanthropist Fethullah Gülen.[45] Ironically, Gülenist charity organizations have been the most visible and committed NGOs in providing humanitarian assistance to sub-Saharan Africa.[46] Viewed in light of Turkey's false predictions about the longevity of the Assad regime in Syria,[47] Ankara's recognition of the depth of the crises that it is trying to help resolve around the globe, and its influence over the respective parties in the countries appear to be waning. In other words, the rhetoric-capacity mismatch in Turkish foreign policy risks moving Turkey farther away from "zero problems with neighbors" towards the dangerous territory of "zero neighbors without problems."[48]

A number of basic organizational challenges have also hindered the Turkish state from realizing its potential to increase the quality and range of its peacebuilding initiatives. The most persistent of these impediments is coordination problems. First identified in a 2012 report,[49] a lack of effective interagency cooperation has been the most visible problem in Turkish peacebuilding activities. The most vital ministries and government agencies that are involved in peacebuilding operations, such as the Foreign Ministry, Health Ministry, Development Ministry, and TİKA, were not informed about each other's activities both at the higher echelons of decision making or in the field. Recent research indicates that very little progress has been made in this area at both the state and third sector levels.[50] One representative of an international organization based in Ankara volunteered that most TİKA bureaucrats in charge of coordination are not even familiar with the basic UN procedures and terms.[51] The lack of institutional training and knowledge of procedures within organizations like TİKA also complicates communication and coordination between the field offices and Ankara. In such situations, the quality and effectiveness of the country programs often depends on the individual in

the field office: If the person assigned to a country office is in fact interested in the mission, TİKA operations in that particular country often provide more substantive results for the beneficiaries.[52]

This lack of consistency in coordination and consistent implementation of principles and goals also affects the development and monitoring of programs. There is a disparity between the prestige and rhetoric around Turkey's engagement and the actual effectiveness of the activities implemented. While TIKA publically provides data on the number of participants or equipment involved in technical assistance programs, greater analysis on how these programs are determined or their impact is not made available. There have been reports in the past of peacebuilding programs such as infrastructure projects or trainings being implemented without consultation with local authorities or research on other aid groups working in the area.[53] These problems appeared to have occurred in countries that TIKA had become newly active in, such as Somalia,[54] Senegal[55] or Uganda.[56] This also indicates an important vacuum in the pre-deployment analyses and monitoring activities for state operations in the field. Such patterns can, however, exacerbate overcrowding, duplication, and waste.[57]

In addition to these problems is the equally detrimental challenge of financing international operations. The influx of Syrian refugees, for instance, has cost the state an estimated 8 billion USD[58] and led to nearly 2 billion USD worth of resources being rechanneled from foreign operations. This has diverted significant Turkish resources from high profile activities in fragile countries such as Somalia.[59] In addition, the volatility of the Turkish lira against hard currencies, as well as ongoing political uncertainty, has taken a toll on the economic stability that is necessary to sustain the funds for Turkey's peacebuilding initiatives. The recent resignation of Ahmet Davutoğlu as Prime Minister, who had developed many of Turkey's new foreign policy principles, further adds to the speculation over the future and sustainability of the country's peacebuilding practices.

ENDNOTES

1 | "BRICS" is the acronym for the association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

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5 | Teri Murphy and Onur Sazak, *Turkey's Civilian Capacitry in Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center, 2012).

6 | Füsun Gür, Nurdan Çakır, Şevki Mert Barış et al., "Turkish Development Assistance 2013," Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2014, 9.

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8 | Kathryn Achilles, Onur Sazak, Thomas Wheeler and Auveen Elizabeth Woods, *Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia: Risks and Opportunities for Building Peace*, Safeworld and Istanbul Policy Center, March 2015, 4.

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10 | United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, "United Nations Alliance of Civilizations," accessed February 1, 2016, http://www.unaoc.org/.

11 | Group of Friends of Mediation, "Group of Friends of Mediation," accessed February 1, 2016, http://peacemaker.un.org/friendsofmediation

12 | Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs," speech delivered at the Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Algeria, May 28, 2014, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-delivered-by-h_e_-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-at-the-ministerial-conference-of-the-non_aligned-movement_-28-may-2014_-algeria.en.mfa.

13 | Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Resolution of Conflicts and Mediation," http://www.mfa.gov.tr/resolution-of-conflicts-and-mediation.en.mfa.

14 | Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Candidacy of the Republic of Turkey to the United Nations Security Council for the period 2015-2016," http://www.mfa.gov.tr/candidacy-of-the-republic-of-turkey-to-the-united-nations-security-council-for-the-period-2015-2016.en.mfa.

15 | Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy," 3.

16 | Ahmet Davutoglu, "Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy: objectives, challenges and prospects," *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 41, no. 6 (2013): 865-870, doi:10.1080/00905992.2013.857299.

17 | Fuat Keyman and Onur Sazak, "Turkey as a Humanitarian State,"

18 | Telephone Interview with Foreign Ministry official in discussion with the author, Ankara, March 26, 2015.

19 | Selcan Hacaoglu, "Turkey Embracing Iraq's Kurds as Trade Erodes Old Enmity," Bloomberg Business, July 11, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-10/turkey-s-embrace-of-iraqi-kurds-shows-trade-eroding-old-enmity.

20 | Ibid. An estimated 1,300 Turkish companies work in Iraq.

21 | Gür et al., "Turkish Development..."

22 | "Foreign Trade Statistics, January 2015," *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Customs and*

23 | Selçuk Çolakoğlu and Mehmet Yegin, "The Future of Afghanistan and Turkey's Contributions," International Strategic Research Organization (USAK),(September 2014): 34.

24 | Interview with Foreign Ministry Officials in discussion with the author, Istanbul, August 25, 2015.

25 | Interview with Turkish Diplomat in discussion with the author, Istanbul, February 25, 2014.

26 | Telephone Interview with Foreign Ministry Official in discussion with the author, Ankara, June 10, 2015.

27 | Gür et al., "Turkish Development…"3. See also "Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013," (Development Initiative, 2013), 25; The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013 ranks Turkey as the fourth largest government donor of humanitarian assistance.

28 | Gür et al., "Turkish Development…", 8.

29 | 2013 is the most recent data available on Turkey's ODA from TİKA.

30 | Filiz Bikmen. "The rich history of philanthropy in Turkey: A paradox of tradition and modernity," in *Philanthropy in Europe: A rich past, a promising future*, ed. N. MacDonald and L. Tayart de Borms (London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2008), 223-234.

31 | Gür et al., "Turkish Development…", 22-23.

32 | Ibid: 51, 164..

33 | Nurçin Yıldız, Füsun Gür, Alper Eren et al., "Annual Report 2012," Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), 2013; Füsun Gür, Nurdan Çakır, Şevki Mert Barış et al., "Turkish Development Assistance 2013," Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2014.

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35 | Gür et al., "Turkish Development…", 203; 37

36 | "Türkiye Bursları Scholarhsips", accessed March 30, 2016, http://www.turkiyeburslari.gov.tr/index.php/en/

37 | There is a wide range of other non-governmental bodies in Turkey administering development programs. This includes nonprofit groups, foundations, faith-based organizations, schools, and professional associations, including businessmen and doctors' associations. These groups vary in their ideologies, their orientation, and their relationship with and autonomy from the state. As such, the term "third sector" is a suitably broad term to categorize the various groups of non-state actors that are engaged in peacebuilding activities. See Korel Göymen, "The Evolvıng State – Third Sector Relations In Turkey," in *The Third Sector in Europe: Prospects and Challenges*, ed. Stephen P. Osborne (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 211-229.

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39 | Interview with Kimse Yok Mu official in discussion with the author, Istanbul, March 2015.

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46 | Ibid.

47 | "Premier vows to pray in Damascus mosque 'soon,'" *Hürriyet Daily News*, September 6, 2012, accessed October 26, 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/premier-vows-to-pray-in-damascus-mosque-soon.aspx?pageID=238&nID=29505&NewsCatID=338.

48 | Sassounian, "Why the UN Rejected Turkey's Bid for a Security Council Seat."

49 | Murphy and Sazak, "Turkey's Civilian Capacity."

50 | Achilles et.al., Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia.

51 | Interview with UNDP-TIKA coordinator in discussion with the author, Istanbul, March 13, 2015.

52 | Ibid.

53 | Interviews with the representatives of Turkish NGOs operating in Africa, as well as Kızılay officials; Presentations by Paul Larson on "Logistics of Health Aids," Stephen Gloyd on "Sustainability of Health Aids," and Maryam Deloffre on "International NGO Behavior and Interactions with States" at the joint IPC-TİKA workshop on "International Humanitarian NGOs and Health Aid" on March 27, 2015, Istanbul.

54 | Interview with Turkish Diplomat in discussion with the author, Istanbul, February 27, 2014.

55 | Telephone Interview with UNDP-TIKA coordinator in discussion with the author, Ankara, March, 13, 2015.


56 | Comments from audience made at the joint Istanbul Policy Center and Makerere University, Peace and Conflict Studies Program workshop on "Turkey's Engagement in Africa's Development", on September 14, 2015, Kampala, Uganda

57 | Interviews with the representatives of Turkish NGOs operating in Africa, as well as Kızılay officials; Presentations by Paul Larson on "Logistics of Health Aids," Stephen Gloyd on "Sustainability of Health Aids," and Maryam Deloffre on "International NGO Behavior and Interactions with States" at the joint IPC-TİKA workshop on "International Humanitarian NGOs and Health Aid" on March 27, 2015, Istanbul.

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