IPC–MERCATOR ANALYSIS

November 2026

BEYOND CLIMATE DENIAL: MISINFORMATION ON CLIMATE-RELATED EXTREME EVENTS AND POLICIES IN TÜRKİYE

Andrea Briones



IPC

ISTANBUL POLICY CENTER
SABANCI UNIVERSITY
STIFTUNG MERCATOR INITIATIVE

Introduction

Climate disinformation and misinformation pose growing challenges to informed policymaking decisions by shaping public understanding of climate risks, undermining trust in scientific and public institutions, and potentially weakening support for climate action.[1] These concerns are particularly relevant in the Mediterranean, a climate change hotspot where intensifying extreme weather conditions compound existing environmental and socioeconomic pressures.[2] In this context, information integrity is not merely a matter of communication but also a consideration for effective climate governance, resilience, and human security.

Türkiye's information environment, including social media platforms, has been identified as being among the most vulnerable to the spread of false information, with a 2020 assessment highlighting the presence of bots, trolls, and algorithmic amplification at scale.[3] Misinformation and disinformation about climate change come in various forms and serve different purposes, but both are known to spread rapidly and ultimately hinder climate action. Evidence suggests that the circulation of these claims shapes how societies understand climate change and leads to an underestimation of its risks, which in turn delays urgent action.[4]

These narratives have evolved over time.[5] They now extend beyond the outright denial of climate change and its anthropogenic nature and scientific evidence to include more subtle narratives such as questioning the feasibility/effectiveness of climate solutions (technologies and policies), undermining the credibility of actors, or portraying them as being at odds with public interests. By examining two illustrative cases in Türkiye, this analysis explores how traditional climate denial coexists with more nuanced forms of misinformation, as well as how these narratives shape debates potentially reinforcing denial and/or delay in ways that may not be immediately apparent.

Technological and Psychological Factors that Favor Propagation

The spread of disinformation and misinformation can shape human behavior, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions, often with wider implications.[6] Several social and technological factors help explain how misleading narratives circulate and gain traction online. Social networks can facilitate their dissemination through homophily, i.e., the tendency for individuals to connect with others who share similar interests, beliefs, or backgrounds. Combined with trust in familiar sources, these dynamics can contribute to the formation of echo chambers, in which similar points of view are repeatedly reinforced without being questioned, which can exacerbate polarization and provide opportunities for exploitation by malicious actors.[7] Social media algorithms further strengthen these dynamics by prioritizing engaging content over its accuracy or reliability,[8] potentially increasing the visibility of attractive, attention-grabbing claims.[9] Visual content adds a further dimension to these dynamics through emotional appeal and perceived credibility, while artificial intelligence content can blur the distinction between real and synthetic, potentially contributing to "reality apathy," eroding trust in genuine evidence.[10]

The reception, consumption, and interpretation of information is also influenced by social and cognitive factors. People often rely on mental shortcuts when processing complex information, which can reinforce confirmation bias[11] by favoring claims that align with preconceived ideas and beliefs and scrutinize or dismiss contradictory evidence.[12] Their appeal can also depend on


emotional framing (e.g., evoking fear or a sense of threat), perceived social norms, and conformity, which influence whether information is trusted and/or shared.[13] Consequently, the reach of a claim cannot be explained by its factual accuracy; its resonance with people's worldviews, identities, and concerns may also matter. These factors are worth bearing in mind when examining climate-related misinformation on social media.

A Framework for Analyzing "Old" and "New" Misleading Climate Narratives

While misinformation refers to false or incorrect information shared without intending to deceive,[14] disinformation implies a clear intent to cause harm or purposefully deceive others,[15] driven by economic, political, or ideological interests.[16] Despite the absence of the intent to deceive, misleading claims can still generate confusion and skepticism, making it harder for people to access reliable information.[17] Conceptually, disinformation can be understood as a subset of misinformation (Figure 1), meaning that an analysis of misinformation by default encompasses disinformation. Given the difficulty to discern intent in online environments, this analysis examines both together.

This analysis is a qualitative reading of published studies, fact-checking, and official statements. The categorization of climate misinformation used in this analysis (presented below in Box 1) builds on the framework developed in a report on climate disinformation produced as part of the IBERIFIER+ project.[19] The definitions in Box 1 are proposed categories informed by the literature cited in that report rather than verbatim definitions from the authors. The two cases presented below are illustrative rather than representative of these new forms of climate mis/disinformation and denial.

Figure 1. Disinformation, A Subset of Misinformation[18]



BOX 1. CATEGORIZATION OF OLD AND NEW CLIMATE DIS/MISINFORMATION

"Old dis/misinformation" or "old denial" includes:

1 | **Trend denial**: Rejection of the existence (or continuity) of the observed global warming trend.

2 | **Attribution denial**: Acknowledging that climate change is happening while rejecting its anthropogenic origin (i.e., the role of human activities in causing it).

3 | **Impact denial:** Acknowledging that climate change is happening but downplaying the extent or severity of its negative impacts, portraying it as exaggerated or even beneficial.

4 | **Consensus denial:** Rejecting or questioning the existence of a scientific consensus on the existence of climate change and/or its anthropogenic origin.

"New dis/misinformation" or "new denial" includes:

5 | **Solutions denial:** Discrediting climate solutions (e.g., policies, technologies) by portraying them as ineffective, damaging, or impractical, and/or by promoting approaches that justify delaying/avoiding meaningful change. These may include so-called "fossil-fuel solutionism" (presenting fossil fuels as part of the solution) or "implicatory denial" (invoking hypothetical future, currently non-existent, technological solutions) to suggest that science-based recommendations regarding urgent action are unnecessary.

6 | **Agency denial:** Undermining the credibility or legitimacy of individuals, organizations, or institutions involved in climate science or action, including through allegations of incompetence, hypocrisy, or wrongdoing.

7 | **Public interest denial:** Portraying climate action as serving hidden or malicious interests rather than the public good, including through conspiracy theories that frame climate science, policies, solutions or the actors promoting them as tools for controlling or harming the population, advancing elite interests, or pursuing geopolitical agendas.

Mapping Climate Misinformation in Türkiye: Two Illustrative Cases

Misinformation can hinder the implementation of necessary climate policies by shaping public understanding of climate risks and undermining confidence in the measures designed to address them. This is particularly relevant in Türkiye, a country highly exposed to climate-related hazards and undergoing a significant transformation in its domestic climate policy framework. The two examples below illustrate how "new" climate misinformation has already taken shape in Türkiye and assesses the impact such misinformation has on society and climate governance.

WILDFIRES CLOSELY CONNECTED TO EXTREME WEATHER CONDITIONS: THE GAP BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC ATTRIBUTION AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS

Located in the Mediterranean region, Türkiye is highly exposed to rising temperatures, heatwaves, drought, and wildfire-conducive weather conditions.[20] Although regional trends vary, climate change is projected to increase their intensity and frequency. During the devastating Manavgat fire in Antalya and fires across Muğla in 2021, anomalously high temperatures, dry vegetation, strong winds, and local topography (alongside human ignition sources) contributed to conditions that favored rapid fire spread.[21] In a separate analysis of the 2025 fire season, a World Weather Attribution study found that human-induced climate change had made extreme fire weather conditions affecting Türkiye and some neighboring Mediterranean countries approximately ten and thirteen times more likely, according to two indicators measuring, respectively, fire-suppression difficulty once ignited and how dry conditions increase vegetation flammability.[22] These findings concern conditions conducive to severe fires rather than the likelihood of individual fires igniting, highlighting the importance of distinguishing between ignition sources and the climatic factors influencing fire risk and severity.

Yet the scientific link between climate change and wildfire-conducive conditions is not necessarily reflected in how these events are understood by the public.[23] Public interpretations of extreme events may focus on their immediate causes and identifiable actors, without necessarily connecting them to broader climatic trends and environmental conditions, which might reinforce the perception that such events are isolated incidents.[24] This disconnect can be reinforced by the temporal and geographical distance commonly associated with climate change[25] and by the way climate-related risks and their local implications are communicated.

During emergencies, uncertainty, heightened emotions, and the rapid circulation of information can favor the spread of misleading explanations.[26] Research examining the 2021 wildfires found that false associations and distorted content were common forms of misinformation, with many of the accounts sharing it operating anonymously.[27] Fact-checking studies published during this period also documented out-of-context images and videos presented as evidence, together with misleading claims concerning their alleged causes and perpetrators. Similar narratives resurfaced during different fire seasons, including allegations of deliberate sabotage, foreign interference, or alleged economic interests in the development of burned land.[28] Some conspiracy theories portrayed foreign actors as deliberately setting fires to undermine Türkiye's food sovereignty and engineer demographic decline under the guise of the "climate agenda."[29] Such claims are not unique to Türkiye but echo broader conspiracy narratives that frame climate change as part of wider schemes to exert political, economic, or social control.[30] More traditional forms such as impact denial have questioned the role of climate change in shaping fire-conducive conditions, using wildfires' historical occurrence to downplay changes in their frequency and/or severity. Trend denial, in turn, uses more subtle forms, such as humor, irony, and ridicule, to cast doubt on climate science as illustrated by the use of hashtags such as #ArsonEmergency as a counter-frame to #ClimateEmergency.[31]

While research on online misinformation during extreme weather events remains limited, particularly regarding its longer-term effects,[32] existing evidence highlights the importance of how such

events are attributed and interpreted. Its implications extend beyond the immediate management of emergencies. There is a positive association between attributing extreme weather events to climate change and support for climate policies, whereas exposure to most types of extreme weather events alone is not associated with greater climate policy support.[33] Misleading narratives that obscure this connection may therefore complicate public understanding of climate risks. That disconnect can also affect our ability to prepare and adapt, for example, through long-term policies and support measures.

THE CLIMATE LAW: MAPPING MISINFORMATION ONLINE IN A CONTESTED POLICY DEBATE

Türkiye's position in international climate governance has evolved considerably since 2021, when the country ratified the Paris Agreement after years of climate inaction.[34] This was followed by the announcement of a net-zero emissions target for 2053, subsequently reflected in its climate objectives (Nationally Determined Contributions, NDCs) submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2023.[35] These international commitments were accompanied by the gradual development of a domestic climate policy framework. The adoption of Climate Law No. 7552 in 2025[36] established a legal basis for mitigation and adaptation planning as well as introduced provisions for a national emissions trading system (TR-ETS). These measures also reflected the growing importance of carbon pricing and the implications of the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for Turkish industry and export competitiveness.[37] The decision to host COP31 in Antalya in November 2026 marked a further step in Türkiye's international climate engagement. Its shared presidency with Australia places Türkiye at the center of international discussions on climate governance.

However, the country's growing engagement in international climate governance has not taken place without domestic contestation. As international commitments translate into national legislation and policy measures, questions naturally arise over their implications, making open public debate, including criticism and competing perspectives, essential to legitimate and effective policymaking.[38] These processes involve changes and a degree of uncertainty, which can provide fertile ground for misleading narratives that exploit existing concerns through unfounded claims.[39]

In the context of climate governance, such narratives do not necessarily involve outright rejection of climate change. Research on discourses of "climate delay" identifies arguments that, rather than denying climate change, accept its existence but justify inaction or insufficient action, for instance, by redirecting responsibility or emphasizing the costs and downsides of climate policies.[40] In fact, in some online communities, acceptance of climate change coexists with new types of misinformation.[41] In Türkiye, these dynamics became increasingly visible following the ratification of the Paris Agreement in 2021, which prompted a shift in the government's climate discourse toward green developmentalism and fueled the rise of reactionary groups promoting anti-climate change rhetoric on social networks. Narratives were framed around concerns over environmental sovereignty, economic injustice, and population control, reinforcing nationalist grievances and a sense of collective victimhood.[42] Similar dynamics resurfaced during the legislative process of the Climate Law, where different forms of denial overlapped and reinforced one another.

An analysis of 225 original social media posts criticizing Türkiye's Climate Law published between February and July 2025 across four platforms identified six interconnected narratives centered

on individual freedoms, economic inequality, sovereignty conspiracies, cultural threats, scientific credibility, and democratic legitimacy. Social media users portrayed the legislation as a threat to everyday life, economic livelihoods, and national autonomy, including through claims about restrictions on farming, personal carbon footprint, and foreign control over Türkiye's natural resources.[43] The timing is significant as the sample span the legislative process, from the submission of the bill to the parliament to its publication in the Official Gazette. Another study analyzing 1,132 posts published on X between April and July 2025, when the issue was trending, under the hashtags #İklim KanununaHayır, #İklimTasmasınaHayır, #İklimAldatmacası (#NoToClimateLaw, #NoToClimateTax, and #ClimateDeception) reached similar conclusions. It identified national sovereignty concerns, economic and ecological anxieties, and conspiracy theories as central themes in the denialist discourse.[44] Claims about restrictions on individual freedoms and economic burdens primarily reflect solutions denial, presenting climate policies as inherently harmful or impractical. Attacks on the credibility of scientists and institutions contribute to agency denial, while the questioning of climate science itself reflects more traditional forms of denial. Conspiracy theories around foreign interference, global elites, and cultural threats illustrate public interest denial, framing climate measures as serving external or hidden agendas rather than the public interest.

Conclusions

The Mediterranean Basin is warming faster than the global average as a result of greenhouse gas emissions, while projections by climate models predict intensifying environmental pressures across the region. Addressing these challenges requires both accelerated emissions reductions and stronger adaptation measures to reduce exposure and vulnerability to climate impacts. However, the effectiveness of these responses depends not only on scientific evidence and appropriate instruments but also on how climate risks and measures are communicated, understood, and accepted by society. Access to reliable, evidence-based information enables informed decisions, while their public acceptance, also influenced by levels of trust in institutions, shapes whether climate policies can be adopted and sustained over time.

The two cases above show that climate misinformation extends beyond the outright rejection of climate change. Instead, they are largely articulated through new forms of denial. Misleading information can hamper climate resilience both by distorting the perception of climate change risks and by weakening public understanding of, and confidence in, the responses designed to address them. This does not mean that criticism of climate measures or disagreement over their implementation should be equated with disinformation. Public scrutiny of their costs, distributional effects, and effectiveness is an essential part of democratic debate. The distinction lies in whether claims about climate risks and policy implications are supported by verifiable evidence or rely on unfounded assertions.

By shaping perceptions of climate risks and the legitimacy of policy responses, systematic misinformation can complicate public debate, impact decision-making, and obstruct the implementation of effective climate policies. In an information environment saturated with content, where engagement is prioritized over accuracy, the ability to tell reliable from misleading information depends heavily on the sources people turn to. Strengthening information integrity requires more than

correcting individual false claims: it calls for accessible, transparent, and scientifically grounded communication, alongside effective collaboration between scientific institutions, public authorities, independent media, and fact-checking organizations. COP31 also offers an opportunity to build on the information integrity initiative launched at COP30 and carry this issue forward in international climate discussions. As Türkiye and neighboring Mediterranean countries face growing climate risks and advance their climate policy frameworks, ensuring that public debate is informed by reliable evidence will be essential to maintaining trust, supporting informed scrutiny, and strengthening the resilience of societies.

Notes

1 | Lara Lázaro-Touza et al., *Social perception of climate crisis issues and disinformation* (IBERIFIER, 2026), https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21491780.

2 | MedECC, "Climate and Environmental Change in the Mediterranean Basin: Current Situation and Risks for the Future," Mediterranean Experts on Climate and environmental Change, 2020, https://www.medecc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/MedECC_MAR1_SPM_ENG.pdf.

3 | Baris Kirdemir, "Exploring Turkey's Disinformation Ecosystem: An Overview," EDAM Cyber Governance and Digital Democracy 2020/04/EN2020, https://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Exploring-Turkeys-Disinformation-Ecosystem-by-Baris-Kirdemir.pdf.

4 | Emrah Budak and Enes Baloğlu, "Accurate Information Sharing and Combating Disinformation on Climate Change: A Comparison of Climatefeedback.org and Teyit.org," *Türk Kütüphaneciliği* 39, no. 3 (2025): 265–287, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/4666892.

5 | Paula Gori, *Climate Change Disinformation* (Springer Nature Switzerland, 2026), https://www.springerprofessional.de/en/climate-change-disinformation/51931212.

6 | Kirdemir, "Exploring Turkey's Disinformatoin Ecosystem."

7 | Kathie M. d'I. Treen, Hywel T. P. Williams, and Saffron J. O'Neill, "Online misinformation about climate change," *WIREs Climate Change* 11, no. 5 (2020): e665, https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.665.

8 | UNDP, "What Are Climate Misinformation and Disinformation and How Can We Tackle Them?" UNDRR PreventionWeb, 2025, https://www.preventionweb.net/news/what-are-climate-misinformation-and-disinformation-and-how-can-we-tackle-them.

9 | Gizem Ceylan and Wendy Wood, "From likes to trusts: How trust feedback reduces misinformation on social media," *Behavioural Science & Policy* 12, no.1 (2026), https://doi.org/10.1177/23794607261423714.

10 | Aviv Ovadya, "Deepfake Myths: Common Misconceptions About Synthetic Media," Alliance for Securing Democracy, June 14, 2019.

11 | İlker Kafalı and Cem Çalişkan, "Seeking the Truth Among Dead Crops: Carbon Footprint Victimhood, Platformed Conspiracism, and Climate Countermovement in Turkey," *International Journal of Communication* 20 (2026): 2631–2651, https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/26247/5558.

12 | Andrew White, "Overcoming 'confirmation bias' and the persistence of conspiratorial types of thinking," *Journal of Media & Cultural Studies* 36, no. 3 (2022): 364–376, https://doi.org/10.1080/10304312.2021.1992352.

13 | Alberto Acerbi, "Cognitive attraction and online misinformation," *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications* 5, no. 15 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0224-y.

14 | Stephan Lewandowsky, "Climate Change Disinformation and How to Combat it," *Annual Review of Public Health* 42 (2021): 1–21, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-090419-102409.

15 | Sander van der Linden, Anthony Leiserowitz, Seth Rosenthal, and Edward Maibach, "Inoculating the Public against Misinformation about Climate Change," *Global Challenges* 1, no. 2 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1002/gch2.201600008.

16 | Marco Delmastro and Antonio Manganelli, "Disinformation Economics" in Lisa Ginsborg and Paula Gori (eds.), *Disinformation: A Multi-Disciplinary Analysis* (Springer, 2026): 57–69, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-00480-2.

17 | UNDP, "What Are Climate Misinformation and Disinformation."

18 | Treen, Williams, and O'Neill, "Online misinformation."

19 | Lázaro-Touza et al., "Social perception of climate crisis issues and disinformation."

20 | IPCC, "Cross-Chapter Paper 4: Mediterranean Region" in *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Cambridge University Press, 2022): 2233–2272, doi:10.1017/9781009325844.021.

21 | Bikem Ekberzade, Tolga Görüm, Furkan Karabacak, Semih Sami Akay, and Ömer Lütfi Şen, "Up in flames: the human factor behind a megafire in Mediterranean Türkiye," *npj Natural Hazards* 2, no. 65 (2025), https://doi.org/10.1038/s44304-025-00120-4.

22 | World Weather Attribution, "Weather conditions leading to deadly wildfires in Türkiye, Cyprus and Greece made 10 times more likely due to climate change," Center for Environmental Policy, 2025, https://doi.org/10.25560/123302.

23 | Viktoria Cologna et al., "Extreme weather event attribution predicts climate policy support across the world," *Nature Climate Change* 15 (2025): 725–735, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-025-02372-4.

24 | Kiley Price, "Many People Aren't Connecting the Dots Between Climate Change and Extreme Weather," *Inside Climate News*, September 8, 2026, https://insideclimatenews.org/news/08092026/todays-climate-extreme-weather-attribution-disconnect/.

25 | Isabell Richter, Elizabeth Gabe-Thomas, Ana M. Queirós, Stephen R.J. Sheppard, and Sabine Pahl, "Advancing the potential impact of future scenarios by integrating psychological principles," *Environmental Science and Policy* 140 (2023): 68–79, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2022.11.015.

26 | Sonya Hilberts, Mark Govers, Elena Petelos, and Silvia Evers, "The Impact of Misinformation on Social Media in the Context of Natural Disasters: Narrative Review," *JMIR Infodemiology* 5, no. e70413 (2025), https://infodemiology.jmir.org/2025/1/e70413/.

27 | Kadriye Kobak and Şuheda Soğukdere, "Sosyal Medyadaki Dezenformasyon: 2021 Türkiye Orman Yangınları Örneği," *Uluslararası Medya ve İletişim Araştırmaları Hakemli Dergisi* 4, no. 2 (2021): 167–189, https://doi.org/10.33464/mediaj.990600.

28 | Besire Korkmaz and Seçil Türkkan, "Alevlerin ortasında ve henüz kanıt yokken Türkiye: İklim krizi mi, sabotaj mı?" *Teyit,* August 3, 2021, https://teyit.org/dosya/alevlerin-ortasinda-ve-henuz-kanit-yokken-turkiye-iklim-krizi-mi-sabotaj-mi.

29 | Kafalı and Çalışkan, "Seeking the Truth Among Dead Crops."

30 | Daniel Stockemer and Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau, "Understanding climate change conspiracy beliefs: A comparative outlook," *Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review* 5, no. 6, Special Issue on Conspiracy Theories (2024), https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-162.

31 | Esra Özgür, "Orman yangınlarında sabotaj iddiaları Türkiye'ye has değil," *Teyit,* August 11, 2021, https://teyit.org/teyitpedia/orman-yanginlarinda-sabotaj-iddialari-turkiyeye-has-degil.

32 | Stefan Daume, "Online misinformation during extreme weather emergencies: short-term information hazard or long-term influence on climate change perceptions?" *Environmental Research Communications* 6, no. 2 (2025), doi.org/10.1088/2515-7620/ad1b67.

33 | Cologna et al., "Extreme weather event attribution."

34 | Kafalı and Çalışkan, "Seeking the Truth Among Dead Crops."

35 | Republic of Türkiye, "Updated First Nationally Determined Contribution," United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2023, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2023-04/TÜRKİYE_UPDATED%201st%20NDC_EN.pdf.

36 | Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, İklim Kanunu. Kanun No. 7552. (Climate Law No. 7552) Resmî Gazete, Sayı 32951, July 9, 2025.

37 | Murad Karaduman, Dilan Acar, and Sibel Karaduman, "Marketizing Climate Policy in a Polarized Media Landscape: A Critical Discourse Analysis of News Coverage on Türkiye's Climate Law," *Journalism and Media* 7, no. 3 (2026): 146, https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia7030146.

38 | Graham Blue, "Public Deliberation with Climate Change: Opening up or Closing down Policy Options?" *Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law* 24, no. 2 (2015): 152–159, https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12122.

39 | Başar Baysal, Muhammed Onur Çöpoğlu, and Çağla Vural, "Disinformation Campaign During the Climate Law Process: Rising Counter-Narratives on Social Media and Societal Vulnerability," SETA, March 17, 2026, https://www.setav.org/en/disinformation-campaign-during-the-climate-law-process-rising-counter-narratives-on-social-media-and-societal-vulnerability.

40 | William F. Lamb et al., "Discourses of climate delay," *Global Sustainability* 3, e17 (2020): 1–5, https://doi.org/10.1017/sus.2020.13.

41 | Lluis de Nadal, "From Denial to the Culture Wars: A Study of Climate Misinformation on YouTube," *Environmental Communication* 18, no. 8 (2024): 1186–1203, https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2024.2363861.

42 | Kafalı and Çalışkan, "Seeking the Truth Among Dead Crops."

43 | Baysal, Çöpoğlu, and Vural, "Disinformation Campaing During the Climate Law Process."

44 | Ayşe Seda Aslan and Mutluhan Çamur, "Dijital Çağda İklim Bilgi Düzensizliği: Türkiye'de Yürürlüğe Giren İklim Kanunu'na İlişkin 'X' Platformunda Yapılan Paylaşımların Tematik Analizi," *Etkileşim* 17 (2026): 364–395, https://doi.org/10.32739/etkilesim.2026.9.17.342.

About the Istanbul Policy Center-Sabancı University-Stiftung Mercator Initiative

The Istanbul Policy Center–Sabancı University–Stiftung Mercator Initiative aims to strengthen the academic, political, and social ties between Turkey and Germany as well as Turkey and Europe. The Initiative is based on the premise that the acquisition of knowledge and the exchange of people and ideas are preconditions for meeting the challenges of an increasingly globalized world in the 21st century. The Initiative focuses on two areas of cooperation, EU/German-Turkish relations and climate change, which are of essential importance for the future of Turkey and Germany within a larger European and global context.

Andrea Briones is a 2026 Mercator–IPC Short-Term Visiting Fellow at IPC.

The interpretations and conclusions made in this paper belong solely to the author and do not reflect IPC's official position.

Beyond Climate Denial:
Misinformation on Climate-Related
Extreme Events and Policies in Türkiye
12 p.; 25 cm. - (Istanbul Policy Center-Sabancı University-Stiftung Mercator Initiative)

Cover Design and Page Layout: MYRA

Istanbul Policy Center
Bankalar Caddesi Minerva Han No: 2 Kat: 4
34420 Karaköy-İstanbul
T +90 212 292 49 39
ipc@sabanciuniv.edu - ipc.sabanciuniv.edu

IPC | ISTANBUL POLICY CENTER
SABANCI UNIVERSITY
STIFTUNG MERCATOR INITIATIVE