Turkish Foreign Policy and The Qatar Crisis

Introduction

The recent shuttle diplomacy of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been yet another futile attempt to resolve the ongoing crisis between Qatar and the Saudi-led coalition, namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and Bahrain. The resurfacing of the intra-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis has turned out to be another setback for Ankara’s regional ambitions. Dubious and cautious about the Trump-led, anti-Iranian Arab-Israeli coalition, the Turkish preference to stand straddled between the Arabs and Iranians has lost further ground as Turkey and Qatar have voiced similar geopolitical reasoning in regional policy and formed alliances on a number of regional issues including the Syria crisis and the Palestinian question. Overall, the cornering and eventual isolation of Qatar from Arab geopolitics not only largely undermines Turkish access to the Gulf region but also dilapidates Turkey’s ability to support like-minded groups and movements from Syria to Egypt and Libya.

New Politics, Old Habits

In examining the Qatar crisis, Turkey has been limited by its dilemma of being stuck between hard- and soft-power preferences. It is rather paradoxical that Turkey seeks to provide a security guarantee for Qatar by establishing a military base in the country and holding a strictly pro-Qatari position while also offering Turkish mediation to both parties. President Erdoğan has appealed to Saudi leadership to play up to its role as “the elder brother” of the Gulf monarchies and restore relations with Qatar. To that end, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu paid visits to Doha, Kuwait City, and Riyadh in mid-June to carry messages of reconciliation.12 Erdoğan then accentuated these efforts one month later by paying follow-up visits to these countries.12 Ankara seems to be seeking inroads to mediate the conflict; however, the Saudi-led coalition is reluctant to let Turkey play that role. It swiftly turned down Turkey’s offer for mediation.

Conclusion

The Saudis appear cool-headed and reluctant to be embroiled in conflict with Turkey, which would put Saudi regional interests further in jeopardy as such a conflict carries the potential to push Turkey toward further cooperation with Iran. Erdoğan has likewise been cautious not to agitate the Saudis and has left room for a way out of the crisis on amicable terms. Lately, the crisis has shown signs of settling down, especially after U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit to Doha to sign a joint defense agreement as well as his willingness to see through an end to the embargo against Qatar. In the meantime, the 13-point ultimatum for Qatar has been reduced to six points, which now excludes the closure of the Turkish military base and Al Jazeera news agency.