Behind Döner Diplomacy: The Turkish Diaspora's Exaggerated Public Agenda-Shaping Power in Germany

Executive Summary

This analysis argues that German policy circles have exaggerated the public agenda-shaping potential of the Turkish diaspora. Although Turkey has established strong influence over the conservative segment of its diaspora in Germany since 2002, and most voters in Germany cast their ballot for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, they have not become political agenda-setters. Yet, German policy circles bring in the diaspora as one of the main reasons to keep Turkey close despite democratic backsliding and differences on foreign policy themes. This is because Berlin needs Ankara to halt migration and thereby mitigate the surge of the far-right in Germany. However, human rights advocates have criticized both Germany and the EU for extra-territorializing human rights violations, specifically through the 2016 EU-Turkey migration deal. This makes it difficult for the incumbent German coalition government, which promised a value-based foreign policy, to continue engaging Turkey. Thus, exaggerating the Turkish diaspora’s role in bilateral relations is a way of justifying to foreign policy partners and to the primarily pro-immigration, liberal German public that Berlin needs to keep Turkey close.

Conclusion 

Turkey has established a strong grip over the conservative segment of its diaspora in Germany since the AKP came to power in 2002. This gives the impression that the Turkish diaspora is a potential agenda-setter in Germany. However, German policymakers have partially exaggerated this danger to German democracy. On the one hand, the Turkish state’s attempts to control its citizens abroad are a threat to the sovereignty of Germany, which Berlin has taken measures to counteract. Yet, on the other, the oftenmentioned large-scale political mobilization of the diaspora has yet to be achieved. Although the majority of the Turkish diaspora in Germany prefer Erdoğan, this support has not translated into political activism inside Germany: for instance, mass support behind a German party serving the AKP’s agenda. Nevertheless, referring to the diaspora as a potential threat comes with benefits for both German and Turkish policymakers. On the one hand, for Germany, this implies that there is a justifiable reason why Chancellor Scholz and President Steinmeier need to engage President Erdoğan amid heavy anti-Turkey sentiment in German society and rule of law deficiencies in Turkey. This is not to argue that Germany should not engage Turkey but to shed light on the fact that, among other reasons, the German government uses the Turkish diaspora to justify why it does not adhere to its values-oriented foreign policy principles. On the other hand, for Turkey, the engagement provides gradually narrowing access to its diaspora and allows German policymakers to exchange views in other fields, such as migration and EU integration.