Can the EU Clean Politics in Enlargement Countries? Turkey in Comparison

Executive Summary

This commentary examines the limits of the European Union's transformative power in combating corruption in enlargement countries, with a comparative focus on Bulgaria and Turkey. While the EU is often perceived as a force capable of promoting clean governance and strengthening the rule of law, its actual capacity to engineer deep institutional change is far more constrained. The rule of law is not a policy "deliverable" imposed from Brussels but a domestic responsibility rooted in national institutions, political culture, and societal consensus. The EU's experience with Bulgaria and Romania—where post-accession monitoring under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) has yielded limited results—demonstrates that formal legislative reforms and institutional redesigns do not necessarily translate into genuine accountability or the dismantling of state capture networks.

In Turkey's case, the EU's leverage is even weaker due to stalled accession negotiations and declining credibility of the membership perspective. Unlike in Bulgaria and Romania, Turkish elites face little incentive to simulate compliance with EU standards. Moreover, public tolerance toward high-level corruption remains significant, as demonstrated by electoral support for the ruling AKP despite major corruption allegations in 2013. Economic growth, political polarization, and charismatic leadership have outweighed concerns over transparency and judicial independence. The article concludes that sustainable anti-corruption reform cannot be imposed externally; it requires a critical mass of domestic actors—citizens, institutions, and civil society—willing to demand accountability. Opening negotiation chapters on judiciary and fundamental rights (Chapters 23 and 24) may be necessary, but it is far from sufficient to transform governance without deep societal change.