Mapping Turkish Actors in Climate Change Policies

Executive Summary

The multilateral climate policy process in Turkey began in 2004, the year the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was ratified and intense diplomacy was conducted to launch accession negotiations with the European Union. Intense debates—resulting from public interest sparked by the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the US in the same year, and the 2006-2007 drought in Turkey—lasted until 2009, the year Turkey became a party to the Kyoto Protocol and the inconclusive Copenhagen Summit was held. In subsequent years, efforts focused on Turkey completing its obligations arising from the Convention, such as national communications and action plans, and projects carried out for capacity building in the public sector. The civil climate movement also began to form as of 2005; the work of non-governmental organizations, particularly environmental organizations, intensified after 2009. The private sector also became a more active actor during those same years.

Climate policies can be defined as a policy area that includes the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change, the development of financial tools and technologies required for this purpose, and adaptation to the effects of climate change. Policies related to fossil fuel energy production, cement, iron and steel, transportation, construction, agriculture, livestock, forestry, etc., which are among the sectors causing the most greenhouse gas emissions, as well as general economic and development policies, are closely related to climate policies. However, rather than treating climate change as a secondary issue under the heading of environment and as separate from policies regarding these areas—which are determined by other dynamics, primarily market dynamics and growth policies—it is more functional to define climate policies as a specific policy area directly related to the tools for combating climate change. All individuals and groups attempting to influence climate policies or making formal or informal initiatives for this purpose are defined as policy actors.

This actor map considers all parties from the public and civil sectors together, in light of the development of projects, publications, and positions on policies, while also taking into account global and local developments influencing the process. It is hoped that such a map, which addresses actors from different sectors together on a horizontal plane, can be a starting point for a negotiation ground that could be developed in the coming period. This report also outlines the development of climate policies and the climate movement in Turkey.

Although there are serious constraints regarding participation and debate in Turkey, there is a policy-making process in place involving government and non-governmental parties, including climate policies. However, how the process is operated, how effective it is, who participates, and whether an open, participatory, and auditable policy-making process exists remain important problem areas. As a result of the EU negotiation process and reforms in public administration, an approach corresponding to a governance perspective—such as strategy determination and project meetings or joint project implementations involving the private sector, civil society, and other sectors—has begun to become widespread in Turkey as well. However, the understanding dominant in the state bureaucracy at the decision-making and implementation stages is closer to the traditional public administration approach, which deems consultation, rather than negotiation, appropriate with other actors. Nevertheless, both the public administration—which carries the potential for change under the influence of global change and reforms—and the increasing role of the private sector and the growing climate movement make a more democratic and multilateral policy process possible.

Although Turkey has participated in international climate policies since the Second World Climate Conference held in 1990, the process before 2004 was limited to the public sector. Turkey did not take an active stance due to its inclusion among developed countries in the Annexes of the Convention in 1992, and only struggled to be removed from the Annexes and to be recognized as a developing country. Following Turkey's removal from Annex II (which envisioned providing financial aid to developing countries) in 2001 and the emphasis on its "special circumstances" among Annex I members, the Convention was ratified; however, an active stance was not adopted in the ensuing process either. Turkey's climate policies can be defined as "special circumstances policies."

Turkey has not leaned toward adopting any mitigation targets, and the adopted strategies and action plans are far from providing mitigation. In Turkey, which aims to further increase energy policies dependent on coal and other fossil fuels, it cannot be said that a real political will exists to combat climate change, despite preparatory studies, the emphasis on the threat of climate change at the discourse level, and capacity building in the bureaucracy.

Turkey is expected to become a party to the new climate regime expected to be established at the Paris Summit in 2015, by determining a "reduction from increase" target that will limit the rate of emission growth if a critical mass is reached—that is, if a sufficient number of countries participate in the agreement. However, it is argued that this target should not be binding, but rather flexible and dynamic. By requesting the reorganization of the Annexes, Turkey also maintains its claim to participate in the process like developing countries through Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)—that is, through projects that will not place a burden on the budget. Turkey continues its path as a country that has failed to reconcile its economic and development policies with climate policies, and has instead increased the importance it gives to adaptation policies rather than mitigation. The loss of momentum in EU negotiations also weakens climate policies.

The climate movement, which became quite visible with street protests and campaigns from the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005 until the 2009 Copenhagen Summit—creating significant pressure especially for Turkey to ratify the Kyoto Protocol—experienced disappointment and lost its strength after the failure of Copenhagen. The climate movement has recently begun to revive under the influence of the Climate Network (İklim Ağı), established by large environmental organizations coming together, and the global movement that started before the Paris Summit. In recent years, think tanks and universities have also become more visible actors in terms of policy production.

The actors influencing Turkey's climate policies can be classified into six groups: The public sector, the private sector, international organizations, civil society, academia, and the media. Public institutions are the primary actors forming policies. Private sector representatives, participating through unions and associations such as TOBB and TÜSİAD in the Climate Change and Air Management Coordination Board (İDHYKK), which ensures the coordination of the climate policy bureaucracy, have also become effective actors in determining policies, especially in recent years. Companies that are part of the global system, in particular, have begun to take an explicit stance in climate policies with motivations such as reducing costs through efficiency and energy saving, gaining a competitive advantage with new technologies, and becoming more attractive to investors through sustainability management. However, in general, the influence of sectors with high emissions such as energy, cement, and iron-steel, combined with the concerns of SMEs with limited flexibility about losing existing business areas, brings a defensive stance to the fore in climate policies.

In the public sector, the most decisive ministries in climate policies are the Ministries of Environment and Urbanization, Forestry and Water Affairs, Development, and Foreign Affairs. In particular, the Ministry of Development, which views environment and development as conflicting areas, and the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, where energy strategies based on fossil fuels dominate, appear as the most defensive ministries against following active climate policies and mitigation targets. The economic bureaucracy stands on the same line due to concerns that climate policies will bring a burden to the budget and reduce competitiveness in foreign trade. Although the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, which is tasked with coordinating climate policies, is in favor of taking a more open position, it cannot be sufficiently effective. International organizations such as the UNDP and REC have also been among the most active actors in the creation of climate policies, although their roles and influence have decreased in recent years. It can be said that the most decisive actors in climate policies are the political and high-level economic boards, namely the High Planning Council and the Economic Coordination Council.

Civil society organizations, networks, platforms, and social movements can be examined as international and Turkish environmental NGOs, think tanks, and vocational-expert NGOs. Civil society generally plays a role as a warning, mobilizing, and compelling actor. Although platforms and social movements, especially those with ties to the global climate movement, are effective through actions and campaigns, these activities lack continuity and remain dependent on individuals. Some international environmental organizations and think tanks play a role in the production of information and policy. Think tanks with relations to the private sector and public institutions are also becoming increasingly active actors. Studies on climate policies in academia are far from sufficient, but interest in the subject has been increasing in universities in recent years. As for the media, it cannot be considered an effective actor except for independent and alternative organizations such as Açık Radyo and some internet newspapers. The mainstream media fails to bring climate change to the agenda sufficiently even during major climate disasters and international conferences, and is inadequate in establishing the connections of the subject with economy and politics.

Public, private sector, and civil society actors have different structures that ensure coordination and cooperation among themselves, such as İDHYKK, the Climate Network, and the Climate Platform. İDHYKK also provides dialogue between the public and private sectors, but is closed to civil society and academia. Academia, on the other hand, has not yet been able to create a cooperation network within itself. There is also no permanent structure where actors cooperate or negotiate with actors outside their own fields. The public sector invites civil society to some project meetings and workshops, but there is no criterion for how the selection is made, nor are there mechanisms to ensure that civil society influences policies. There is also no dialogue regarding climate policies between the private sector and environmental organizations. The public sector utilizes scientists working on climate change as consultants and establishes relations through conferences and projects. However, the view that this relationship is insufficient and unproductive is widespread, especially in the academic sector. It can be said that there are healthier relations between academia and civil society, particularly through individuals who are present on both sides.

In 2015, when the Paris Conference will convene to establish the new climate regime, Turkey will host the G20 meeting for the first time. This increases Turkey's role in the Paris process. It is more possible than ever for Turkey to play a positive role in the solution to climate change by strengthening its profile and performance. Turkey has taken important steps to create the infrastructure for climate policies. However, it does not yet possess the political determination that is a prerequisite for combating climate change. Turkey needs to be able to create policies that are functional and embraced by society, which it needs primarily to save its own future. For this, it must first solve the problem of transparency and participation and create a real debate process where all actors come together on a democratic negotiation ground.