Political Engineering Through Law: Hungary and Beyond

This paper investigates the way authoritarian regimes employ the law as a method of control and legitimization by focusing on the example of Hungary and extrapolating the lessons to authoritarian movements across the world.

The author begins by discussing the history of Hungary after the fall of Communism in 1989. Hungary initially had a very successful democratic transition, with strong political institutions, a multi-party system, and a vibrant free press, culminating in their accession to the EU in 2004. This began to change with Viktor Orbán’s super majority in 2010. Orbán engaged in political reform, centralizing power and undermining democratic institutions.

Orbán’s authoritarianism used the law as a tool of power and legitimacy, the paper argues. Rather than ruling without the constraints of law, Orbán massively reshaped the legal system to consolidate his control, transforming the law from a neutral arbiter to an instrument for
remaking society. Accelerated legislating, judicial restructuring, legal ambiguity, and emergency powers have all helped this process.

The author also notes similar processes in Serbia, Poland, and especially Turkey. In both Hungary and Turkey, the ruling government reshaped the legal institutions to centralize power while maintaining adherence to the legal system. Both countries did this by routinizing states of exception, allowing the legal system to serve political ends while maintaining a façade of institutional formality.

Introduction

It is often assumed that autocratic leaders view the rule of law primarily as an impediment—a system of constraints they must circumvent or dismantle to exercise unrestrained power. In this conventional understanding, authoritarian regimes are either seen as outright lawless or as possessing legal systems that are fundamentally devoid of societal or normative value.1 However, empirical cases such as Hungary and Turkey challenge this assumption, revealing a more complex and strategically calculated relationship between authoritarian governance and law. Rather than abandoning legality, contemporary autocratic leaders have become increasingly adept at appropriating legal norms, institutions, and discourses as tools for consolidating power and legitimizing their rule. Far from being incidental, this performance of legality serves both domestic and international functions: it sustains the appearance of constitutional governance, placates international critics, and bolsters regime legitimacy among domestic audiences.